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FOREWORD
Although the following study is intended to have general appli­
cations to the subject of resource taxation, four states are selected 
for detailed consideration -- Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan and Texas.
The bases for these selections should be noted for the information of the 
reader.
Michigan appears, not because she is a leader in the collection 
of resource taxes, but because she was a pioneer in the development of 
special forest taxation. Her system of forest taxation represents one 
of the most sophisticated structures of special taxes in this resource 
area.
Arkansas and Louisiana exemplify those states who have adopted 
extensive applications of resource taxes, especially severance taxes.
Texas and Louisiana are the leading states in volume of re- 
source-tax yields, and are among the few states in which resource taxes 
account for a substantial percentage of total tax collections.
A varied portrayal of resouree-tax applications and policicies 
is gained from the consideration of these states. Although the four 
states could be hardly called a "cross-section” of states applying re­
source taxes, their cases do run a broad spectrum of applications and 
yields for this type of tax.
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ABSTRACT
The taxation of natural resources raises questions of policy 
and application which are unique among taxes levied on production.
This is especially true at the level of basic extraction of the re­
sources, and it is this level of resource taxation which is the sub­
ject of this study. In addition to the usual questions of repressive 
effects upon enterprise, taxation of basic resources raises questions 
of conservation and the orderly exploitation of commodities which are, 
by nature, subject to depletion, and often not subject to renewal by 
human effort.
Concern for the special problems of natural resources dates 
from the Nineteenth Century in the United States, but the adoption of 
special forms of taxation for basic-resource industries dates from about 
1911, with the development of special types of forest taxation in the 
state of Michigan, and in other areas where the timber industry has 
suffered the ravages of uncontrolled logging. The so-called "yield- 
tax" variation on property taxes, by which the timber owner is relieved 
of part or all the annual burden of the ad valorem property tax, paying 
instead a specified sum (or percentage of value) at time of harvest of 
the timber, was largely developed at this time. The aim of this form 
of tax was to relieve the timber owner of harsh burdens of property tax 
until he was best able to pay.
Severance taxes (privilege taxes on the act of removing natural 
resources from the soil or water) were developed during the 1920's, and
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are applied to a wide variety of natural resources among numerous states. 
The tax may be applied either in addition to or in lieu of other taxes, 
depending on the policy chosen.
The survey states selected for this study vary widely in the im­
portance of their natural resource industries, and in the manner in which 
they tax such industries. Texas and Louisiana possess massive abundance 
in natural-resource wealth, particularly minerals. Arkansas and Michigan 
realize substantially smaller amounts from the basic resource industries, 
though Michigan's industries are more productive of wealth than those of 
Arkansas.
Taxation of natural resources in the survey states differs 
widely, both in scope of application and yields realized from the taxes. 
Texas and Louisiana receive substantial sums from the taxation of minerals 
industries, and these taxes (severance taxes, for the most part) are im­
portant elements in the tax structures of the states. By contrast, 
Arkansas and Michigan realize only very minor portions of their tax 
revenues from natural-resource levies.
While Arkansas, Louisiana and Michigan levy severance taxes on 
timber resources, Texas does not. Michigan and Louisiana provide yield- 
tax modifications of the property tax for timber producers, but Arkansas 
and Texas do not offer such special option to this group.
Applications under the minerals severance levies of Arkansas 
and Louisiana are extensive, covering a broad number of categories.
Texas levies severance taxes against petroleum products and sulfur, but 
does not extend this tax to other minerals categories. Michigan's 
severance tax is limited to petroleum products.
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The study seeks to analyze patterns of shifting, incidences 
and effects for severance taxes, noting the nature of market structures 
in which the products are traded, and the economic power of owners, 
developers and processors as pertinent factors in determining these 
patterns.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: SPECIAL ASPECTS AND POLICY PROBLEMS
IN THE TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
"The value of land....expresses the exchange value 
of monopoly. It is not in any case the creation of the
individual who owns the land; it is created by the growth
of the community. Hence, the community can take it all
without in any way lessening the production of wealth." 1
Thus did Henry George describe the appropriateness of a "single tax" on 
the value of "land" and the economic rents derived therefrom, to the ex­
clusion of all other forms of taxation. 2 The suggestion of Mr. George 
notwithstanding, the tax structures of modern nations comprise a variety
of tax sources, although land taxation does appear to be virtually univer­
sal as a basis for taxation. For the purposes of this study, it will be
desirable to utilize the expanded definition of "land" used by the econo­
mist: that is, a term embracing all natural resources. At the same time,
it is desired to exclude the consideration of man-made improvements to the 
land, such as structures, augmentations to land fertility and other things 
arising out of the expended efforts of individuals. In embarking on a 
study of the taxation of natural resources for the four survey states —  
Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, and Texas —  it would appear proper to 
develop some criteria for judging the effectiveness of such taxation in 
achieving policy goals regarded as appropriate by consensus of students 
in the field of resource taxation.
1George, Henry, Progress and Poverty, Book VIII, Ch. Ill
gIbid., Book I, Ch. III.
2With the above consideration in mind, the present chapter is de­
voted to a survey of the special character of resources taxation as dis­
tinguished from other taxes, and to the unique problems associated with 
this form of taxation. The subject of "land" taxation, as it applies to 
natural resources, has become substantially more complex and difficult in 
practice than Mr. George may have anticipated when he said:3
"...With perhaps the exception of certain licenses and stamp 
duties...which can be relied on for only a trivial amount of 
revenue, a tax upon land values can, of all taxes, be most 
easily and cheaply collected. For land cannot be hidden or 
carried off, its value can be readily ascertained, and the 
assessment once made, nothing but a receiver is required for 
collection."
A. Taxes Applied to Natural Resource Industries:
Severance, Yield and Related Levies
Natural resources possess a unique character, and, therefore, 
have given rise to unique forms of taxation. To the extent that they are 
to be considered a part of the common and social wealth of a region, so 
has society demanded that a portion of the value arising from their exploi­
tation and development is due to the community. This is partly recompense 
for the loss of this wealth, and partly for the purpose of furthering 
public projects to replace and/or conserve such resources. This duality 
of motive in the taxation of natural resources should become apparent in 
the examination which follows.
Severance Taxes. These levies constitute the most active and 
most productive of revenue among the taxes on resources, though their
3George, 0£. Cit., Book VIII, Ch. Ill, p. 4l4.
3yield among all tax sources for states is quite modest (of $48.8 billions 
of total state revenue, and $2 6 .1 billions in tax revenues for the states 
in 1965, severance taxes accounted for only $503 millions).4 For a hand­
ful of states, however, the severance tax is a major source of tax reve­
nue, and, indeed, of total state revenue. In 1965) for example, of total 
tax revenues in the state of Louisiana of $581 millions, severance taxes 
accounted for $179 millions, or 3 0 .8 percent; for Texas, the totals were 
$1,187 millions, $202 millions and 17 percent; for New Mexico, $188 mil­
lions, $28 millions and about 15 percent. These, however, are exceptions; 
most states levying severance taxes do not depend upon them heavily as a 
source of tax revenue. Table I following gives more detailed evidence of 
this generalization for those states levying severance taxes, and report­
ing revenues from them in 1965*
The severance tax is customarily levied on the act of severing 
natural resources from the earth, principally when the objective is clear­
ly connected with a commercial purpose. The levy of the tax is generally 
upon the "severer" of the resource, not necessarily upon the owner (though, 
by implication, the owner may bear all or part of the burden if the severer 
is successful in shifting the tax backward. See Chapter V on shifting and 
incidence of the tax). Marquis5 characterizes the severance taxes as prop­
erly "...privilege taxes imposed additional to other taxes..."6 and not
4Compendium of State Government Finance, Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Dept, of Commerce, 1965, pp. 19* 21: Table 7 --Revenue by Source, I965.
Marquis, Ralph W., "Severance Taxes on Forest Products and 
Their Relation to Forestry", Land Economics, Vol. 25, No. 3, August, 19^9, 
p. 318, col. 1.
sIbid.
4Table I
Severance Tax Collections in Dollars for 1965 
and Rank in Dollar Volume of Collections1 
(Thousands of Dollars)
Dollar Volume Severance Tax
Rank   State  Collections in 1965
1 Texas 202,285
2 Louisiana 179,085
3 Oklahoma 38,483
4 New Mexico 27,637
5 Minnesota 17,367
6 Mississippi 11,986
7 Arkansas 4,6i4
8 North Dakota 3,40 6
9 Alaska 3,123
10 Utah 3,H8
11 Montana 2,886
12 California 1,283
13 Colorado 1,250
14 Michigan 1,046
15 Nebraska 1,029
16 Oregon 737
17 Kansas 530
18 Virginia 356
19 Indiana 310
20 South Dakota 288
21 Kentucky 285
22 Idaho 174
23 Wisconsin 130
24 Florida 89
25 Wyoming 73
26 New Hampshire 54
27 Missouri 30
28 Nevada 12
Total All States
Reporting...........  503,3702
1. Adapted from: Compendium of State Finances, Bureau of the 
Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1965- Table J -- 
Revenue by Source, p. 21, col. 6.
2. Figures do not add to total due to rounding.
as a substitute for other taxes. The tax "...operates as a lein on the 
severed...products until paid, or, in some states, until the products are 
sold."7 Williams8 identifies the severance tax as an "...occupation, 
privilege, or license tax..."9 not to be confused with a property tax, 
as it is charged against the act of severing, and not the severed property 
itself.10 Thus, the apparent intent is to assess the social cost inherent 
in the removal of natural resources, in part at least, against the person - 
or firm actually removing them. There is no assurance, however, that the 
severer will ultimately bear all or even part of this burden directly, as 
the commercial nature of his activity provides a basis for tax shifting.
The subject of shifting of taxes on natural resources will be considered 
more fully in the chapter devoted to that subject (Ch. V), but it may be 
appropriate to briefly consider the possibilities open to the severer 
attendant to the severance tax.
The severer, as an exploiter of the natural resource, frequently 
secures his rights to such exploitation from the owner of the resource 
lands by leasehold claims to the mineral or other resources, paying the 
owner a consideration for the privilege. To the extent that a severance 
tax reduces the net expectations of the severer negotiating such leasehold 
(and attendant royalty agreements), he may seek to "capitalize" the burden
7Ibid., Col. 2.
8Williams, Ellis.. T., "Trends in Forest Taxation", National Tax 
Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 2, June, 19&1, PP- 113“^ -•
9Ibid., p. 129.
10Williams, 0p_. Cit. , Loc. Cit.
6of the tax by a reduction in the amounts offered for the resources; i.e., 
based on the expected reduction in net proceeds for all materials he may 
remove during the entire recovery period. To the extent that the owner 
has no comparably-remunerative use for the lands, and few bidders appear 
for the resources, the extent of the backward shift tends to be magnified. 
Backward shifting of a severance tax presents a potentially-damaging pros­
pect when fully or largely implemented, as suggested by Marquis:11
"...while a severance tax of as much as 50s£ on lumber selling at
$60 per M at the mill might not seem exhorbitant, it assumes
greater relative importance when shifted to the timber owner 
selling stumpage for $10."
Conceivably, such a levy might render only marginal resource lands unecono­
mic, but there are also implications for conservation, which will be ex­
amined in the subsequent section of this chapter devoted to that subject.
Gronouski12 notes that the application of severance taxes to 
mineral fuels (e.g., oil, natural gas, coal) and to timber is most common, 
although "...a few states, notably Arkansas and Louisiana, use this method 
for taxing a wide variety of natural resources."13
Yield Taxes. This category of tax is not cus-tomarily an addi­
tional form of taxation, but rather constitutes a form of property taxation 
in lieu of the traditional ad valorem property tax—levied annually. Basi­
cally, the yield tax is a property tax, but one which is levied so that it 
falls due at the time the resource property is converted (or harvested).
110E . Cit., p. 31 7, Col. 2.
12Gronouski, John A., et. al., "Taxation of Mineral Resources," 
Michigan Tax Study Staff Papers, Lansing, Mich. 1956, pp. 3^3-60.
13Ibid., p. 3^8.
Thus, properties classified under the yield tax would be taxable only 
once; the resource owner is relieved of the annual burden of a tax on 
property which is either not ready for harvest (as in the case of stand­
ing, immature timber), or cannot most economically be marketed due to 
present conditions of demand ( as in the case of petroleum or other mineral 
reserves). The yield tax has not been a generally big producer of reve­
nues, either for the states1 general funds or for the local governments' 
property-tax collectors, and, indeed, appears not to have been intended 
for this purpose. Williams14 suggests that the early concern for the 
"problems of forestry" was a principal underlying cause for the develop­
ment of the yield-tax concept.15 A study conducted under the sponsorship 
of the Forestry Service of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, and pub­
lished in 1933 details special forest tax laws existing at that time, and 
reveals that most yield taxes only reduced the burden of property taxation, 
or, at the very least, provided for more favorable timing.16
The most extensive application of the yield-tax principle has 
been in the area of forest and timber products, and much of the form of 
yield taxes is derived from the specific needs of forests and forestry. 
Development and conservation, rather than fiscal yield, appear to have 
been the overriding considerations throughout the development of yield 
taxes on timber. Williams dates the development of the yield-tax concept
140p. Cit.
15Ibid., ,p. 113.
lsFairchild, Fred Rogers, and Associates, "Forest Taxation in the 
United States", USDA Misc. Publication Mo. 218, Forestry Service, U. S. 
Department of Agriculture, Washington, 1939* Table 120; pp. 39^“99*
8from a "movement for timber exemption" from ad valorem property levies in 
the state of Nebraska during the years IQ59-6I, though "..occasional 
attempts to deal with forest problems... had been made previously.1117 The 
"Fairchild Report" identified lb laws designated "yield-tax" in 13 states 
(Michigan had two such laws) as of July 1, 1933j with 33 states in all pro­
viding some special property-tax benefits to forest owners.18
Numerous differences prevailed among the tax laws noted by the 
Fairchild Report, though one point of rather general similarity was the 
levy based on ad valorem rates against the market values of products sold.19 
Elegibility requirements differed widely: Some, such as that for Alabama,
were quite liberal and inclusive, allowing "...land suited for forest cul­
ture; use must not be incompatible with forestry.1,20 Other yield-tax laws, 
such as that for Massachusetts were much more highly restrictive:21
"Property assessed at not more than $25 per acre and including 
not over 20 cords per acre, but so stocked with trees as to pro­
mise a specified minimum stand per acre."
The state of Oregon had a similarly-restrictive law, seeming to categori­
cally exclude actively-used commercial forest, listing:22
"All land in the state classified by (the) Board of Forestry on 
its own initiative and accepted by the tax commissioner as chief­
ly suitable for forestry which does not contain any mature forest 
crops in merchantable quantities."
17"Trends in Forest Taxation", p. 113
lsFairchild, et. al., 0|>. Cit., Loc. Cit.
19Ibid.
2°Ibid.
21Ibid.
^Fairchild, et. al., 0£. Cit., Loc. Cit.
These latter stipulations were quite characteristic of many of the early 
attempts at yield-tax application. Their purpose, clearly, was to en­
courage the rehabilitation of cut-over lands and to foster management of 
new stands of young timber. What they decidedly did not do was to offer 
incentive or encouragement to the more-or-less recent practice of select­
ive cutting and simultaneous replantings in commercial tracts so as to 
assure continuing harvest. The laws attacked the consequences of poor 
forestry practices, rather than the causes; the statutes were remedial, 
but not preventive.
The extent of relief from the ad valorem property tax also was 
subject to wide variations as between states, with some exempting only the 
trees themselves from annual assessment and leaving the bare land fully 
liable to the tax, while others retained annual payment schedules, but 
reduced the ad valorem levy to a very nominal figure; still others merely 
deferred the ad valorem levy on trees until the year in which harvested, 
at which time the full, accrued taxes were applicable.23 Some states 
without a yield tax as such also granted some relief or deferral privi­
leges in special legislation for forestry industries.24
Once the forest owner has qualified his tract for listing, and 
has been placed under yield tax classification, the option of declassify­
ing or removing such property from classification (as he might desire to 
do in the event of some opportunity for commercial exploitation) is sub­
ject to considerable differences as between the several states. Some
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
plans, such as that of Mississippi, are largely or fully voluntary, with 
declassification at the owner's option rather easy; others, such as those 
of Kentucky and Louisiana, are construed as contractual obligations.25 
These latter plans frequently included penalty fees or taxes provided 
when withdrawal occurred prior to the maturity date of the contracts, 
which were designated to run for as few as five, or as many as fifty 
years, or more.26 Perhaps this ”locking-in" effect, as well as other 
features of the yield-tax laws helps to explain why the participation 
under these laws has fallen short of expectations, based on actual versus 
potential classification. This result will be pursued in the section on 
"Policy Problems" following next in this chapter.
Other Tax Exceptions and Preferences. Although the yield-tax 
concept has met its most extensive application in the case of timber, 
other natural resource operations are sometimes allowed relief or special 
treatment under the property tax. One such set of special regulations is 
described by Gronouski27 as applied in the state of Michigan. For Michi­
gan1 s metallic (iron and copper) mines, the value of underground metallic 
deposits is assessed, not by the local tax assessor, but by the Geological 
Survey Division of the Michigan Department of Conservation. This assess­
ment is forwarded to the local assessor, who is required to enter the 
figure on the tax books.28 This procedure has the twofold purpose of
11
forestalling exhorbitant assessments (or inaccurate ones, due to the lack 
of technical know-how of local assessors in determining mine values) by 
the localities, and that of assuring uniform tax treatment for companies 
in competition with one another within the state. The Geological Survey 
Division does not, however, seek to set valuation on the bare land on 
which the mine is situated,nor, necessarily upon the equipment and other 
improvements to the property.29
In the case of nonmetallic minerals, no similar provision for 
GSD appraisal exists, the assumption being that such deposits are of 
"massive abundance" and that their discovery adds little to the value of 
the property.30 Gronouski takes exception to this view, contending that 
taxation of the richer deposits on such an assumption of "massive abun­
dance" is to belie their ability to "...add substantially to the value of 
the property."31
The rather obvious discrimination in favor of metallic mines in 
the state of Michigan is perhaps better understood when this preoccupation 
is considered in the context of its leadership position and competitive 
situation among producers of these metals. Michigan is consistently a 
high-ranking producer (No. 1 in 19^5) of domestic iron ores, but subject 
to intense and increasing competitive pressure from neighboring producers 
and from Canada.32 In copper production, Michigan is one of the lesser
29Gronouski, 0£. Cit., p. $k-6.
3°Ibid.
31Ibid.
32Minerals Yearbook, 19f>5> Vol. I, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Depart­
ment of Interior, 196^!
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producers (6th of 8 producers in 1956), and is beset by competitive dis­
advantage of relatively modest quality of ores.33 Logically, other states 
would stress those minerals that yield substantial values in much the same 
way.
Michigan also provides incentive through exemption from property 
taxes for a maximum of ten years to any newly-discovered metallic mineral 
ore (but not to the land in which it is located), "..when it is not part 
of an operating mine..", or, if it jLs a part of an operating mine, the 
exemption may be claimed "...until the mine comes into a 10-year (terminal) 
recovery period as determined by the mine's average annual rate of extrac­
tion."341 Such a practice would appear to materially dilute the property- 
tax base, but it should be recognized that the exemption comes before the 
value of the minerals had been subject to inclusion on the tax rolls, and 
thus much resistance (though by no means all) by local officials may be 
forestalled.
The existing variances and exceptions among the several states 
of the nature described above would not serve the purposes of maximum 
annual yield from the property tax, and their policy application does not 
appear to contemplate this. They are, instead, more likely to act as pro­
motive and/or conservation measures. The motivation may be similar to that 
which produced the federal "percentage depletion allowance" for natural 
resource owners, and those whose income is largely derived from the develop-
33Ibid.
34Gronouski, Ojd. Git., Loc. Cit.
13
merit of natural resources, though one critic35 suggests that the percen­
tage depletion allowance provided only the opportunity for short-run, 
tax-sheltered profits for vertically-integrated producers (through rais­
ing crude oil prices as high as possible, and taking most of their profits 
at that tax-sheltered level), or, as a long-run, speculative boon to the 
owners of (oil bearing) properties,36
B. Policy Problems in Natural Resources Taxation:
Some Significant Considerations
As suggested in the preceding discussion, much of the taxation 
of natural resources is heavily permeated with policy considerations. In 
this section of the study, attention will be given to some important ele­
ments of policy, and their relation to taxation. Results of some tax 
policies will be studied, and some critical proposals for improving policy 
will also be examined. For purposes of the discussion, policy problems 
have been grouped under two principal headings: policy differences in 
dealing with renewable and non-renewable resources; and considerations of 
conservation, incentives to production and fiscal yield.
Renewable versus Non-renewable Resources. A significant aspect 
of the taxation of natural resources which contributes to its complexity 
is the basic difference in the needs and ends associated with the treat­
ment of renewable resources as distinguished from those which are exhaust­
ible but not renewable. Implicit in the tax policies for timber and forest
35Davidson, Paul, "Public Policy Problems of the Domestic Crude
Oil Industry", American Economic Review, Vol.LIII, March, 1963, pp.85_108.
36Ibid., pp. 103-7.
products, and the limited number of cases in which the products of river 
and seacoast are taxed, is the imperative of replacement and regeneration 
as the products are removed, and in all too many cases, the need also pre­
vails for rebuilding depleted stocks. Thus, not only is the forest yield 
tax a means of deferring the burden of tax upon the owner of immature 
forests, or cut-over land replanted to new growth, but the revenues from 
this tax are, in most states, dedicated to the purposes of conservation 
and forestry. 37 Increasingly, it is the practice to allocate timber 
severance tax revenues to purposes of forestry, also. 38 The ultimate 
yardstick of the success or failure of policies designed to foster pre­
servation of renewable resources, or to rebuild stocks of such resources 
if depleted, are the actual data on the accessions or depletions of the 
resource stocks, coupled with data on the scope, growth and economic 
success of the enterprises engaging in the exploitation of the affected 
resources. That is, it is not enough to say that the volume of timber, 
or acreage of timber land are stable, increasing or diminishing; additional 
data regarding the scope and vigor of timber operations, and their econo­
mic significance to the state or region are necessary to complete the 
determination of the effectiveness of policies designed to engender the
perpetuation of useful stocks of timber resources. 39
Non-renewable resources, though they are incapable of replace­
ment by man, have been the subject of conservation and orderly exploitation
^Fairchild, 0£. Cit., and Williams, 0j>. Cit.
38Williams, Oja. Cit. , and Marquis, Oj). Cit.
39To be considered in the section immediately following.
through special tax treatment, publicly-sponsored or financed research 
into improved methods of exploitation, and other policy applications.40 
The success or failure of policy in this area is not so readily deter­
mined as in the case of, say, forestry; however, the economics of the 
industry -- costs, technology, wastes, returns, etc. -- may serve to indi­
cate whether optimum conditions of conservation and orderly exploitation 
prevail. Public monies spent on research in schools of mines, geological 
research agencies of state and federal governments, and in other areas 
may return rich dividends in prolonging the life of limited resource 
stocks, and in the utilization of stocks previously-uneconomic qualities.
Conservation, Incentives and Fiscal Yield. In the taxation of 
natural resources, three rather distinct guiding (and often conflicting) 
benchmarks for policy have presented themselves. First, when one thinks 
of the term "tax" the most obvious conclusion is that this is a basis for 
raising public revenue, and so it should be. However, in the case of 
taxes affecting any productive sector of the economy ( a feature, it may 
be argued, of any tax), an equally-important consideration is the assur­
ance of minimum repressive effects to the orderly conduct and basic effi­
ciency of the industry yielding the tax. Finally, and because of the 
exhaustible nature of most resources, the motive of conservation —  assur­
ing optimum utilization of scarce, often irreplaceable wealth -- is a 
strong consideration. Because of its great import, the motive of conser­
vation will be studied first.
40See Gronouski, Op. Cit.
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An area in which conservation has traditionally been interwoven 
with the tax structure is that of timber and forestry resources. Williams41 
dates the '’modern" period in forest taxation from the movement in the 
state of Nebraska previously mentioned (p. 8 above). The final develop­
ment of the yield tax to serve in lieu of basic ad valorem property taxes 
dates from about 1910 in Nebraska and several other states, as a means of 
relieving the owner of standing timber from an annual tax bill, deferring 
property taxation until the timber "crop" is harvested. 42 Forest sever­
ance taxation developed along somewhat similar lines, with one of the 
earliest being a Louisiana tax enacted in 1910 as "An Act to Create a 
Conservation Fund.." by an annual levy "...upon those engaged in severing 
timber and minerals from the soil" (Act 196 of I9IO) . 43 The legislation 
under which most severance taxes are now levied on timber generally pro­
vides for the allocation of part or all of the collections to forestry 
purposes, 44
As a comprehensive and effective conservation measure, the yield 
tax can hardly be described as an unqualified success, if judged on the 
basis of experience in classification of eligible forest tracts. In the 
case of Louisiana, for example, classification proceeded on a slow, rather 
disappointing scale prior to the passage of a mandatory provision in 195 -^>
4l"Trends in Forest Taxation".
4 2Ibid., p. 113.
43Farris, Theodore Newton, "Severance Taxation in Louisiana", 
Louisiana Business Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, Baton Rouge, La., April, 1938>
p. 3 8 .
44Marquis, "Severance Taxes on Forest Products..", p. 317j and 
Williams, "Trends in Forest Taxation", p. 130-
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after which classifications increased to the extent that, by 1959 it was 
estimated that -^0 percent of the forest land in Louisiana was classified 
under the amended set of classifications. 45 Establishing communication 
with forest owners provides a more compatible base for "selling" the yield 
tax to those who desire to qualify their land under such laws. Programs 
involving the yield-tax concept conducted on a largely- or wholly-volun­
tary basis have tended to fare rather poorly in enlisting participations 
and mandatory programs have met with some resistance, as well. Marquis46 
cites several basic causes for the lack of success for forest-land parti­
cipation under yield taxes:47
1. Lack of Knowledge on the part of forest-land owners, either of 
the existence or substantive features of the laws;
2. Administrative Restraints ("red tape"), especially in the "volun­
tary" programs -- a mass of reports, forms, investigations, etc.;
5* Excessive Restrictions on the use of classified lands (e.g., pro­
hibition of grazing)and misunderstandings about imagined res­
trictions;
1*-. Lack of Sympathy of, or outright opposition by, local officials-- 
spiteful raising of bare-land assessments, etc.;
5. Overly-Restrictive Eligibility Requirements, such as limitation 
to very small tracts only, exclusion from use as resorts, etc., 
and;
6 . Absence of Tax Advantage -- Immediate plans for substantial re­
movals of timber; underassessment at local levels or low millage 
rates, etc.
Answering these criticisms requires substantial overhaul of current yield 
tax laws, in Marquis' opinion. He proposes the following answers in cor­
recting the shortcomings of current laws: a) broadening and liberalizing
45Hayes, Ralph W., "Progress in Land Classification in Louisiana 
Under the 195^ - Forest Tax Law", LSU Forestry Mote Mo. 40, August, i960,
p. 5 .
46”Forest Yield Taxes", USDA Circular Mo. 8893 Forest Service,
U.S.Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., April, 1952, PP- 1-50*
47Ibid., pp. 10-12.
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coverage; b) modernizing the plans in accordance with present forestry 
practice (especially the allowance of selective cutting -- "thinning" -- 
on tracts with immature trees); c) striving for equitable tax treatment 
of classified lands (by local assessors); and, finally, d) the enlisting 
of popular support for the programs. 48
Based on the observations above, it would appear that the ex­
clusion by yield-tax programs of any coverage for forest lands in process 
of actual commercial exploitation is an area deserving of some serious 
attention. Especially in the case of smaller, privately-owned tracts, the 
owner is virtually forced to consider the "harvesting" of his timber as a 
short-run venture, with no incentive to engage in forest management while 
the cutting is actually going on. Rather, the ad valorem levy constitutes 
a valid reason to exploit his stand quickly. The modern practice of "sus- 
tained-yield" forestry, wherein new plantings are made simultaneously with 
the cutting of mature trees, and attendant care for growing trees not yet
ready for harvest, is much to be preferred from the standpoint of timing
over the rapid denuding of the land, with the ultimate necessity to "start 
from scratch" on production of a new forest. The latter course may require 
as much as -fifty years or more to produce trees suitable for lumber and 
building products; in the meantime, the land produces neither income nor 
appreciable taxes.
It was noted earlier that severance taxes on timber are devoted 
in large part to providing funds for carrying on forestry and conservation 
projects,"but the effects of a tax on the operation of forestry enterprises
48Ibid., pp. kl-50.
are also a proper subject for policy study. One possible effect of a 
severance tax suggested by Marquis is that, if it makes the marginally- 
productive resource less attractive, it may result in foregoing develop­
ment of the poorer deposits or tracts in favor of an increased rate of 
exploitation for the higher-grade, more profitable resource supplies. 49  
While this may contribute to a more efficient level of exploitation in the 
case of some resources, the implication for forestry may be the neglect 
of many beneficial, but lightly remunerative, forest practices, such as 
the necessary thinning (as pulpwood) of trees in an immature stand, or 
"salvage cutting” in a producing commercial forest. 50 Care in setting 
rates should also be exercised in view of the very real possibility that 
the tax may be shifted back to the owner, possibly discouraging his opera­
tion, or causing him to conduct operations contrary to conservation needs.
Conservation among the non-renewable resources infers policies 
which will make most attractive the exploitation of resource supplies with 
minimum waste and maximum recovery of resource supplies. Incentives to the 
active exploration, discovery and efficient exploitation of new resources 
would also be indicated as desirable policy attributes. On the one hand, 
many severance tax laws for non-renewable resources seek a mixture of dif­
ferential rates in accordance with the economic recovery value of the 
resource (for example, the Louisiana rates of severance tax for crude 
petroleum of varying specific gravities, and differing recovery methods), 
while on the other hand, tax exemption may be offered, or deferral of tax
49Marquis, "Severance Taxes on Forest Products..1', p. 318, col. 1.
5°Marquis, "Severance Taxes on Forest Products..”, p. 318, cols.
1 and 2.
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application granted for new operations (e.g., the metallic mines property 
tax deferral in the case of Michigan). Taxes levied against non-renewable 
resource wealth may best serve the needs of conservation if they neither 
discourage the orderly development of resources, nor produce a climate in 
which the producer feels compelled to extract what he can in the shortest 
possible time, abandoning the desolated lands to no further economic use­
fulness, and having wasted much of their formerly-abundant wealth.
A rather controversial question dealing with conservation and 
the economics of resource industries not directly connected with taxation, 
but having peculiar application to the crude petroleum and natural gas 
industries may be worthy of attention at this point. The characteristics 
of these two mineral fuels, the one a liquid, the other either a gaseous 
or liquid substance in its natural state, possess the potential of simul­
taneous recovery from a single pool or "dome" by several operators in the 
same field. Under these circumstances, an operator who removes the oil or 
gas from one of these deposits thus denies that portion to the others pro­
ducing from the same field. This "first come, first served" characteristic 
is given legal stature under the so-called "common law rule of capture", 
which upholds the right of any legitimate claimant to any quantities which 
he may withdraw. 51
Obviously, if all the developers in a given pool were to pursue 
their self-interest independently, the temptation would exist to engage in 
a contest with one another to determine which producer could pump the most 
product at the expense- of his rivals, so long as the reserves lasted.
51Davidson, Op. Cit., pp. 88-91.
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This characteristic is termed by Davidson to be the negative "user cost 
of the rule of capture"; that is, the user cost is associated with not
cp
pumping, as distinguished from those which are associated with pumping.
The interests of conservation obviously dictate the finding of a solution 
to this potentially-wasteful situation, and the solutions chosen by sever­
al oil- and gas-producing states (notably Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and 
California) employ the practice of "prorationing" or establishing "oil 
allowables" for most normally-producing fields. The aim of prorationing 
is to assure that no producer in a producing field will extract more than 
his "fair share" of the production from existing wells. 53 The relevant 
state statutes are reenforced by the federal "Connally Hot Oil Act", which 
"prohibits interstate commerce in oil and oil products produced in viola­
tion of state prorationing laws." 54
Davidson contends that prorationing is an inferior solution to 
the problem, and that the interests of conservation would be better served 
by the practices of "unitization", that is, of forcing the leaseholders of 
a given field to form a unified management "..for the specific purposes of 
operating the wells as a single production unit. 55 This solution, says 
Davidson, would not only overcome the "negative user cost" imposed by the
5£Ibid., p . g!+ .
53Ibjd., p. 8 5.
54Ibid.
55Ibid.
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rule of capture, but would allow the other user costs56 to regulate the 
operation of each field for attaining optimum efficiency in production 
and marketing. 57 Adelman58 echoes Davidson's criticism of prorationing, 
asserting that the practice produces "...a systematic bias...in favor of 
drilling more wells than necessary; the more wells drilled in any pool, 
the greater the allowables for the pool."59 An additional premium is 
placed on the more expensive, deeper wells, which enjoy a higher allow­
able. 60
Adelman sees as a further ill engendered by prorationing the 
preference accorded by the state of Texas to the "so-called 'stripper1 
or marginal wells", which are exempted from prorationing restrictions, 
and thus have achieved a dominant role in establishing cost structures 
for crude petroleum in that state. 61 He suggests that eliminating pro­
rationing (under the system of unitization proposed by Davidson) would 
result in improved efficiency for the industry by removing from production 
many of the marginal wells (which Adelman felt should not have been
56Davidson characterizes the other user costs as a) "the user 
costs inherent in all raw materials"--the return on presently-used mater­
ials, weighed against possible future returns had the materials not been 
used now; and, b) the "user cost of ultimate recovery" —  weighing the 
actual rate of recovery against that rate which would yield the greatest 
ultimate recovery from the pool. (0]3. Cit., pp. ^1-2).
57Ibid.
5SAdelman, M.A., "Efficiency of Resource Use in Crude Petroleum", 
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXXI, No. 2; October, 196k, pp. 101-22.
5 9Ibid., p. 104.
soIbid.
61Ibid.
developed in the first place), along with the inflated costs associated 
with such wells. 62 Clearly, there is much substance in the criticisms of 
Davidson and Adelman, and the purposes of conservation would be well- 
served by a serious review of the consequences of prorationing on the 
total structure of crude oil and gas production techniques. If, as these 
two critics suggest, prorationing is responsible for both a wasteful rate 
of extraction in the better wells, and a cost structure inflated by the 
sheltered presence of marginal wells, then obviously prorationing is not 
achieving the purpose of conservation (nor even operating efficiency from 
the standpoint of cost), and new solutions should be sought -- perhaps 
the use of unitized management suggested by Davidson, Needless to say, 
the same types of solution would be equally-applicable to the natural gas 
producers as to crude oil producers.
The matter of Incentives to Production would seem to have, by 
inference, been suggested in many of the policies consistent with conser­
vation aims discussed above. Any measure affecting expectations in the 
development of natural resources, either by owners or producer-developers, 
must necessarily have ramifications for conservation, and vice versa. The 
words of Henry George concerning the positive effect which a tax levied 
upon the "whole of rents" of land may have "...by compelling those who 
hold land on speculation to sell or let for whatever they can get . . . " 63 do 
not appear to contemplate the total abandonment of lands producing modest, 
but acceptable returns, such properties often reverting to the state
62Ibid., p. 105 and Appendix 2 , p. 117•
S3George, 0£. Cit. , Book VIII, Ch. Ill, p. *1-16.
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through tax delinquency. Neither does George seem to consider the possi­
bility that the owner (and/or developer) would be goaded into a quick, 
wasteful and destructive exploitation, often culminating in the abandon­
ment of the ravaged lands to the state. 64 Thus, a sound tax policy for 
incentives would encourage orderly exploitation of resources, neither 
producing conditions tantamount to confiscation, nor generating a climate 
conducive to the rape of resources in a feverish attempt to realize a 
quick profit and abandon the lands to the state's guardianship after they 
are desolated beyond economically-productive yield.
Finally, there is the question of fiscal yield of resource
taxes. It is perhaps appropriate that this policy question was deferred
for last consideration, inasmuch as dollar yields on resource taxes have 
often been virtually incidental to the other policy goals. 65 A tax which 
yields the maximum short-run revenues may, in the long run, be poorest in 
benefits to the community if it causes the other goals of conservation and 
incentive to be disregarded. Five or ten, or even twenty years of fat 
receipts from property or severance levies, followed by the exodus of the 
industry, loss of payrolls and other benefits, and perhaps even the ulti­
mate decline and fall of the very community, is not a desirable end result. 
Granted that for many communities tied to non-renewable resources the ulti­
mate loss of the resource industry is an inevitability, even the eventual
64For a discussion of "mining out from under" a tax, see Groves, 
Harold, Financing Government, 6th ed., Holt, Rinehart and Winston (New 
York: 196^), p. 305-
65Especially so in the case of forestry taxation, with yield
being literally "ploughed back" into the development of the industry (see
Williams, "Timber Trends.." and Marquis, "Severance Taxes..”).
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loss of the principal industry need not be hastened by a climate of oppres­
sive taxes. For the community supported by renewable resources, such as 
forest and timberlands, sound management may assure that the loss of this 
support will never occur.
Still, the question may well be raised: For a locality in a
principal natural resource region, with little or no other property or 
commercial basis for local tax support, and faced with rising costs of 
government and community services, how may such an area possibly forego 
the increasing demands for revenue from the only practical available 
source -- i.e., the resource industry? There appears to be no simple, 
panacea-like solution to this truly perplexing by-product of conservation 
and production-incentive resource-tax policy. The most obvious (and most 
difficult) solution would be for the region so affected to diversity the 
tax base, attracting new industries, both subsidiary to and nonrelated to 
the resource supply, as a means of making the community more fiscally 
"shock-proof". Thus, a timber producing area could logically host a fur­
niture or wood products manufacturer; a mining region might logically 
attract a processing or fabricating plant, especially if it is blessed 
with a location near a principal market. Subsidiary and/or service indus­
tries would logically follow the basic plants, once the breakthrough had 
been made. Examples of this type of activity may be taken from the loca­
tion of furniture manufacturers in Michigan, 66 petroleum refining and dis-
asAn interesting footnote to this situation is the fact that 
Michigan, having declined in significance as a timber producer, must now 
import raw materials from other states for her furniture industry (See 
Barlowe, Raleigh, "Forest Yield Taxes," Michigan Tax Study Staff Papers, 
Lansing, Mich., 1958, p. 361). Here is a case in which the "back-up" in­
dustry has paid real dividends.
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tribution plants in Louisiana, Texas and other oil-producing states, and 
metals processors in Michigan, Indiana and Arkansas.
A second solution to the problem of deficient local revenues 
which may be and has been applied is the cooperative support by other 
levels of government, involving supplemental payments to replace revenues 
which might have been forthcoming in the absence of yield or other tax 
modification in support of resource policy. Such programs have been oper­
ated in varying degrees in several states, with a plan in New Hampshire 
being one of the most interesting, if not particularly blessed with fiscal 
soundness.67 The New Hampshire yield tax as applied in a 19^9 Act exempted 
standing timber from taxation under the ad valorem property tax, but guar­
anteed "...that the towns would lose no revenue as a result..." of the 
law.68 Perhaps the localities have not been the losers under this plan, 
but, by 195k the proceeds of a relief fund created by a special revenue 
bond issue were "...nearly at an end..." due to "...rising tax rates 
(local) over the state..." and a decline of timber cutting, which was to 
have retired the bond issue.69 Although most transfer payments would 
possibly have a less risky, even speculative, character (it may be noted 
at this point that New Hampshire showed some g.aming spirit by passing the 
first modern state lottery), they do in fact constitute transfers, not the 
production of added tax revenues. The claim against the state's revenue
67Hill, H. W., "Timber Taxes in New Hampshire", Papers and Pro­
ceedings of the -^7th Annual Conference, National Tax Association, 195^>
pp. llj-8-53.
6sIbid., pp. 151-2.
S9Ibid.
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sources simply displaces the claim against local sources, and the general 
task of finding adequate revenues to finance public services remains. The 
federal government also participates in a transfer program to localities 
(to replace property taxes which would have arisen from forest preserves 
located in the assessment area), and also payments of severance taxes on 
timber taken from public lands are made to state and local governments.70
Problems in the allocation of revenues from resource taxes as 
between the various levels of government are a natural consequence of the 
multi-level administration of government in this country, and the social 
viewpoint regarding ownership claims to natural resources. The local 
governments -- townships, counties, school districts and parishes -- are 
prone to demand a share in revenues, especially those derived from custom­
ary sources of local-government support, such as the ad valorem property 
tax. Further, where the local government is authorized to levy license 
or occupational fees, gross receipts or income taxes, sales taxes, and 
other, less common local-government taxes, these units will be prone to 
exploit this power among the resource industries along with others. The 
increasing pressure on local government finance for more and more expensive 
services is likely to make these units even less inclined to forego taxes 
which they feel are their due.
The State, on the other hand, views a more complex, larger pic­
ture of the tax treatment of natural resource industries than the mere
7°Williams, Ellis T., "National Forest Contributions to Local 
Governments", Land Economics, Vol. Jl, No. 3» August, 1955> PP* 20^-14.
The severance tax can be collected on such cutting without Constitutional 
questions, largely because the tax is laid upon the severer, not the owner, 
and is not a property tax (Marquis, "Severance Taxes on Forest Products..", 
pp. 315“ This right was affirmed in Wilson, et. al. v. Cook (19^6)
327, U.S. 4 7 4.
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raising of revenue. While the locality in which resources are located 
tends to take a somewhat proprietary view of such resources, the state 
is apt to regard them as a part of the total largess of the commonwealth; 
that is, not as belonging solely to the locality in which an accident of 
nature and geography has lodged them. Further, the state has tradition­
ally taken a greater concern for the conservation and husbanding of scarce 
resources, although policies directed to this end may, and often do, 
reduce the short-run fiscal "payoff” in the form of tax revenues.71
The basis thus exists for debate between the privileges of the 
locality and the state regarding resource matters. The various states 
may resolve this problem in different -ways', but the State is likely to 
prevail in most instances, if for no other reason than its customary 
sovereignty in tax matters over the local units, and the fact that legis­
lators from other parts of the state have the power to outvote those from 
the affected area. Admittedly, there may be some exceptions to this rule, 
but, in the main, the state has the balance of political'power. Some con­
cession to the localities is apparent, however, in the return of a portion 
of state-collected revenues to the locality in which the collections origi­
nated,72 and under other arrangements.
The objections to allocation formulae have by no means been 
stilled by actions of the state intended to placate the localities, but
71ln the case of forest yield taxes, the deferral of property 
levies on immature timber stands, ultimately to be collected as the timber 
is harvested.
72For example, the turnback of a portion of the severance tax in 
Louisiana to the Parish from which the minerals or timber were severed 
("Severance Tax-General", Legal Dedication, Louisiana State Tax Handbook, 
p. 8l) .
there seems reason to believe that no revolutionary changes in the rela­
tive power positions of the two levels of government will be forthcoming 
soon, especially with the concentration of population in the urban areas, 
and the reapportionment of many state legislatures to reflect this trend 
in political structure. The opposite view —  that disproportionate poli­
tical influence held by sparsely-settled, resource-rich areas will dimin­
ish rapidly -- appears to be more in keeping with the true trend direction. 
To say that this will impose undue hardships on the resource-rich areas 
does not appear proper, however. Perhaps it may be more accurate to say 
that, resource policy will now tend to be conducted on a more objective, 
socially-oriented basis, rather than on a locally-oriented (which has 
often meant "narrowly-oriented") basis.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
FOR THE FOUR SURVEY STATES
The impact of natural resources on the economies of the four 
survey states -- Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan and Texas -- is the subject 
of this chapter. It is the principal aim of this discussion to provide a 
more complete knowledge of the role of resources within the several states, 
and to compare the magnitude of resource industries as between the states. 
This knowledge will help to place in more meaningful perspective the en­
vironments in which the taxation of natural resources for the four states 
occurs. Further, more insight into the ends and goals to be sought 
through resource taxation policies should result from this knowledge.
For purposes of classification, the study will give separate consideration 
to timber and forest products, mineral resources, and fisheries and other 
resources, in successive sections.
A. Timber and Forest Products 
Areas, products and Volume. All four states are active in the 
production of timber and forest products, although the size of forest area 
and magnitude of harvest varies, as does the relative importance of the 
industry to each state. Area in commercial forests for the State of Arkan­
sas constitutes 6^.3 percent of the state's total land area (see Table 2 
on the following page), in Louisiana, the percentage is in Michigan
about 5^ percent, but in Texas the total forest area constitutes only 
about 14.3 percent of the vast ( l68 million acres) area of that state. In 
absolute terms, the forest area in Arkansas is 21.6 million acres; Michigan
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Table 2
Land Areas by Major Class of Land for the United States, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan and Texas -- Jan. 1, I9631
(Thousands of Acres)
State Total Land 
Area2 Total
Forest
Commercial
Land 
Produc­
tive Re- 
s erved
Unpro­
duc­
tive
Crop
Land
Other3
U. S. . 2,271,3^3 758,865 508,845 16,880 234,012 448,305 1,064,173
Ark... 33,599 21 ,591 21 ,530 61 -- 8,436 3,572
La. . . 28 ,868 16,756 16,512 57 7 4,907 7,385
Mich.. 36,492 19,699 19,121 388 240 9,957 6 ,8 3 6
Texas. 168,218 23,954 11,991 21 11,942 35,599 108,665
1. Partial data from a summary of all states
2. From 1959 Census of Agriculture
3 . Includes pasture and rangeland, swampland, industrial and 
urban areas, and other nonforest areas.
Source: Timber Trends in the United States, I965, Forest Service, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Table 1, pp. l40-4l.
has 19*7 million acres in forest; Louisiana a bit more than 16.7 million; 
and Texas almost 24 million acres of forest land. All except Texas have a 
favorable ratio of commercial forest land to total forest acreage; that is, 
forest land which is physically capable of producing usable timber and is 
available for that purpose. 1 As suggested by this rather broad basis of 
classification, the commercial forest area may vary widely in the actual 
amounts of merchantable timber available for various uses in any given
1Iimber Trends in the United States, 1965, Forest Service, U. S. 
Department of Agriculture. Appendix 2 -- "Definitions of Terms."
year. The poor ratio of Texas' total forest land to commercial forest 
land is better understood when placed in the context of climate differences
across that giant state. The bulk of Texas' commercial forest land is
located in East Texas (accounting for all but about 500*000 of her 12 mil­
lion acres in commercial forest lands), in a region roughly bounded by the 
prairies adjacent to the gulf coast on the South, northward to the Red 
River, and on the East by the Louisiana border, extending to a western 
limit varying between 80 and 120 miles distance "..to the point where rain­
fall becomes generally insufficient to support good commercial forests." 2 
Apart from the so-called "lost pines" section of West-central Texas, there 
are no contiguous timber stands of any great magnitude outside the Eastern 
region. 3 In view of the above situation, the discussion of Texas' timber 
resources will be devoted to the East-Texas area.
The survey states are in very different stages of development of 
their forest industries. While Michigan was one of the earlier states
outside the Northeast to develop her forest industries, ranking first
nationally in lumber production during much of the decade ended in 1889, 
the excesses of this period resulted in a rapid depletion of her most 
favored wood species -- white pine -- and her fortunes were subject to a 
rapid decline.4 At her peak production In 1889, the annual sawtimber cut
2"Forests of East Texas", Forest Survey Release 77, Southern 
Forest Experiment Station (Philip A. Briegleb, dir.), June, 1956, p.
3Ibid.
4Findell, Virgil E., et. al., "Michigan's Forest Resources," 
Station Paper No. 82, Lakes States Experiment Station, Forest Service,
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Sept., i960, p. 1.
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(see definitions. Table 3 on following pages) at sawmills was approximate­
ly 5 .5 billion board feet; the decline to a low ebb in 1932 was precipi­
tous, with the cut in that depression year only 160 million board feet . 5 
As may be noted in Table 3a> sawtimber cut in 1962 was a modest 495 million 
board feet. Meanwhile, the pulpwood industry has become more and more im­
portant in the timber picture, the cut for this purpose rising from 7 97 
thousand cords in 195^ to 1*09 million cords in 1962.® Veneer production 
is in decline, with cooperage apparently having become insignificant ( less 
than 1,000 board feet in 1962), as indicated in Table 4.
The timber industries of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas, in con­
trast to the case of Michigan, appear either not to have reached a climax, 
or to evidence a rejuvenated status compared to prior periods. In the 
State of Arkansas, the 1958 harvest exceeded one billion board feet of 
sawlogs for the first time,7 and by I962 the harvest was 1.2 billion board 
feet (Table 4). Pulpwood, the second-leading industrial wood, accounted 
for 1.2 million cords in 1959j8 and had increased substantially to a cut
of a little more than 1.7 million cords in 1962 (Table 4). The pulp and
paper industry has grown rapidly in Arkansas since World War II, and is 
now one of the leading industries using forest products. Together, saw­
timber and pulpwood account for about 90 percent of the industrial output
5Ibid.
sFindell, 0£. Git., p. 20.
7Stemitzke, Herbert S., "Arkansas Forests", Forest Survey
Release No. 8 5, 19&1, Forest Service, U. S. Dept, of Agriculture, p. 13 
(So. Forest Experiment Sta.).
aIbid., p. 14.
Table 3
a. Sawtimber1 -- Growth and Cut, 1962, and Volume, 1963, on Commercial 
Forest Land: United States, Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan and Texas.
(Amounts in million board feet - international 1/4-inch log rule)
State Net annual Net annual Net volume Jan. 1, 1963
growth2 cut3 Total Softwood Hardwood
United States.. .. 5 M 5 3 48,401  2 ,5 3 6 ,7 9 9 2 ,0 5 8 ,0 2 2 ^78 , 7TT
Arkansas...... . .  2 ,3 6 9 1,607 42,348 26,363 15,985
Louisiana..... .. 2,985 1,368 52 ,280 2 5 , l 4o 27,140
Michigan...... . .  1 ,036 ^95 2 6 ,496 7 ,4 0 0 19,096
Texas......... 850 31,625 21 ,667 9,958
b. Growing Stock1 -- Growth and Cut, 1962 
Forest Land: United States, Arkansas,
, and Volume, I963, on Commercial 
Louisiana, Michigan and Texas.
(Amounts in million cubic feet)
State Net annual Net annual Net volume, Jan. 1, 1963
growth2 cut3 Total Softwood Hardwood
United States.. . .  16,265 10,148 627,882 434,082 193,800
Arkansas...... TOT 424 12,702 5,909 6,793
Louisiana..... 839 390 15,204 5 ,T02 9,500
Michigan...... 166 12,520 3,233 9 ,287
Texas......... 528 234 9,034 5 , m 3 ,8 6 3
Sawtimber comprises all live trees of commercial species which con­
tain at least one saw log defined as follows: Softwoods must be
at least 9*0 inches in diameter, breast height (dbh), except in 
California, Oregon, Washington and Coastal Alaska, where the mini­
mum is 11.0 inches, d.b.h. Hardwoods must be at least 11.0 inches, 
d.b.h in all states.
Growing Stock comprises all live sawtimber trees, poletimber trees, 
saplings and seedlings meeting specified standards of quality or 
vigor; excludes cull trees.
Comprises natural growth and excludes catastrophic losses.
Sawtimber and poletimber trees (where applicable) removed from 
inventory by harvesting, land-use change, or silviculture treat­
ment .
Source: Timber Trends in the United States, 1965; adapted from a Table in
Statistical Abstract of the U. S., I966, p. 677*
2 .
3.
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Table 7
Total Output of Timber Products for the United States, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Michigan and Texas, I9621
Product Total U.S. Arkansas Louisiana Michigan Texas
Saw Logs (Th. bd. ft.)
All species...... 37, 132,537
Softwoods........ 27,337,886
Hardwoods........  6,7975651
1,205,695 
7 6 0,07l 
775,657
981,726
592,772
388,657
319 ,000
7 3 ,0 0 0
276,000
605,517 
777,721 
160,793
Veneer logs (Th. bd. 
Total all species
Softwoods.......
Hardwoods........
ft.)
. 5 ,917 ,126  
. 7,931,562 
985,56k
37.576
37.576
35.572
35.572
2 1 ,7 6 0
162
21,598
37,811
366
37,775
Pulpwood (Th. cords)
All species.....
Softwoods.......
Hardwoods.......
73,126 
3 3 ,2 1 2  
9,917
1,730
1 ,3 8 2
378
2 ,0 0 6
1,580
726
1 ,090
730
660
1,730
1,163
267
Miscellaneous Industrial
woods (Total)* (th. cu. ft.)
All species......  505 ,773
Softwoods........  252,290
Hardwoods........  253s 153
2 7 ,6 7 1
12,977
17,727
19,021
12,236
6,785
23,773
7,757
19,019
20,863
12,731
8,132
*Miscellaneous Industrial Woods (Products)
Cooperage (Th. bd. ft.)2
All species...... 215,976 18,578 5 ,0 0 0 — 906
Softwoods........ 20,756 — — — —
Hardwoods......... 195,220 18,578 5 ,0 0 0 — 906
Piling (Th. Lin. ft.)
All species.... 71,530 2,175 7,783 260 2 ,7 6 9
Softwoods........ 3 6 ,1 7 2 1,972 7,783 10 2 ,7 6 9
Hardwoods........ 5,358 203 ------ 250 ------
Poles (Th. pieces)
All species...... 6 ,6 5 6 577 7oo 20 652
Softwoods........ 6 ,6 1 6 577 7oo 20 652
Hardwoods........ 7o — — ------ ------
(footnotes at end of table)
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Table 4 (continued)
Product Total U.S. Arkansas Louisiana Michigan Texas
Miscellaneous Industrial Woods (Products) continued.
Posts (Th. pieces)
All species.... 168,749 16,242 5,837 3,500 16,465
Softwoods...... 70,360 8,064 3,034 3 ,1 0 0 5 ,608
Hardwoods...... 98,389 8,178 2,803 400 10,857
Mine timbers (th.cu. 
All species....
ft.)
48,401 146 2,505
Softwoods...... 8,089 24 -- 1,353 --
Hardwoods...... 40,312 122 -- 1,152 --
Other industrial (Th 
All species....
.cu.ft.)3
19f,607 11,556 4,800 17,920 3,214
Softwoods...... 74,998 2,243 484 558 630
Hardwoods....... 122,609 9,315 4,316 17,362 2,584
All species........
Fuelwood (Thousand cords)
29 ,922 1,529 1,169 600 777
Softwoods.......... 11,248 446 267 25 223
Hardwoods.......... 15,674 1,083 902 525 55^
1. These estimates of total output include both roundwood and plant 
byproducts.
2. International 1/4 inch log scale. Saw logs assumed to equal tim­
ber tally.
3. Includes hewn ties, excelsior bolts, shingle bolts, turnery; and 
handle stock, shuttle blocks, chemical wood, farm timbers, and 
plant byproducts used for mulch, livestock bedding, etc.
Source: Adapted from: U.S.Dept, of Agriculture, Forest Service: Timber 
Trends in the United States, 1965; Table 3 8, pp. 168-92.
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for Arkansas forests, with the remainder being accounted for by veneer 
logs, cooperage bolts (mainly tight cooperage for such things as whiskey- 
aging casks) and pilings and posts. 9
Louisiana's forest-industry output of sawtimber in 1953 amounted 
to l.k billion board feet, and, by I962 the cut was down markedly to 9^1 
million board feet (Table , possibly due in part to the slack building 
activity in the state at this time. In the case of pulpwood, however, 
the expansion continued to an excess of 2 million cords in 1962 (Table k). 
Pulpwood cutting is the dominant wood use in the forests of the Northwest­
ern and Northcentral parts of the state, comprising about two-thirds of 
the cut, and in other regions pulpwood accounts for virtually half the 
timber cut. 10 Other products sharing in the timber cut are veneer logs, 
cooperage bolts, poles, piling and posts.
In Texas forests, sawlogs are the principal timber product, but 
pulpwood, especially pine pulpwood, is a high-ranking and growing cate­
gory. 11 Trees cut for lumber are also largely pine, virtually all second- 
growth stock, and for the most part cut in the Southeastern region.1 2 . The 
lumber cut in East Texas appears to be declining among the small, portable- 
mill operations, in favor of permanent, stationary mills, with the 1962 cut 
of sawlogs at a level of 605-5 million board feet. 13 Pulpwood production
9Ibid.
louporests of Louisiana", Forest Survey Release No. 751 Southern 
Forest Experiment Station, Forestry Service, U.S.Department of Agriculture, 
p. lk.
lluForests of East Texas", p. 14.
12Ibid.
13Ibid. and Table i(-.
accounted for one-third of the 195 -^ softwood cut, with much of the cut 
shipped to paper mills in Louisiana and Arkansas (about 40 percent).14
Texas is a leading producer of poles and piling. She ships the 
cut trees principally to East Texas wood-preserving plants,15 with pro­
duction in 1962 of 2.7 million linear feet of piling and 652 thousand 
pieces of pole production, virtually all softwoods in both cases (Table i(-) . 
Her production of cooperage, in line with other states' experience in 
loose cooperage (for crates and boxes), has declined, amounting to less 
than one million board feet in 1962.
The importance of forest and wood-products industries for the 
states of Louisiana and Arkansas is readily apparent when it is noted 
that the lumber and wood-products industries account for about 26 percent 
of the total manufacturing employment in each state. 16 For Arkansas, this 
represents a relative decline from the 1950 percentage of ^1.6 , but this 
has been largely caused, not by a decline in timber activity, but by the 
expanding industrial base in that state. Although their number is inde­
terminate, and varies widely, woods workers not included in the above 
figures should swell the numbers of workers supported through forest in­
dustries even more. Texas' smaller output of wood products would suggest 
a lesser employment percentage, and the much smaller scale of timber and 
wood-products production in Michigan in comparison to vast manufacturing 
base, would indicate a very small percentage employment.
14Ibid., p . lh-.
15Ibid., p. 15.
lsuporests of Louisiana", p. 15, and Accelerating Economic Growth 
in Arkansas, Arkansas Economic Expansion Study Commission, report (196k ),
p . 22
Table 5
Forest Land Area and Ownership of Commercial Forest Land, United States, 
Arkansas, Louisiana and Michigan: I9631
(in Thousands of Acres. As of Jan. 1)
State
Total
forest
land
Commercial Forest Land2
All
owner­
ships
Federally owned or 
managed State, Private
Total
Na­
tional
forest
Other
county,
and
municipal
Total Farm
Wood-
using
indus­
tries
Other
United States.... 758,865 508,845 113,176 96,804 16,372 28,692 366,977 151,017 66,628 149,332
Arkansas......... 21,591 21,530 2,64l 2,373 268 205 18,684 5,613 4,028 9,043
Louisiana........ 16,576 16,512 704 575 129 181 15,627 2 ,808 3,223 9,596
Michigan......... 19,699 19,121 2,540 2,420 120 3,780 12,801 3,841 1,548 7,412
Texas............ 23,954 11,991 719 618 101 34 11,238 2,435 3 ,128 5,675
1. Partial reproduction of a table including data for all states.
2. Comprises all land which was a) producing, or physically capable of producing 
usable crops of wood, b) economically available on date shown or prospectively, 
and c) not withdrawn from timber utilization.
Source: Department of Agriculture, Forest Service: Timber Trends in the United States, 1965
Appearing in Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1966, p. 676.
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Ownership, Reserves a n d  M a n a g e m e n t . Although the bulk of forest
lands are in the hands of individual owners, such as farm operators, and 
others not connected directly with the forest industries, public owner­
ship, and ownership by wood-using industries have become quite significant 
in the commercial forests of the survey states, as indicated by the sum­
mary table below, and by Table 5 on the preceding page. The relative 
shares of each type of owner are indicated as follows;
Table 5b
Ownership Percent of Commercial Forest Owned , by Class
class U.S. Arkansas Louisiana Michigan Texas
Private...... 7 2 .2 8 6 .8 94.6 6 7 .0 23*7.
Farm....... 29-7 2 6 .1 17.0 2 0 .1 20 .5
Wood-using
Industry.. 13.1 18.7 19.5 8 .1 2 6 .1
Other...... 29 .4 42.0 5 8 .1 3 8 .8 47.3
Public....... 2 7 .8 15 .2 33-0 JjJ
Federally- 
owned or
managed... 2 2 .2 12.2 4.3 13.3 6 .0
State, coun­
ty and Mun­
icipal. . .. 5.6 1 .0 1 .1 19.7 0 .3
Source: Table 5
Several observations are in order regarding the distributions 
of forest-land ownership in the four states. First, it should be apparent 
that ratios of public-to-private ownership are below the national average 
for the states of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas, markedly below for the 
latter two states, and higher than the national average for Michigan. 
Michigan1s public ownership of forest lands is somewhat unique, in that
kl
state and local governments account for the majority of acres ( 19*7 per­
cent of the total of 33 percent for all public owners), while nationally 
the preponderant public owner is the federal government. These state and 
local holdings are mostly state-owned tracts held in the Northern Lower 
Michigan area. 17 For the State of Arkansas, publicly-held lands are pri­
marily in the Ozark and Ouachita National Forests, and in the state's 
parks system. For Texas, public lands are located principally in the 
Southeastern region, and managed so as to build up the growing stock. 18 
As noted, both Texas and Louisiana have very small percentages of commer­
cial forest land in publicly-owned holdings (respectively, 6 .3 and 
percent).
The very substantial portion of commercial forest area in all 
the survey states owned by nonfarm, non-wood-industry owners reflects 
both the incidence of reversion of abandoned farmlands to forests, and 
the absentee ownership characteristic of such holdings which has manifested 
itself in spotty forest management. Forest management has been most con­
spicuously practiced on the public lands and those held by the wood-using 
industries, with most of the balanced growth and yields appearing on those 
lands. 19
17Findell, et. al., Op. Git., p. 9*
ls"Forests of East Texas”, p. J.
19For example, Findell (Op. Cit., p. 8) noted that by 1955j 70 
percent of the replanted area in the State of Michigan was publicly-owned; 
Sternitzke (Op. Git., p. 6) identified the Ozark and Ouachita regions 
(half publicly-owned) and the Southwestern region (2/5 owned by forest in­
dustries) as leading in both reforestation and pine volume.
k-2
In terms of volume of standing live timber, a comparison shows 
Louisiana to be the leader of the four survey states ( see Tables 3a an<3 
3b) in both the sawtimber and growing-stock measures. Arkansas and 
Michigan are in a virtual tie for second-place in volume of growing stock, 
with Texas last by a considerable margin. In sawtimber volume (mature 
trees) however, Texas is ahead of Michigan, reflecting the rebuilding 
task facing the latter state's forest industry. 20 Michigan's softwood 
production is a problem area, dating back to the last century, when ruth­
less logging operations in their heyday all but eliminated her famed white 
pines. Many of the former white-pine stands have been supplanted by vol-
On
unteer growth of aspen, a wood less-desired by the wood-using industries.
In East Texas, the Southeastern region appears to be progressing much more 
than the Northeastern region, the former held in principally-large tracts 
by private owners and wood-using industries, while the Northeast is char­
acterized by small holdings by farmers and others. 22
One characteristic of forestry industries among the states which 
has both predictive and descriptive values for the quality of forest man­
agement, and the probable future expectations for sustained (or increasing, 
or decreasing) yields is the ratio of net annual growth to net annual cut 
for sawtimber and growing stock. These ratios are portrayed below:
2oSee Findell, 0j>. Cit., pp. 9“!^ for a discussion of the pro­
blem of balance in Michigan's growing stock, especially the lack of middle- 
sized timber.
21Findell, Ojj. Cit. , p.2.
22"Forests of East Texas", pp. 1,2.
Table 3c
Ratio of Net Annual Growth to Net Annual Cut, l$)62: 
Sawtimber and Growing Stock
U.S. Arkansas Louisiana Michigan Texas
Sawtimber....... 1.13 l.kj 2 .1 8 2.09 2 .2 6
Growing Stock.... 1.60 1.67 2.15 2 .5 0 2 .2 6
Source: Tables 3a and 3 b
The above ratios do not, however, portray some significant 
qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the forest volume within 
the states. In the State of Arkansas, for example, softwoods have been 
gaining in volume steadily, with 80 percent of the gain in softwood tim­
ber occurring on tracts held either by public agencies or by the wood- 
using industries, largely in Western Arkansas.23 At the same time,' hard­
wood volume has been declining in the sawtimber-sized classes for the 
state, both as a result of overcut (with the cut exceeding growth by as 
much as 69 percent in 1958) and the removal of hardwood trees (either as 
a silviculture measure in lands better suited to pines or other softwoods, 
or clearing of farm lands, especially in the Delta Regions) from forest 
land s.24
23Sternitzke, Ojd. Cit., pp. T_9*
24Ibid., p. 9.
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Louisiana's forest land is rated as 50 percent well-stocked25 
(containing at least 70 percent of the number of good trees, including 
seedlings and saplings, required for full stocking), as compared to about 
two-thirds of Arkansas’ forest land,26 and an area approaching 70 percent 
for Michigan.27 and 59 percent for the East Texas forests.28 The South­
western section of Louisiana is in process of rebuilding (though not 
infrequently without direct management) following a heavy cutting during 
the 1930's.29 Finally, although Louisiana's hardwood stands are nearly 
half of sawtimber size, the largest concentration lies in the bottomland 
stands (three-fifths of total volume) along the Pearl River, Mississippi 
River, and elsewhere where logging operations are "difficult".30
Michigan1s forest problems, in addition to the dearth of good- 
quality softwood sawtimber,include an unbalanced volume in softwoods, with 
saplings and seedlings in abundance, but a dearth in poletimber-sized 
trees to serve both the current needs of the pulpwood industry, and the 
necessary subsequent growth to sawtimber size, a category which is already 
deficient.31 Finally, balance in the cutting of trees has been cited as 
lacking, with some trees (especially yellow birch, sugar maple, spruce and
25"Forests of Louisiana”, p. 6.
2sStemitzke, 0£. Cit. , p. 4.
^Findell, 0£. Cit., pp. 2,3«
2s»Forests of East Texas", p. 5*
29"Forests of Louisiana", p. 8.
3QIbjd., p. 4.
31Findell, Ojd. Cit., p. 7-
5^balsam fir) being overcut, and others (such as oak, aspen, paper birch 
and soft maple) undercut to the extent that even necessary selective 
thinning is inadequate.32
In the East Texas forests, the Northeastern region comprises a 
problem area, consisting of numerous small-sized tracts notable for the 
absence of sound forest management. Chronic overcut of softwoods between 
1935 and 1955 resulted in a 39 percent decrease in softwood volume in 
this area, while the Southeastern region showed a 23 percent gain in this 
category.33 The fact that the Southeast is characterized by larger 
tracts, and numerous tracts owned and managed by government or wood-using 
industries, gives some indication as to why this two-sided picture exists 
for East Texas forests. Thus, the Northeast contains less than 50 percent 
well-stocked stands, while the Southeast shows better than 63 percent 
well-stocked stands.34
To summarize, it appears that timber and forest products are, 
and will continue to be significant for each of the states' manufacturing 
and employment (perhaps a good deal more for the three Southern states, 
if present indications may be credited, than for Michigan). Some forest 
problems are common to all the states (need for education in scientific 
forest management, problems with insects, fire and disease, and presence 
of cull trees, for example), while others, such as Louisiana's "difficult" 
logging in the swamplands, or the competition between rich Delta farming
32Ibid., pp. 9s 10
33,,Forests of East Texas", Table 3> P* 6.
34Ibid., pp. 5, 6.
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potential and needed hardwood stands occupying the land in Arkansas, are 
unique to each state.
It appears that efforts are being made to expand methods of 
sound forestry management by government, industry and private agencies 
in each state, but the success has been larger with those groups who might 
be expected to grasp opportunities for more efficient forest operations -- 
the public agencies (as an example to private owners, to some extent) and 
the wood-using industries. Small tracts should provide a steadily-dimin­
ishing contribution to total volume and cutting for the timber industry, 
continuing the trend that emerges in each of the four forest surveys con­
sulted for this study.
The conditions and expectations surrounding the conduct of 
forest operations should provide helpful perspective for adjudging the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of forest tax policy, and rates of tax­
ation, to be examined in Chapter III of this study. The way in which such 
taxes have been shaped by, and at the same time have contributed to the 
shaping of, forest practices and conditions in each of the several survey 
states should now be somewhat easier to ascertain.
B. Mineral Resources
Mineral resources, as non-renewable by nature, present not only 
the questions of conservation and efficient use, but additionally raise the 
considerations of available reserves and the depletion period at current 
production rates. Some attention will be given to these matters, as well 
as the production, employment and economic impact of mineral resource in­
dustries to the survey states. For purposes of classification, mineral
production has been scheduled in three classifications: mineral fuels,
metallic minerals, and other minerals. Summary data on minerals produc­
tion for the survey states, and for the United States, for the year 19^5 
are presented on the pages immediately following (Table 6), and frequent 
reference will be made to these descriptive figures.
Mineral Fuels. The significance of mineral fuels to the states 
of Texas and Louisiana is very evident from an examination of Table 6, 
with the two states ranking first and second, respectively in value of 
mineral fuels production in the nation. This is based largely on the 
strength of crude petroleum, but also includes natural gas and natural gas 
liquids leadership. These substances are also very important to Arkansas' 
minerals yield, accounting for almost half her total for minerals. By 
contrast, Michigan's mineral-fuels production accounts for only about 10 
percent of the total value of her minerals value. In absolute terms,
Texas1 mineral fuels accounted for almost 4.3 billions of dollars for 
I965, and comprised about 37 percent of production value for the entire 
nation in that year. Louisiana1s 2.8 billion-dollar yield placed her 
second to Texas, and accounted for about 20 percent. Among the survey 
states, Arkansas was third with 88 million dollars from mineral fuels, and 
Michigan last with 56 millions, neither being significant nationally.
Arkansas was the only one of the four survey states to record 
coal production in 19&5j though Texas' production of some lignite was noted 
among the "items whose value cannot be disclosed" for security purposes 
(Table 6, p. 48). Arkansas apparently had some lignite produced under 
somewhat similar conditions, but the bulk of her production was bituminous 
coal. The producing coal mines (six were-active in 1963) were located in
Table 6
Mineral Production in the United States, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Michigan and Texas for the Year I965
(Value in thousands of dollars; Quantities as indicated)
Mineral
Production / Value of Production
United States Arkansas Louisiana Michigan Texas
I. MINERAL FUELS:
Coal (Bituminous and Lignite)
Th. short tons............. 512,088 226 — -- w
Value...................... 2 ,276,022 1,643 — -- w
Natural Gas (millions of cubic 
feet)...................... 82 ,831 4,466,786 34,558 6 ,636,555
Value............ .......... 2,494,542 12,922 812,955 8,674 858,396
Natural Gas Liquids:
Natural Gasoline and cycle 
products (th. gallons).... 7,288,070 27,787 1,431,836 9,054 3 ,772,471
Value.................... 494,354 1,578 102,731 607 256,959
LP gases (th. gallons)..... 11,257,267 69,752 1,300,038 76 ,299 5,847,601
Value............ ........ 417,249 3,139 46,101 3,815 204,666
Peat (Short tons)............. 603,746 -- -- 230,950 —
Value...................... 6,080 -- -- 2,134 —
Petroleum (crude).............
(Th. 42-gal. barrels)......
&
2,848,462 23?230 594,830 14,728 1,000,749
Value................. . 8 ,158,150 68,974 1,841,714 41,091 2 ,962,119
Value of other Mineral Fuels:2 35,652 -- -- -- w
Total Value Min. Fuels:3 14,045,000 88 ,256 2 ,803,501 56,321 4,282,140
Footnotes at End of Table
Table 6 (continued)
Production / Value of Production 
Mineral -----------------------------------------------------
United States Arkansas Louisiana Michigan Texas
II. METALLIC MINERALS
Bauxite (long tons-dried
equivalent)................
Value......................
1,653,840
18,652
1,593,085
17,974
— -- --
Copper (recoverable content
of ores, sh. tons)..,...... 1,351,734 — — 71 ,749 —
Value.................. . 957,028 — — 50,798 —
Iron Ore (usable, thous.
long tons)................. 84,472 w — 13,527 W
Value...................... 8o4,498 w — 145,482 W
Wilver (recoverable content
of ores, th. Troy oz.)..... 39,808
51,469
— — 438 --
Values..................... -- — 592 --
Other Metals2 Value........... 1,640,373 X X X X X X w
Total Metals Value3........ 2,472,000 17,934 -- 196,872 w
III. OTHER MINERALS:
Barite (th. short tons) 
Value..............
Bromine and Bromine in 
compounds (th. lbs.) 
Balue...............
852
io , 192 
77,259
249
2,379
32,257
7,171
W
w
w
w
w
w
4=~
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Footnotes at end of table
Table 6 ( continued)
Production / Value of ProductionMineral United States Arkansas Louisiana Michigan Texas
II. OTHER MINERALS (cont.)
Cement:
Portland (th. 376-lb.
barrels)................. 366,802 W W 27,565 30,820
Value...................... 1,154,448 W W 86,996 97,598
Masonry (th. 280-lb.
barrels)................. 23,260 W W 2,108 968
Value....................... 65 , 979 W W 5,373 3,011
Clays (th. short tons)........  )
Value....................... )
i
55,089 866 909 2,402
203,772 1,890 936 2 ,580 6,665
Gem Stones ( est)..............  ' NA NA -- w NA
Value...................... 2,218 31 ------ w 150
Gympsum (th. short tons)...... 10,035 W ------ l.?.3?8 ii.<M
Value...................... 37,423 w ------ 5,027 3 ,79^
Helium (th. cubic feet)
Crude....................... 3,566,73^ ------- -- — ,1?P.13.?.708
Value...................... 39,848 ------ ------ — 10,330
Grade A .................... 819,100 ------ ------ — 350,000
Value............... ....... 28,880 — ----- — 12,250
Lime ( th. short tons)......... 16,79^ 192 842 1,095 1,338
Value....................... 232,939 2 ,7 7 6 9,980 13,057 12,663
Magnesium Compounds from sea 
water and brine (exc. for 
metals) sh. tons, MgO equiv.) 664 ,-021 319,38.9 W )>
Value....................... ^7,555 -- — 26,143 w
Footnotes at end of table
Table 6 (continued)
Mineral
Production / Value of Production
United States Arkansas Louisiana Michigan Texas
III. OTHER MINERALS (cont.)
Perlite (short tons)..........
Value......................
392,384
3,352
---
... ...
1,000
8
Salt (Th. short tons).........
Value......................
37,687
215,699 ...
8 ,126
41,812
4,171
36,087
6 ,964  
30,771
Sand and Gravel (th. short
tons).... ..................
Value.... ..................
908,04-9
4-57,416
12,806
15,836
14,298
16,405
37,545
27,296
32,649
36,075
Stone4 (Th. short tons).......
Value......................
780,012
1,203,618
21,806
26,778
7 ?452
10,905
34,713
36,438
39? 320 
53,659
Sulfur (Frasch-process
mines - long tons).........
Value...................... 146,921
--- 3? 577 
71,9&
— 3,674
83,282
Talc and Soapstone (sh. tons).. 
Value......................
862,875
6,343
W
W
— — 64,211
204
Value of other Minerals not
listed above, U.S.......... 82,138 --- — — —
Total Value Other Minerals3 . 4,117,000 56,861 152,004 238,997 357,660
Value of Items withheld from 
disclosure, incl. items desig­
nated "W11..... ................ X X 16,019 23,350 53,490 78,328
TOTAL VALUE ALL MINERALS...... 21,433,000 179,HO 2,978,855 565,560 4,718,129
Footnotes following page
Table 6 (concluded)
NA: Not Available xx: Not Applicable W: Withheld to avoid disclosure of indi­
vidual company confidential data; 
included with "value of items that 
cannot be disclosed."
1. Figures are for bituminous coal production in Arkansas, lignite production in Arkansas and 
Texas are withheld to avoid disclosure of confidential data.
2. Refers in each case to the minerals not produced by the four survey states.
3. Total is incomplete, due to the withholding of value data on confidential items.
"Stone" in this case excludes abrasive stone, bituminous limestone, and ground soapstone. 
These items appear elsewhere, or in the "items that cannot be disclosed" data.
5. In addition to the "W" items, the following are included in the "items that cannot be 
disclosed" column:
For Arkansas: Abrasive stone, phosphate rock, soapstone, tripoli, and lignite;
For Louisiana: stone (crushed miscellaneous);
For Michigan: Bromine, calcium-magnesium chloride, iodine, potassium aalts;
For Texas: Native asphalt, graphite, magnesium chloride (for metal), pumice,
sodium sulfate, and uranium ore.
Source: Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 1965s Vol. 1, Table 1, pp. 9T-8, and
Table 5s PP* 103~12.
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Western and Westcentral areas of the state, primarily in three counties -- 
Franklin, Johnson and Sebastian. Total production was only about 226 
thousand tons, with Johnson county mines accounting for about 129 thou­
sand, Franklin about 87 thousand, and Sebastian about 10 thousand.35 
Goal-mining in the state accounted for only an average of 109 employees 
in the mine, working an average of I85 days, or a total of about 20 ,000  
man-days, with most operations being surface of "strip" mines ( less than 
4,000 tons came from underground operations in 1965).3S Arkansas' total 
production accounted for less than 0.5 percent of the national output, 
and yielded $1.6 millions in value (Table 6).
Although only Arkansas and Texas were identified as producers 
in I965 among the survey states, the state of Michigan also has some known 
coal deposits of possible commercial value in the Central portion of Lower 
Michigan, but.apparently the exploitation of these deposits is not economic­
ally- feasible at this time.37 Most of the Texas and Arkansas production 
currently goes to gas and coke plants, with small quantities to retail 
dealers and other users.38 Recently, speculation has arisen concerning 
the possible effects of the Arkansas River Navigation Project upon the 
coal mines located in the vicinity of the river, with rumors of tentative 
contracts between mine owners and Japanese industrial interests for delivery
35Minerals Yearbook, 19&5, Vol. II - Mineral Fuels, Bureau of 
Mines, U. S. Department of Interior, p. 118.
36Ibid., Loc. Cit. and p. 123.
37Coal Facts, 1966, National Coal Association (Washington,
D. C., 1967), p. 42.
of coal to that nation (a major coal-user in recent years) in the 1970's, 
when the Navigation Project is scheduled for completion. Arkansas' coal 
reserves are calculated at only about 2..b billion tons as of i960, and 
only about half of that is recoverable, according to industry norms.39 
Michigan's known reserves were only 205 million tons, with about 102 
million recoverable by the industry standard. These figures compare with 
national figures of 1,660 billion tons total, or 830 billion tons recover­
able.40
In the production of natural gas, Texas leads not only the sur­
vey states, but the nation as well, in the volume and value of production, 
with Louisiana second in both categories. Texas' production of 6.6 tril­
lion cubic feet in 19^5 accounted for about 4l percent of national produc­
tion, with Louisiana's k.5 trillion cubic feet comprising just short of 
28 percent of the national total. Thus, between the two states, more than 
two-thirds of the total output of natural gas is accounted for. Arkansas 
is a distant third among the survey states, with 83 billion feet, and 
Michigan's production was a modest >^b.6 billion cubic feet. Natural gas 
is found abundantly in many areas of Louisiana and Texas, sometimes in 
wells producing dry gas, and virtually always is found in conjunction with 
crude oil deposits.41 Arkansas's gas fields lie in the Southern, South­
western and Western parts of the states, presently, and Lower Michigan's
39Minerals Yearbook, 19^5» Vol. I, p. M j-.
4QIbid.
41The Oil Producing Industry in Your State, I967 ed., Independ­
ent Petroleum Association of America, pp. 33> 70.
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oil lands also contain many of her natural gas deposits.42 The production, 
especially, of Louisiana, and to a considerable degree, that of Texas have 
been augmented substantially by offshore discoveries. The reserves of nat­
ural gas proved as of the end of 1965 are indicated below:
Table 7
Estimated Proved Recoverable Reserves of Natural 
Gas -- Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Texas and 
United States, Jan. 1, 1966
(Million cu. ft. at 14.73 psia at 60°F)
Arkansas........  . 2,269,012
Louisiana........  82,811,157
Michigan.........  745,804
Texas............  114,335,292
Total U.S........  286,468,925
Source: Minerals Yearbook
Much the same relationship applies among the survey states in 
the production of natural gas, liquids (often, but not always associated 
with oil-field operations). Again, Texas led both the survey states and 
the nation with a total of S.6 billion gallons of combined categories, 
half the national production, and Louisiana was second with a combined
total of 2.7 billion gallons. Arkansas and Michigan lagged far behind
with 97 million and 85 million gallons, respectively. Data on reserves 
are as follows:
42Ibid., pp. l6, 36.
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Table 8
Estimated Proved Recoverable Reserves 
of Natural Gas Liquids -- Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Texas and U. S. as of Jan. 1, 1966 
(Thousands of barrels)
Arkansas...........  Ik,756
Louisiana..........  2,168,802
Michigan............ k,9l6
Texas............... 3 3 648,624
Total U.S..........  8,023,53k
Source: Minerals Yearbook
Texas is the only state in the survey group producing helium, 
which is designated a "mineral fuel" by the Bureau of Mines.43 Of a 
total 1965 production of 3*5 billion cubic feet, Texas accounted for 1 
billion cubic feet of crude helium; of 819 million cubic feet of Grade A 
helium, Texas produced 350 million cubic feet. This production yielded 
values of $10.33 millions and $12.25 millions, respectively for Texas' 
mineral industries. Other principal producers were Oklahoma, New Mexico 
and Nevada.44
Peat is produced only by Michigan among the survey states, and 
she is the leading producer of this substance, again classified as a "min­
eral fuel" by the Bureau of Mines,45 but most of Michigan's output was 
used for agricultural purposes, such as potting soils, mulch and plant 
nutrients. In 19653 Michigan's production of 231 million short tons 
accounted for 38 percent of national yield. Michigan and the next six
43Minerals Yearbook, I9653 Vol. II, p,k57.
44Ibid.
45Ibid., p. 238.
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producers account for three-fourths of the national total, though some 26 
states reported production. 46
Finally, and by no means least, Crude petroleum is produced by 
each of the survey states. Again, Texas was the undisputed leader in 1965, 
with production of 1,000 million barrels, more than JO percent of the na­
tional total. Louisiana was second, both in the survey group and nation­
ally, with a total of 595 million barrels, or about 2 1 .6 percent of national 
yield. Arkansas' production of 26 million barrels ranked her 15th among J1 
identified producing states, and Michigan's 15 million barrels placed 
18th . 47
In addition to inland producing areas of considerable magnitude, 
Texas and Louisiana also draw considerable crude oil from offshore drilling 
in the Gulf of Mexico. Producing wells may be found in numerous locations 
over much of the area of the states of Texas and Louisiana, but Arkansas' 
production takes place mostly in the Southern and Southwestern portion of 
the state, in a limited number of fields at present. Michigan's Lower 
Peninsula area produces oil in central and Southwestern sections.
Estimated proved reserves for crude petroleum are indicated in 
the following summary:
4sIbid.
47Petroleum Facts and Figures, 1965, American Petroleum Institute: 
New York, p. 4o.
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Table 9
Estimates of Proved Recoverable Crude-Oil 
Reserves of the United States, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Michigan and Texas, January 1, 1966
(Millions of barrels)
United States............... 31,352
Arkansas....................  201
Louisiana................... 5 >246
Michigan......... •.......... 53
Texas.............    9>l8l
Petroleum products constitute the overwhelming payoffs for Texas 
and Louisiana among their minerals industries, accounting for about 91 per­
cent of the value of Texas' unprocessed minerals value, and 94 percent of 
that for Louisiana. When the extensive refining, transportation, and asso­
ciated value-adding industries of the two states are considered, the sig­
nificance of the petroleum wealth of the two states is magnified many times 
over. In Arkansas, the value of petroleum products at the unprocessed 
level approaches k-J percent of her minerals value, but' for Michigan, the 
petroleum production totals only about 10 percent of minerals value, prior 
to processing.
Metallic Minerals. This category would be somewhat sparsely- 
populated among the survey states, were it not for the presence of Michigan 
(see Table 6, p. 48). Michigan is the only survey state with a substantial 
metals industry of multiple-product significance. This is not to discount 
the importance of the bauxite production of Arkansas, in which she stands 
virtually alone among states of the Union. Louisiana and Texas, for all 
their massive mineral wealth, have no significant production in this group.
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Arkansas, as indicated, has a virtual monopoly on the domestic 
production of bauxite ore, the greyish, claylike base for aluminum. Of 
total domestic production, Arkansas accounts for over 95 percent annually 
( the two other domestic producing states are Alabama and Georgia). This 
also describes her position in known reserves of bauxite ore for the U.S. 
It should be noted, however, that the production of bauxite ore in Arkan­
sas, and in the nation (1,595 and 1,654 thousand long tons in 1965, res­
pectively) represent a pittance of world production (56 ,530 thousand long 
tons in I965)-4s The U» S. aluminum-manufacturing industry thus finds it 
necessary to import substantial amounts of bauxite and alumina (semi­
processed ore) to meet its needs. Jamaica led the world in bauxite pro­
duction in 1965, with 8,514 thousand long tons, and several South American 
countries (Venezuela and Surinam, for example) led the United States in 
production. 49 In Arkansas, bauxite ore is found principally in three 
counties in the central part of the state: Pulaski, Saline and Garland.
In addition to the basic mining operations, two of the principal aluminum 
producing firms operate reduction and alumina plants in Saline and Garland 
counties. No plant to produce- finished aluminum metal has ye . been built 
in the state.
As a percent of value of Arkansas' minerals industries at the 
resource level, the $18 millions realized from bauxite constitute almost 
10 percent, though it should be apparent that the processing and related 
activities would substantially enhance its total value to the state's
4sMinerals Yearbook, 1965a Vol. I. "Metals and Minerals", p. 229.
49Ibid.
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economy. Although they do not produce bauxite ore, the states of Texas 
and Louisiana are involved in the aluminum industry, with processing plants 
in each state for ores imported into Gulf ports from South America, prin­
cipally alumina and other treatment plants.
Copper ore is produced only by Michigan among the survey states, 
and she does not rank among the leading producers (she was sixth in 1965> 
and for most years preceding, among eight producing states).50 Her 1965 
production of J2 thousand short tons yielded a value of $51 millions (less 
than 0.5 percent of total output value for the U.S.), according to Table 6, 
p. 48. Copper production is carried on in mines in the Western Upper Pen­
insula, located in three counties: Houghton, Keweenaw and Ontonagon.51
Michigan is also virtually exclusive among the survey states in 
her production of iron ore, ranking generally 1 - 2  with Minnesota in na­
tional production.52 Michigan’s 1965 output was 13*5 million long tons of 
usable iron ore, out of a total industry production of 84.5 millions, or 
about 16 percent of the total. The yield of $145-5 millions of dollars 
constitutes Michigan's largest mineral payoff, and the largest resource- 
industry yield in value of product, as well. Michigan1s iron-ore produc­
tion, like her copper production, arises from ranges in the Upper Peninsula, 
centered in the counties of Marquette, and Menominee in the central portion, 
and Gogebic in the West.53 The volume is roughly accounted for in the order
5°Minerals Yearbook, 1965s Vol. X, p. 2 32.
5Michigan Yearbook, i960, Democratic Business and Professional 
Committee of Michigan, (Detroit, Mich. -- I96I) pp. 183.
52Minerals Yearbook, 19^5? Vol. I., Loc. Cit.
53Michigan Yearbook, Loc. Cit.
indicated, though all are fairly well-balanced in output. Modest opera­
tions attempting to extract iron ore from low-grade pyrites have been 
undertaken in Arkansas and Texas, but no value or quantity figures are 
available at this time.54
Silver production is carried on in Michigan's Upper Peninsula 
on a small scale by a limited number of firms.55 The value of this pro­
duction in 1965 of 592 thousand dollars places it in a minor category.
In assessing metals production, Michigan clearly has the great­
est stake in this minerals category, with about 3^*7 percent of her total 
I965 minerals value consisting of metals production. With the exception 
of Bauxite, which comprises about 10 percent of the minerals value for 
Arkansas, metals are not a major contributor to the minerals industries 
of that state. Nor does the small iron-ore development in Texas appear 
to present the likelihood of substantial volume in the near future. 
Louisiana has no commercial metals-ore production, though both that state 
and the state of Texas do have metals-processing activities.
Other Minerals. Because this category is so numerous, and con­
tains many items produced in only very small quantities, attention will be 
given in the following discussion only to those minerals in which one or 
more of the survey states is a leading producer. One observation at the 
outset is that Texas produces the largest variety of minerals other than 
metals and mineral fuels, and derives the largest total value from this 
group. Next in order is Michigan, with a similarly-diverse variety and
54Minerals Yearbook, 19^5j Vol. I, p. ^80.
55Minerals Yearbook, 19&5, Vol. I, p. 112, p. 83 2.
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a substantial value, followed by Arkansas in number of categories, but 
Louisiana in values (largely on the basis of her rich salt and sulfur 
production). Percentage importance of the "other minerals” category to 
the four states is as follows: Texas, J .6 percent; Louisiana, 5 percent;
Arkansas, J1.6 percent; and Michigan, 42 percent, which is striking evi­
dence of the tremendous importance of mineral fuels in Louisiana and 
Texas, and of the balanced minerals production for Arkansas and Michigan.
Arkansas was second nationally in I965 production of barite, a 
material whose major use has been as an abrasive component in drilling 
"mud" used for drilling oil and gas wells.56 Missouri ranked ahead of 
Arkansas in 1965} but the lead had changed hands between these two states 
frequently for several years, with neither enjoying a clear quantity 
advantage. Texas also produces this substance, but no figures were dis­
closed for 1965} to protect confidential company records. (Table 6, p.48)• 
Total production for Arkansas in 1965 was 249 thousand tons, or 29 percent 
of the national production of 852 thousand tons. Value of the Arkansas 
production was about $2.4 million. Texas is not among the leaders in 
barite production, but. Nevada and Georgia are major producers.57
In the production of Bromine and bromine in compounds, Michigan 
led the nation in I965, followed by Texas, but, due to requirements for 
security of company data, no figures were made public for either state.50 
Arkansas ranked third in production in 1965} with J2, t h o u s a n d  pounds,
5SMinerals Yearbook, 1965, Vol. I, p. 213*
57Ibid.
58Ibid., pp. 257-8.
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or about 10 percent of total U. S. production of 328,115 thousand pounds, 
and produced a value of more than $7 millions.
Among producers of all types of cement, Texas ranked third 
nationally in 1965a with Michigan fourth.58 Texas' advantage over Michi­
gan was in the production of Portland cement, with 30.8 million barrels 
producing $97 millions, compared to Michigan's 27.6 million barrels, pro­
ducing $87 millions. In masonry cement, Michigan had a definite edge, 
with 2 million barrels and $5*4 millions, compared to Texas' 968 thousand 
barrels, producing $3 millions (Table 6, p. 48). Both Arkansas and Louisi­
ana produced cement of both types, but data were withheld to protect com­
pany identities and records.
.Michigan is the second-leading producer nationally of gypsum, an 
alkaline, talc-like substance used in such things as cement-making (masonry), 
dry wallboard, and some paint-making processes.60 Texas is fourth nation­
ally, close behind Michigan's 1965 total of 1.3 million short tons and 13 
percent of the total, with about 1 million tons and 10 percent of the 
national output. Arkansas also had production of gypsum in 1965j but data 
were withheld for protection of company records.
In the production of lime, Texas and Michigan are third and fourth 
nationally with the lead changing from time to time. In 1965? Texas' pro­
duction was higher, with about 1 .3 million short tons to Michigan's 1.1 
million. Louisiana was not far behind with 842 thousand short tons, and 
Arkansas produced a modest 192 thousand short tons. Lime production is
59Ibid., pp. 273, 2 7 6.
soMinerals Yearbook, 1965j Vol. I, p. 463-
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rather generalized, with the majority of states contributing to the totals, 
so that the rankings are subject to frequent change.61 Texas, for example, 
accounted for only about 8 percent of the national total in 1965s Louisi­
ana for about 6.5 percent, even though they were high-ranking states.
Michigan leads the nation in the production of magnesium com­
pounds synthesized from sea water and brines, and Texas was third in 1965. 
Almost half the total for 1965 was produced by Michigan (see Table 6). 
Arkansas and Louisiana had no recorded production of these compounds.
Louisiana ranked first nationally in the production of salt in
1965, with a production of about 8 million short tons. Texas was second
with about 7 million short tons. Michigan was also a substantial contri­
butor with 4 million short tons. Arkansas did not record production of
salt, and apparently has no commercially-significant deposits. The three 
survey states which did record production together account for half the 
national total (Table 6).
Michigan ranks second nationally in the production of sand and 
gravel, with 37*5 million short tons in 1965*62 but, because of the almost- 
universal production of these materials, her share is only about 4 percent 
of the total. Her 37-5 million short tons was closely-matched by 32.6 
million for Texas, followed among the survey states by Louisiana's 14.3 
million and Arkansas' 12.8 million.
Texas led the nation in production of sodium sulfate in 1965, 
but production figures were not made public for reasons of company
alIbid., pp. 557-601.
aaMinerals Yearbook, 1965j Vol. I, p. 8o4.
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security.63 Two other states produce natural sodium sulfate: California
and Wyoming.
Production of sulfur by the Frasch process (involving hydraulic 
recovery) is shared exclusively by two states: Texas and Louisiana, and
their positions are virtually in a tie; Texas led with 5*7 million long 
tons in 1965> or about 51 percent, and Louisiana had 3*6 million long tons, 
or k-9 percent. Production yielded $83 millions to Texas in 1965, and about 
$72 millions to Louisiana.
A summary of minerals production for the four states offers 
several significant characteristics indicative of the differential impor­
tance of these industries. First, it should be noted that Texas and 
Louisiana, with, respectively, $4.7 billions and $3 billions in values 
of product at the mine or well, of a national total of approximately $21 
billions, are the two most significant resource-producers in the nation. 
Taken together, the two states alone account for one-third of all mineral 
values in 1965* Michigan's mineral value of 565*6 million dollars con­
stitutes a bit more than 2.6 percent, while Arkansas' total of 179 million 
dollars constitutes only about O .83 percent of the national total. Viewed 
in terms of the fifty states, the resource industries of Texas and Louisiana 
are much-greater-than-proportionate in their share of the total, Michigan 
is slightly more-than-proportional, and Arkansas is decidedly less-than- 
proportional to the average.
As previously noted, mineral fuels constitute the bulk of value 
for the minerals industries‘for both Louisiana and Texas (9 4 and 91 per-
63Ibid., pp. 855-7.
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cent, respectively). For Arkansas, mineral fuels are also the leading 
category, providing k-9 percent of the total. By contrast, Michigan1s 
mineral-fuels are responsible for only about 10 percent of the total; 
instead, metals (3^-«9 percent) and other minerals (55-1 percent) produce 
the bulk of her mineral revenue.
Total employment in mining, as a part of nonagricultural employ­
ment serve to illustrate the basic-resource impact on the labor market at 
the mines and in the fields:
Table 10
Employees in Mining Industries, 196k, and Total 
Nonagricultural Employment for the United States, Arkansas 
Louisiana, Michigan and Texas
Employees Percent in
______ (thousands) Mining Industry
Total Non- Mining 
_______________________ agricultural___________________________
United States  58 ,188 655 1*1
Arkansas............ k-29 5 1*1
Louisiana  857 -^6 ^.b
Michigan  2,k-73 13 0*5
Texas  2,552 110 3-8
Source: Employment and Earnings, Bureau of Labor Statistics
figures appearing in Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, I965, pp. 22k-5._
Viewing the figures for mining employment, it should be apparent 
that, in numbers and percentages employed, basic mining and resource acti­
vities are not an overwhelming category. Louisiana had the highest per­
centage of nonagricultural workers,  ^.b percent, and Michigan had the
lowest, 0.5 > while Texas was second with 3 .8  percent, and Arkansas stood 
at about the national average of 1.1 percent. In numbers employed, of 
course, Texas and Louisiana had a substantial lead over the other two 
states.
But employment at the mine is by no means the full measure of 
the employment impact of resource industries. Industries drawing upon 
the resource base for their activities, such as transportation, refining 
or processing, service and equipment, and other associated functions may 
have much greater impact upon employment and incomes than is evident in a 
summary of those actively engaged in extractive activities. This comprises 
only the beginning of a chain of activity that extends all the way to the 
consumer.
G. Fisheries
This brief section is devoted to the study of the fisheries of 
the four survey states. A review of the results of the 1964 operations of 
commercial fisheries is presented in Table 11. Catch of fish and shellfish 
are indicated, along with some pertinent information regarding fishermen, 
equipment and processing plants.
From an observation of the table, it will be seen that commercial 
( as opposed to sport, or recreational) fishing is most important to Texas 
and Louisiana, in terms of volume of catch, value, and affected persons.
The value of fisheries products for these two states is several times that 
of either Arkansas or Michigan. Louisiana’s commercial fishing occurs in 
both the Mississippi River and Gulf fishery areas; that of Texas is princi­
pally in the Gulf area, though there is some commercial fishing on rivers
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and streams, notably the Red River, but the bulk of her catch, as that of 
Louisiana, is derived from Gulf fisheries. For Louisiana, only 7 million 
pounds of her catch came from the Mississippi fisheries area, with a value 
of about 1.1 million dollars. These figures are consolidated into the 
totals on the table.
Texas and Louisiana are in a virtual tie for value of fisheries 
products, though Louisiana catches more poundage of fish, while Texas has 
an edge in shellfish, such as shrimp, oysters, clams, etc.
Michigan1s commercial fisheries produced a total of 20 million 
pounds of fish in 196k-, with a value of $2 .5 millions. Michigan is in­
cluded in the Great Lakes Fisheries area, and draws much of her volume 
from the waters of these huge inland bodies. She reported no significant 
shellfish catch by commercial fishermen, and apparently does not deal in 
these species commercially.
The fisheries of Arkansas are quite modest by comparison, even 
with the fisheries of Michigan. Her fisheries are all within the Mississi­
ppi River Fisheries region, comprised of the systems of the Mississippi: 
the Arkansas, White, Black, St. Francis and other rivers which are tribu­
taries of the Mississippi, Her total catch for 196^ amounted to only 
million pounds, comprising a value of about $500 thousand. Her production 
comes primarily from small operations, often of the family-operated type, 
with products sold fresh at nearby markets.
Processing plants and manufacturing operations for fish products 
are, of course, most numerous in Texas and Louisiana (Table 11), and pro­
cess the largest variety of catch. Those plants in Arkansas, and many of 
those in Michigan, process mainly rough fish for dog and cat food.
Table 11
Fisheries Data, 1964 for 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan and Texas
State
1964 Catch in Thousands of pounds; 
Value in thousands of dollars
Fishermen 
(thousands)
Fishing Craft Wholesale and Manufac­
turingVessels Boats
Fish Shellfish,
etc.
Total Plants Employment
season 
av’ g
year1s 
av1 gcatch value catch value catch value
Arkansas...... 3,896' 477 135 18 4,031 495 1 .1 — 910 45 68 68
Louisiana..... 704,845 13,817 78 ,070 22,552 787,087 36,852 11.9 1,062 5,888 237 5,427 3,370
Michigan...... 19,769 2,522 ----- ----- 19,769 2,522 1-3 213 568 66 637 459
Texas (Gulf) ... 73,152 2,1111- 71,918 27,4l4 145,070 29,582 6 .0 1,479 1,103 142 4,786 3,490
Source: Fishery Statistics of the United States, 1964, Fish and Wildlife Service,
U. S. Department of the Interior, Washington, D. C.
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In numbers of fishermen and craft, the preeminent positions of 
Texas and Louisiana are given further documentation, with Louisiana hav­
ing nearly 12 thousand fishermen, and Texas more than 6 thousand, as 
compared to 1,300 in Michigan and 1,000 in Arkansas. The apparent sim­
ilarity between the fishing employment in Arkansas and Michigan is dis­
pelled when it is seen that Michigan1s fishermen utilize not only smaller 
boats, but substantial numbers of larger lakes vessels. For Arkansas, 
most boats are of the flat-bottom type, variously called "john-boats”, 
"bateaus", and other names, suited to use on relatively-small rivers 
and streams.
Mainstays of the Louisiana fishing industry are the menhaden, 
accounting for 2 3 .6 percent of the value of the 196^ catch, the shrimp, 
accounting for 56 percent, and the oyster, accounting for nearly 9 per­
cent of the value. The three species combined totaled almost 92 percent 
of the total value.64 For Texas, also, the menhaden and shrimp were the 
species producing the major share of value of the catch; in this case, 
the shrimp alone accounted for almost 90 percent ($31*2 millions of 
$35-6 millions) of the total.65
Michigan's value leader in 196^ was the whitefish, comprising 
just less than 27 percent of the total. Next in order were the yellow 
perch (2^. 5 percent of value) and chubs (20.^ - percent). The three leading 
species, then, account for about 72 percent of the total value of the 
catch.66
^ Fishery Statistics of the U. S., p . 363 •
65 Ibid.
66Fishery Statistics of the U.S., p. 321.
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Arkansas1 leading commercial fish is the buffalofish, with 61.8 
percent of the 1964 catch's value. Second-ranking catfish (and bullheads) 
account for an additional 25-6 percent, and the two species together form 
more than 8j percent of the value of catch, for the year 1964.67
This brief view of the fisheries industires has sought to place 
in perspective the comparative importance in scale and value of the acti­
vities of the survey states, as well as to denote some qualitative and 
quantitative contrasts among the states. This may provide some basis of 
understanding which will be helpful in the study of taxation for this in­
dustry, which will be considered in Chapter III. As will be observed, 
Louisiana has the most extensive system of taxes on fishery products, 
though Texas, rather surprisingly, does not tax fisheries extensively.
In view of the size and scale of the industry of both these states, some 
question may be raised about that particular lack. For the other two 
states, the tax structure scarcely considers fisheries, perhaps due to 
their relatively minor significance.
67Ibid., p. 268.
CHAPTER III
TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES I:
RENEWABLE RESOURCES -- TIMBER AND FISHERIES
Chapters III and IV deal with the taxation of natural resources 
by the four survey states -- Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan and Texas. The 
present chapter is concerned with taxes levied on those resources of a. 
renewable nature: timber and forest products, fisheries and other living
resources. The following chapter (Chapter IV) considers the taxation of 
nonrenewable resources -- minerals and other resources extracted from the 
soil or water, and not subject to regeneration by human effort or manage­
ment. This division of the study is intended not only to dramatize the 
essential differences between the two classifications of resources, but 
also to illustrate the different character of tax policies applied to the 
two categories.
A. Forest Taxation
Consistent with the secondary importance assigned to the revenue- 
producing function of timber taxes, and the concern for conservation and 
reforestation goals, the forest taxes of the survey states do not dramati­
cally add to the general-fund revenues of those states. A most striking 
contrast to three of the states is the practice followed by the state of 
Texas, which levies neither a severance tax on timber nor a special yield- 
tax formula.
The disposition of revenues from special forest-applied levies 
differs for the three survey states applying such measures. Arkansas re­
tains a practice once quite common for these taxes -- devoting timber-tax
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revenues to the forestry fund. Michigan and Louisiana take a different 
approach to disposition of revenues, combining tax relief to timber owners 
through "in lieu" tax plans with a return of a portion of timber-tax re­
ceipts to the localities. The apparent intent is to replace a part of the 
resultant loss of ordinary property-tax revenues. The state of Michigan 
distinguishes between small, farm-type woodlots and commercial-sized hold­
ings, providing different schedules of taxation for for the two categories. 
Property-tax concessions are made by both Michigan and Louisiana to timber 
owners under reforestation agreements with the State, but this is not the 
case in either Arkansas or Texas.
Severance Taxes. Three of the states levy a tax of the sever- 
“ance type (Texas, as previously indicated, does not), though the features 
of the taxes differ widely. Michigan and Louisiana1 levy their taxes on 
value-based rates (ad valorem), while Arkansas assesses a specific (unit- 
measure) charge, varying with species of timber and type of timber pro­
duct. Michigan's "stumpage" tax charges different rates for private and 
commercial severers. Alternative to the general timber-severance tax in 
Louisiana, all tracts under reforestation contracts with the State are 
taxed only under the state's "reforestation severance tax", a measure 
heavily flavored with the "yield-tax" principle. This latter tax ex­
cludes the standing timber under reforestation contracts from any and all 
other taxation, including ad valorem property levies of state or local
1Though Louisiana prescribed a schedule of specific unit levies, 
practice of the Revenue Department currently is to apply the alternative 
percentage rates instead (see footnote 1 of Table 12).
Table 12
Severance Taxes on Timber and Forest Products 
for the States of Arkansas, Louisiana and Michigan
State Arkans as Louisiana (2) Michigan
Designation Severance
Tax
General
Severance
tax
Reforestation
Severance
tax
Stumpage
Tax
Legal Citation
Ark. Stat. Anno. 
(1947) & Replace. 
(Sec. 84-2102)
Const. Art. X, 
Secs. 1 and 21; 
TS 47:633
Const. Art. X, 
Secs. 1 and 21 
(2); RS 47:651,
56:1541-43,
56:1484-89
CL 380.262/320.309 
MS Anno. 13.192/ 
13.229
Basis of Tax Privilege of 
Severing Timber
Privilege of 
Severing Timber
In Lieu of 
General Property 
and other taxes
In Lieu of General 
Property tax1 and 
Privilege of har­
vesting timber
Rates of Tax
Varies from 20(6 
per cord on pulp- 
wood to 50^ Per 
M board feet on 
pine sawtimber; 
complete schedule 
of unit charges
Virgin Timber:1 
Varies from 15^ 
a standard cord 
of pulpwood to 
$1.50 per M Bd. 
ft. of red gum; 
Other than vir­
gin timber: 5% 
avg. stumpage mkt. 
value for|pulp- 
wood; 2^ |  for all 
other. j
i
Six percent of 
value, in lieu 
of all other 
taxes.
Private: 5$ of val­
ue of stumpage 
Commercial: 10^ of 
value of stumpage.
Footnotes at end of tableI
Table 12 ( continued)
State Arkansas Louisiana Michigan
^  ^ General Reforestation Stumpage
Designation Severance tax Saveranoe Tax Severance Tax Tax
Administration
Assess:
Collect:
Revenue dept. 
(Misc. tax div.)
Revenue dept.
Collector of 
Revenue
Collector of 
Revenue
Collector of 
Revenue
Collector of 
Revenue
Private
Township
Supervisor
Township
Treas.
Commercial 
State Conser­
vation Dept.
State Conser­
vation Dept.
Reports and 
Payments
Reports and Pay­
ments monthly -- 
Producers by 25th 
and purchasers and 
processors by 20th.
Reports and 
payment due 
monthly, on 
or before the 
last day.
Taxes to be 
paid when for­
est products 
are severed.
Private: Tax due to town­
ship Dec. 1, as with gen. 
property tax;
Commercial: Semi-ann. 
report of cutting 5/15  
and 10/15; tax due $0 
days after Cons. Dept, 
determines tax.
Disposition
Classified as spec­
ial revenues; pay­
able to state Fores­
try fund,.
Dedicated 75$>2 
to parish in 
which timber is 
cut; 25$ to Cen. 
Fund.
Same as for 
the General 
Severance tax
Private: Local units 
Commercial: Half to county 
to be distributed by co. 
Treasurer in ratio in 
which 15-mill (assessment) 
is allocated among units.
Fiscal 1966 Yield $884,8^9.25 $^8 ,^ 965.15 $108,^4.45 Private: Local --Not avail Commercial: less than 
$10,000 each to state and 
counties. 3
1. An attorney generals's opinion dated Jan. 12, 1955 asserted that there is little virgin timber 
remaining in the state, and, in practice Department of Revenue only applies "other" rates.
2. From Met proceeds after Collector of Revenue receives $^00,000 from all combined severance-tax 
proceeds for cost of collection (RS k-J:6kk).
5- Estimated.. Exact figure to be obtained when possible.
Table 12 Sources
1. Citizens Research Council of Michigan: Council Comments No. jkl, "Outline of the Michigan Tax
Tax System-1963"} p. 12.
2. Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Louisiana Tax Handbook, 196 -^, pp.77~8^-*
3 . Louisiana Department of Revenue, 26th Annual Report, p. 10 (I966). 
k. Arkansas Revenue Dept., Biennial Report (196^-65, 1965-66), p. J.
5 . Report of the State Comptroller, State of Arkansas, I966, pp. 32-3-
6. Industrial Research and Extension Center, Univ. of Arkansas, "A Summary of Taxes in Arkansas", p. 6.
7 . State of Louisiana, General Severance Tax, Reforestation Severance Tax, et. al., Ch. 6, Subtitle II, 
Title Vf, Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, etc., pp. 4-l^ f-.
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governments. Table 12 characterizes special timber taxation measures of 
the severance type as to their salient features.
In each of the taxes portrayed in Table 12, there are indica­
tions of the concern for establishment of good forestry practice, and the 
recognition of the special needs of forest owners. Arkansas commits tim­
ber- tax revenues to the forestry fund, a practice which was operative in 
Louisiana prior to a change in dedication in 195^ -- N°w both Michigan and 
Louisiana rely on general-fund and other bases of support for their for­
estry services. Perhaps the logic of this separation of severance reve­
nues and forestry-fund supports is best described by Marquis, when he as­
serts that a "..strict dependence on only severance revenues.." to finance 
needed services rendered by the state's forestry agency is not wise, due 
to the fact that "..annual revenues are tied to the level of log produc­
tion. .", which may fluctuate from year to year, not necessarily in unison 
with conservation needs . 2 Thus, the revenues for both Louisiana's gene­
ral severance tax and. her reforestation severance tax are allocated 
three-fourths to the parish from which they are harvested and one-fourth 
to the state general fund.
In Michigan, the revenues from stumpage levies against the pri­
vate (woodlot) forest reserves —  to be discussed more fully under "yield 
taxes" later in this chapter -- are payable to the treasurers of the town­
ships from which severance was made, while commercial owners pay their 
taxes through the state's Conservation Department, one-half going to the 
county of origin, and one-half to the state's general fund. These pay­
2"Severance Taxes on Forest Products", p. 317 > col. 2.
ment schedules are partially in recognition of, and in payment for, 
property-tax losses incurred by the locality in conjunction with classi­
fication of the lands for forestry purposes.
Although Arkansas and Louisiana realize more in dollar terms 
from their timber-severance taxes than Michigan, in no case is the gene­
ral fund conspicuously fattened. As previously stated, the Arkansas re­
ceipts go directly to the State1s Forestry Fund, and Louisiana returns 
three-fourths of her proceeds to the parishes from which the timber was 
severed. Financing of forestry functions very probably more than absorbs 
an amount equal to the one-fourth left to the state general fund.
Yield Taxes. Two of the survey states, Louisiana and Michigan, 
have developed timber property tax structures embodying the yield-tax 
principle (See Ch. I). As noted in the earlier discussion, yield taxes 
are basically designed to provide a measure of relief from the extra­
ordinary burden placed upon owners or resources, expecially timber owners 
during the time between establishment of forest growth and the ultimate 
harvest, by an annual ad valorem property tax. Barlowe, for example, 
summarizes the status of the timber owner thus:3
...It is generally conceded that the average forest property 
which produces one crop of forest products every 25, 50 or 100 
years is taxed much higher relative to the value of this product 
than the farm, which harvests a crop every year, or the commer­
cial and industrial property which turns its inventory over sever­
al times during the course of a single tax period.
3Barlowe, 0£. Cit., p. 372-
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The need for modification of property-tax timing and burden, therefore, 
presents itself, even if, as Barlowe suggests, an "element of subsidy" 
accompanies it . 4
Michigan applied the earlier yield approach, with its "woodlot 
law" enacted in 1911 ( CL 320.251-62; MSA 13.181-92), which, in the ori­
ginal form authorized landowners of "up to 160 acres, half of which is 
improved and devoted to agriculture.." to designate up to one-eight 
(20 acres) "..as private forest reserves."5 The law was amended in 1917 
to raise the proportion designated to one-fourth (40 acres), and the 5 
percent stumpage tax was continued; the minimum forest stand requirement 
was raised from 170 to 1,200 trees of approved species per acre. 6 The 
property tax assessment on listed lands was restricted to $1 per acre 
valuation by the same act (virtually making the measure an "in-lieu" tax, 
eliminating ad valorem liability) . 7 The latter Act yet serves as the 
basic authorization under which the private forest reserves program oper­
ates .
Michigan's "commercial forest reserves" act (CL 205*507; MSA 
7.411 (7)) was enacted in 1925 for the purpose of providing yield-tax 
benefits similar to those enjoyed by woodlot owners to the commercial
4Ibid.
5Ibid., p. 362.
6Ibid.
7Barlowe, 0£. Cit., p. 364.
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forest developers. 8 This Act authorized classification, after examination
by the Department of Conservation, of: 9
...land containing no material natural resources other than 
forest growth, no portion of which is used for agricultural, 
mineral, grazing, industrial, recreational or resort purposes, 
and upon which the owner proposes to develop and maintain a 
forest either through planting of natural production or both...
Stipulations were also imposed regarding the fitness of the land for for­
est growth and its present condition as forest land. 10 This obviously- 
restrictive law failed to achieve the rehabilitation of much of the land 
most in need of it, actually excluding much of it from qualification (such 
as cut-over lands, badly-eroded lands best suited to forests, etc.).
In 1939, the act was amended to approve the listing of:11
...selectively logged lands, land carrying a stand of forest 
growth well advanced toward maturity, or lands carrying in­
sufficient forest growth, but essential to the proper develop­
ment of other forest property accepted for listing.
This liberalizing of the statute appears to have been a forthright recog­
nition of the practical needs of modern commercial forest management, and 
enabled many of the most-needy forest lands to qualify.
The rates of ad valorem bare-land taxes charged to commercial 
owners has been subject to considerable indecisiveness of action by the 
lawmakers, with the original stipulation calling for an annual tax of five 
cents per acre on pine lands and 10 cents per acre on hardwood lands; this
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11Ibid.
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was changed by a 1927 amendment to a uniform 10 cents per acre for all 
classified lands, and in 1935 reduced to 3 cents uniformly.12 The present 
rates are based on a 1958 amendment which provided for a sliding scale of 
charges, dependent on the millage rate of assessment applied to other 
property locally:13
5 cents per acre if the local rate is less than 20 mills;
6 cents per acre if the local rate is between 20 and 25 mills;
7 cents per acre if the local rate is between 25 and 30 mills;
8 cents per acre if the local rate is between 30 and 35 mills;
9 cents per acre if the local rate is between 35 ^0 mills; and
10 cents if the rate is 40 or more mills.
Inasmuch as the land levy is paid to the locality, this sliding scale 
would have the potential of tempting local assessors to raise the millage 
rates to 1+-0 mills or more in areas characterized by large numbers of 
classified acres, but perhaps the return would be so nominal that it is 
hardly remunerative to do so. At any rate, a uniform, but reasonable, 
charge would be less subject to this sort of manipulation by local asses­
sors, and would avoid unfair competitive advantage to owners lodged in 
low-millage areas.
The Michigan private and commercial forest reserves programs 
are both of a "voluntary" character, with no stipulated contractual term 
specified, and with no fixed agreement as to substantive provisions, other 
than those general conditions noted above. Although this means that "..the 
state may change the terms at any time, ...the owner who is adversely 
affected.." may withdraw his lands from listing without penalty.14
12Barlowe, Op. Cit., p. 38 2.
13Ibid.
14Ibid., p. 365.
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Barlowe suggests that, although voluntary listing is desirable, some 
stipulated contractual applications should be included in the interests 
of security to the timber owners.15 Further, the suggestion is made that 
the woodlot (private forest reserves) laws be modified, and their coverage 
enlarged, so that more listings will be encouraged.16 Presumably, this 
could be accomplished through increasing the allowable percentage of 
tracts which may be classified (to, perhaps 50 percent of the total 
acreage, or more), and liberalizing the requirement for cultivation of 
the part of the tracts which are not eligible for classification.
Louisiana first authorized state reforestation contracts in the 
constitution of 1921 (Art. X, Section l), with enabling legislation en­
acted in 1922 (Act 90).17 A severance tax on reforested products was 
authorized by a 1926 constitutional amendment (Act 162), in lieu of other 
taxes, and with proceeds allocated three-fourths to the parish in which 
timber was severed, one-fourth to the state general fund.18 This was 
superceded by the 1948 amending act mentioned previously (Act 546) , which 
dedicated timber severance taxes to the Louisiana Forestry Commission.19 
The Act of 1954 (Act 759> a constitutional amendment) returned the allo­
cation of revenues to the distribution provided by the 1926 law (Act 162),
15Ibid., p. 573.
lsBarlowe, 0j>. Cit., p. 373-
17Louisiana State Tax Handbook, 1964, p. 83.
18Ibid.
19Ibid.
and this is the present basis for distribution -- three-fourths to the 
parish of origin, one-fourth to the state's general fund. 20
The reforestation contracts in Louisiana are mandatory and 
binding in their provisions, with such contracts not to exceed 40 years. 
Timber produced on lands under contract is subject only to the reforesta­
tion severance tax, and may not be taxed under the ad valorem property 
tax. Though the land is not so exempted, it may be taxed only at a fixed, 
relatively nominal rate. 21
Louisiana's mandatory land classification under Act 759 of 19^k 
has provided for, in addition to land under reforestation contracts, four 
other classifications of forest land: "tidewater cypress", "hardwood 
lands", "long-leaf pine lands", and "other pine lands" .22 The taxation 
of timber on the classified lands is now based on rates of 2-J percent on 
all timber except pulpwood, and 5 percent on pulpwood (average stumpage 
value in each case). The bare land in each case is subject to property 
taxation at the local level, with the stipulation of uniform assessment 
for all lands within a particular classification. 23 Thus, no property 
within, say, the tidewater cypress classification, may be assessed at a 
different valuation than other lands in this same classification, regard­
less of differences in local assessment practices. This has the effect
20Ibid.
21Williams, "Trends in Forest Taxation", p. 127.
22Hayes, Op. Cit., p. 2.
23Williams, "Trends in Forest Taxation", p. 128.
of leveling assessments statewide on bare-land values for all timber 
tracts in the same classification.
The states of Arkansas and Texas have no counterparts to the 
yield-tax measures of Michigan and Louisiana, and, largely due to histori­
cally- low assessments in timber areas, timber owners probably have not 
been harmed appreciably by this lack. However, with the expansion of 
urban areas into previously-agricultural regions, it is probable that 
assessments will continue to be upgraded (as, for example, the general 
attempt to standardize the assessment ratios statewide in Arkansas at a 
minimum 20 percent ratio to actual value, dating from 1955)? and the sit­
uation may demand some relief for timber owners in the foreseeable future.
The perfect approach to yield-tax or "in-lieu" tax treatment of 
forest resources quite obviously has not been found as yet, judging by the 
mixed policy results under those statutes presently applied. However, the 
unique character of this resource area deserves recognition, and the 
measures taken thus far to seek a more equitable and palatable tax treat­
ment of the timber resource may be productive of salutary result. Con­
tinued study of the problem is clearly incumbent on students of forestry 
and taxation alike.
B. Fisheries Taxation
As implied previously, this section must be devoted largely to 
the system of fisheries taxation developed by the State of Louisiana, 
inasmuch as the other survey states have only a limited application of 
taxes which are directed at fisheries. This is not to say, however, that 
the states do not collect substantial revenues by other means, such as
licenses, fees and permits. As an example, the Wildlife Division of the 
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department collects a wide variety of fees and 
license charges from the extensive fisheries industry of that state, 
licensing such activities as commercial fishing, guide services, bait 
dealerships, processing-plant operations, boat operations for commercial 
purpose, and a variety of others.24 Sales of shell, sand and gravel by 
the Division in fiscal 1963 netted almost $2 millions, as a related acti­
vity.25 Similar activities by the Michigan Conservation Department's 
Fish Division, and Arkansas1 Game and Fish Commission may be expected to 
yield non-tax revenues much in proportion to the scales of activity in 
commercial fisheries of those two states. However, none of the three 
states have developed extensive systems of taxes, of the severance variety 
or other, applied to fisheries.
Louisiana, in addition to the usual fees, licenses and permits, 
levies a variety of tax measures of the severance type upon fisheries 
activities, and is unique among the survey states in the number and variety 
of such levies. Louisiana's General Severance tax (Art. X, Sec. 1; RS 
47:631) levies a tax on the commercial severance of shells. This tax 
accounted for a total revenue of $307,723*23 in fiscal I9 6 6 .26 Arkansas 
has only one application under her severance tax relating to fisheries -- 
a tax on mussel shells -- which has become inoperative with the decline of
24Data are from the Wildlife Division, Parks and Wildlife 
Department of Texas, Annual Report, Fiscal years 1962-6 3.
25Ibid„
26Louisiana State Tax Handbook, pp. 77-80, and 26th Annual 
Report, 1965-66, Louisiana Department of Revenues, p. 10.
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the shell industry (which manufactured buttons and other things prior to 
the advent of plastics, but has been dormant as an industry roughly since 
World War II), and no revenue has been reported for some time.
Oysters are taxed in Louisiana under a special severance tax 
(Art. X; RS 56:10), administered by the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission 
of Louisiana, paid by "oystermen, boatmen, or individuals removing oysters 
from leased grounds or natural reefs or when sold by packers, canners, 
commissionmen, dealers or firms."27 The rate is 2^ cents on each barrel 
of oysters taken from leased bottoms; 3 cents if taken from natural reefs.28 
The yield on this tax for fiscal 1965 was $11,145.60, and the receipts 
have varied within the range of $10 thousand to $20 thousand for the past 
several fiscal periods.29 Texas levies a nominal oyster tax through the 
Wildlife Division, but the yield was less than $200 for fiscal 1963.3° 
Louisiana's Oyster Severance Tax is dedicated to the Conservation Fund, 
with surplus funds, if any, at the year's end to be transferred to the 
state General Fund.31
Louisiana levies a severance tax on salt-water shrimp of 15 cents 
per barrel for shrimp taken from the waters of the state, and 50 cents a 
barrel on out-of-state shipments other than by common carrier (Art. X;
27La. State Tax Handbook, 1964, p. 82.
2sIbid.
29llth Bienniel Report, 1964-65) Louisiana Wildlife and Fish­
eries Commission, p. l4,
3°Annual Report, 1962-63, Wildlife Division, Parks and Wildlife 
Dept, of Texas.
31La. State Tax Handbook, 1964, p. 8 3.
RS 5^:10, 5 6:5 0 5 ) .32 The original levy was passed in 1940 (Act 143), end 
amended in 1946 to reflect the present rates (Act 7 8 ) *33 The tax is to 
be paid by the "first purchaser, processor, wholesaler or other dealer 
who deals in buying, selling or handling salt water shrimp."34 The tax 
is collected monthly by the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission, and yielded 
$44,627.22 in fiscal 1965,3S down some considerable amount from normal 
collections, which run between $50 and $60 thousands, and perhaps the 
result of adverse conditions at "harvest" time. The tax is payable into 
the Conservation Fund, with annual ending surplusses, if any, payable to 
the General Fund.36
It is perhaps belaboring the obvious to say that Louisiana has 
the most sophisticated tax structure for fisheries; she has virtually the 
only one among the survey states. It is somewhat surprising that Texas 
and Michigan have no severance-tax systems for fisheries products, con­
sidering the substantial size of their fishing trade. In the former case, 
It appears that Texas uses the fee system and licenses instead of sever­
ance levies, as such, and perhaps this is also the case for Michigan. If 
so, the purposes of public revenues are served, and the social interest in 
resources upheld, in the absence of taxes, as such. For Arkansas, it is
32Louisiana State Tax Handbook, 1964, pp. 84-5.
33Ibid., p. 84.
34Ibid.
35llth Biennial Report,1964/1965, La. Wildlife and Fisheries 
Comm., p. 14.
3sLa. State Tax Handbook, 1964, p. 8 5 .
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not surprising that her public revenues from commercial fisheries are, 
like the private returns, quite modest.
CHAPTER IV
TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES II:
MINERAL RESOURCES
Having examined the taxation of renewable resources, the impres­
sion may have been left with the reader that little, if any, substantial 
fiscal significance attaches to tax revenues from natural-resource acti­
vities. Rather, the implication thus far has been that, in the interests 
of conservation and promotion, revenue from taxation is sacrificed or 
"ploughed-back" into the industries in question. The present chapter 
should dispel much doubt as to the productivity of fiscal benefits from 
resource taxes, as the non-renewable resources are much more abundant 
revenue producers.
Several features of the natural resources industries studied in 
Chapter II suggest the probable results of taxation of mineral resources, 
with the reader already having a pretty good idea as to the major revenue 
producers. Some surprises are in store, however, regarding the extent 
and rates of application of taxes to various minerals industries in the 
survey states. Texas and Louisiana, for example, with their abundant 
petroleum and natural gas wealth logically would, and do, obtain the 
lion's share of severance revenues from this industrial group. Similar­
ly, Arkansas might be expected to derive much of her resource-tax revenue 
from the same industries, and, indeed, she does. A major surprise arises 
however, when Michigan's resource-tax applications are examined. With 
abundance in a variety of minerals categories, and with petroleum indus­
tries accounting for only 10 percent of minerals value, one would suppose
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that the bulk of her resource-tax revenues would be derived from sources 
other than petroleum. Michigan, however, does not levy severance taxes 
on any minerals industry other than the oil and natural-gas industries.
Her rich metallic-minerals industries and others are not taxed on the 
basis of severance, either by specific-rate or ad valorem measure. Cer­
tainly, this practice is a strangely-selective approach to minerals taxa­
tion, and one which mitigates against one particular natural-resource 
industry in a rather discriminatory, even arbitrary manner. More will 
be said regarding this feature of Michigan1s natural resource tax struc­
ture in the final chapter of this study. Table 1J on the following page 
presents the totals for severance-tax collections from minerals indus­
tries in the four-state group for fiscal 1965-66, and Table lip compares 
rates on minerals commonly taxed.
A. Mineral Fuels Taxation
Because of their overwhelming importance to three of the four 
survey states (Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas) and because the remaining 
state (Michigan) levies severance taxes only on this classication, first 
consideration will be given to the manner in which the states tax the 
mineral fuels. The following discussion will center primarily on sever­
ance taxes, but will also examine selected other special features of 
resource taxation in the four states, as to applications, rates and yields.
Oil and Natural Gas Severance Taxes. Arkansas taxes oil and 
natural gas under her general severance tax (Ark. Stat. Ann., 19^7 and 
Repl.; Sec. 84-2102). These revenues, and all severance-tax revenues
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Table 13
Mineral Severance Tax Collections -- Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Michigan and Texas -- Fiscal 1965-66
(Thousands of dollars)
Mineral Arkansas Louisiana Michigan Texas
Bauxite............ $ 340 $ $ — $ —
Natural Gas........ (1) 8 l, 978
Nat. Gas Liquids.... (1) 14,862 1,0993 74,l853
Oil................. 2,854 103,421 131,217
Oil and Gas Regul... -- — — 1,810
Salt................ 255 —
Sand and Gravel..... ( 1) 467 — --
Stone........ ...... (1) 5 — --
Sulfur............. -- 2,714 — 3,350
Miscellaneous,...... 692 — — --
Total Severance 
(minerals) $ 3,885 $204,484 $ 1,099
$210,762
Total Tax Coll.
(state)....... $252,917 $658,571 $1,467,654 $1,267,084
Percent of Total 
from Mineral Sev.... 1 .6 3 1 .1 0.1 16.7
1. Detailed figures not given for fiscal 1965-66; these items are 
included in the "miscellaneous" total.
2. No separate figures given for Natural Gas and Natural Gas Liquids.
3. Total not detailed for Natural Gas, Natural Gas Liquids and Oil; 
composite total.
Source: "State Tax Collections", Governmental Finance, GF No. 16,
1966, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Data are from Table 9 "  "State Tax Collections in Detail".
Table 14
Minerals Severance Taxes:
Comparative Analysis of Rates on Minerals Commonly-Taxed by Two 
or More of the Survey States
Minerals Arkansas Louisiana Michigan Texas
Rates Applied
Natural Gas............ . 0.3 cents per M 
cubic feet
2 3 /1 0 cents per 
M cubic feet1
2 percent of 
gross cash mkt. 
value
T percent of 
gross value or 
1 cent per M 
cubic feet, which­
ever is greater
Natural Gas Liquids..... 5 percent of value 2 cents per bbl. 2 percent of 
gross cash mkt. 
value2
4.6 cents per bbl.. 
gross production
Crude Oil.............. , 5 percent of value 18-26 cents per 
bbl., depending 
on specific grav­
ity
2 percent of 
gross cash mkt. 
value2
4.6 cents per bbl. , 
gross production.
Sulfur................. • • —  —  — $1.03 per long 
ton (2,240 lbs.)
—  —  — $1.03 per long ton 
(2,240 lbs.)
1. Excluding those wells producing at less than standard pressure, which are taxed at 0.3 cents per 
thousand cubic feet.
2. Does not include the Oil Privilege Fee of one-eights cent per barrel on oil produced.
Sources: Report by the State Comptroller, Arkansas, I965; Louisiana State Tax Handbook, 1964; 
29th Annual Report, Department of Revenue Division (Michigan); Vernon1s Annotated 
Statutes of Texas, i960, and Replacements, Title 122A, Chs. 4 and 5*
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other than those for timber (see Ch. Ill), are distributed three-fourths 
to the State General Fund, and one-fourth to the County Aid Fund for dis­
tribution to the counties of origin.1 The tax on natural gas is 0.3 
cents per thousand cubic feet of natural gas severed, and the tax on oil 
(crude) is 3 percent of market value "at time and point of severance", 
except that wells producing 10 barrels or less per day are taxed at the 
rate of 4 percent.2 Additional credits are allowed to oil and gas pro­
ducers for "amortized cost of construction, and expense of operating, 
underground salt water disposal systems", and the producer may be allowed 
a credit of 75 percent of the severance tax otherwise due "for a speci­
fied time after the discovery of a new pool".3 Natural gas liquids are 
not subject to a stipulated levy, but would likely be included under the 
"all other natural resources" category, taxed at a rate of 5 percent.4 
Yield for oil severance taxes was $2.8 millions in fiscal 1965-6 6, and, 
although not specified separately, natural gas and gas liquids probably 
accounted for somewhat less than $300 thousand during the same period.5
Louisiana taxes oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids under . 
her General Severance Tax (Art. X, Sec. 1 and 21), Natural gas is taxed
•'•Distribution is authorized among the counties one-half to the 
County General School Fund, and one-half to the County Road Fund (Sec. 
84-2112). From the Report By the State Comptroller, State of Arkansas, 
1965, P. 33.
2Sec. 84-2102 (e), from Report by the State Comptroller, 1965 
(Arkansas) p. 32.
3Ibid.
4Ibid. (Sec. 84-2102 (h).
5Biennial Report, Commissioner of Revenues, Arkansas, 1964-65,
1965-66, p. 27.
at 2 3 /1 0 cents per thousand cubic feet at standard pressure (15.025  
pounds pressure per square inch at 6o°F), with marginal wells, including 
those in which the gas accompanies oil production taxed at 0 .3 cents per 
thousand. 6 The tax on oil varies according to specific gravity, from 
18 cents per barrel for 22 gravity and below to 26 cents for oil over 
43 gravity. Wells incapable of producing more than an average of six 
barrels per day are taxed at half the regular rates. 7 Natural gas 
liquids are taxed at 2 cents per barrel for distillate, condensate and 
all other liquids severed with either oil or gas. 8
Fiscal I966 yields were as follows: gas -- $82 millions;
oil -- $103 millions; distillate -- $14 millions. 0 Thus, about $200 
millions of Louisiana's total severance tax collections of $205 millions 
for 1966 are accounted for by her mineral fuels (about 97*6 percent of 
the total). This is striking evidence, indeed, of Louisiana's stake in 
her natural gas and oil industries, both as a source of wealth and as a 
major contributor of tax revenues. Taxes collected on all the mineral 
fuels are dedicated one-fifth to the parished from which severed, but 
not to exceed $200 ,000 total for any parish in any year, with the balance 
of collections going to the Severance Tax Fund.10. This latter fund is
aLouisiana State Tax Handbook, 190+, p. 79*
7Ibid.
aArt. X, Secs. 1 and 21; TS 47:633* La. State Tax Handbook, 
1964, pp. 79-80.
926th Annual Report, Louisiana Department of Revenues, Fiscal
1965-6 6, p. 10.
l0Art. X, Secs. 1 and 21; Art. XII, Sec. 14; RS 47:644-45, from 
La. State Tax Handbook, 1964, p. 8 l.
maintained for the purpose of supplying free school books and supplies 
to Louisiana's public schools, with any "residue" to be transferred to 
the State Public School Fund. 11 As a practical matter, the "residue" 
after the procurement of textbooks has constituted the overwhelming por­
tion of the total (about 97 percent of the Severance Tax Fund total was 
transferred to the Public School Fund in fiscal 196 3 ) .12
The State of Michigan levies a severance tax on the production 
of oil and natural gas under an Act ( CL 205-301; MSA 7-353; Act -^8 , P.A. 
I929) specifically limited to "each corporation, association or indivi­
dual engaged in the business of taking these products from Michigan land 
The rates imposed on natural gas and oil are identically set at 2 per­
cent of the gross cash market value at the point of severance. 14 Col­
lections from these sources have varied between $1 .1 and $1 .2 millions 
within most recent years., but fell to less than one million dollars in 
fiscal 1966. Total collections, including oil and gas privilege fees 
(to be discussed later in this chapter) were just over $1 million. 15
Texas levies a set of "occupation" or "privilege" taxes upon 
her mineral fuels producers, under the general severance-tax type of
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
13Twenty-Fifth Annual Report, Mich. Dept, of Rev. Div., pp. J2
73-
14Ibid., p. 7 2 .
15Vemon's Annotated Texas Statutes and Repl., i960, Title 
122A, Ch. 3 (to be subsequently cited V.A.S.T., Title 122A, Ch. ).
levy based on value of production, quantity of production, or both. The 
series of "gross-receipts1 taxes were imposed under the auspices of the 
state in the early and middle 1930's to include oil producers, natural 
gas producers, sulfur producers, and producers of carbon black. (GS Art. 
70!+7 a~70^7h) • In the 1959 legislature, the title designations were 
changed, along with a number of others, to be placed under the "General 
Taxes" category (Title 122A) . 16 The statute taxing natural gas producers 
(Art. 3*01) establishes a rate of 7 percent of the gross value of the gas 
produced within the state, with a minimum of 121/1500 of one cent per 
thousand cubic feet. 16 The tax is collected monthly from the "first pur­
chaser" of the gas, who is authorized to deduct the tax from the payments 
made to the producer (Ch. 3s Art. 3-03) 5 although default by the pur­
chaser is deemed not to absolve the producer or subsequent purchasers 
from their liability. The producer is privileged, however, to sue the 
purchaser who defaults for recovery of any withheld amounts. 17
An Act of the 1959 legislature (Art. 3*H) applies a modification 
to the rates which are charged, calling for "not less than one cent per 
thousand cubic feet", with the new rate deemed necessary to "derive a 
reasonable State revenue" from natural gas production (Art. 3*H(l)l) 
and to "tax equitably those persons integrally engaged in the occupation" 
of gas production; that is, to distribute the burdens more equitably.
(Art. 3*11 (l)ll) . 18 Apart from the reservation of 0.5 percent of the
16Ibid.
l7Ibid.
18Ibid.
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tax collections to pay for administration and enforcement, the tax is 
distributed three-fourths to the Omnibus Tax Clearance Fund and one- 
fourth to the Available School Fund, a practice common to all the sever­
ance levies.19 Collections of combined natural gas production taxes in 
fiscal I966 amounted to $74 millions.
The Tax on Oil and Gas produced (Title 122A, Arts. 4.01-4.03) 
levies the tax on producers ("any person owning, controlling, managing 
or leasing any oil well and/or any person who produces in any manner any 
oil..") including royalty owners and other interested parties (Art. 4.01 
(1)) at the rate of 4.6 cents per barrel of 42 gallons, without any de­
ductions, on gross production (Art. 4.02) . 20 The tax is payable on the 
same basis as the gas tax, and is to be paid on any oil, except that 
which was necessarily removed from gas by means of refrigeration or other 
costly processes, which oil is subject to a reduced tax. Again, payment 
is to be made by the first purchaser from the producer, who "collects" 
the tax by reducing the amount he pays the producer. 21 The payments are 
made to the Comptroller of Public Accounts, and their disposition is the 
same as that of the tax on gas producers. 22
A Severance Beneficiary Tax (Art. 22.01) is levied on persons 
other than the person producing oil or gas, when such person is recipient 
of oil or natural gas under contract from the producer, and the tax is
19VAST 122A, Ch.3.
2°Ibid., Ch. 4.
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
assessed at basically the same rates as that of the taxes it replaces. 23 
Total severance tax collections on oil under these titles (4.01 and 
2 2.01) amounted to $131 millions in fiscal 1966.
A Severance Tax on Coal is levied by the State of Arkansas 
under the general severance title (Ark. Stat. Anno. 19^7 and Replace­
ments; Sec. 84:2102), imposing a rate of 2 cents per ton of 2,000 pounds 
on coal, lignite and iron ore . 24 Collections of this tax in fiscal 1966 
were included in the "miscellaneous" category and not separable, but the 
collections in a recent year amounted to slightly more than $3,000. The 
revenues from this tax are classed as general revenues three-fourths and 
special revenues one-fourth, as in the case of other minerals under the 
severance tax, with the revenues distributed as are those of oil and 
gas: three-fourths to the General Fund, one-fourth to the County School
Fund. The declining significance of coal mining in Arkansas has been 
reflected in declining receipts from the coal severance tax.
In summary, severance taxes on mineral fuels produce the bulk 
of severance-tax revenues for minerals in all the states in the survey, 
with Texas and Louisiana realizing by far the richest returns; Arkansas 
is a distant third, and Michigan realizes the smallest return. The tax 
may be considered a major revenue-producing measure for Texas and Louisi­
ana, comprising, respectively, 16 and 32 percent of total tax revenues 
for those two states. 25 Arkansas' mineral-fuels tax receipts accounted
23Ibid., Ch. 22.
24Report by the State Comptroller, (Arkansas) I965, p. 32.
25Totals for tax revenues and severance revenues are in Table
13.
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for only about 1 .6 percent of her total tax collections in fiscal 1966, 
and Michigan's mineral-fuels taxes amounted to less than 0.1 percent 
( see Table 15).
Other Taxes on Mineral Fuels. In addition to severance taxes, 
both Texas and Louisiana at one time levied a "gas-gathering tax" through 
which all "gatherers" of natural gas and distillate produced in the res­
pective states were taxed after severance from the well. 26 "Gathering" 
was generally defined as "..the first taking or retaining of possession 
of gas produced for transmission.." after severance, and "...after it had 
passed through any separator, drip trap, meter or other means designed 
to separate oil from the gas." 27 The intent of both the Texas and Louisiana 
statutes was apparently to assess a privilege fee against receivers and 
transporters for export of natural gas from the state, the statutes have 
both been successfully challenged as violating the "commerce clause" of 
the U. S. Constitution by seeking to regulate interstate common-carrier 
(pipeline) movements. 28 The Louisiana state legislature in 1958 recog­
nized the probable invalidation of the law in a suspension of collections
asTSA (Vernon 1948) j Art. and Act 155 (1940) anc* Repl.:
RSI4.7 :671-675 (1950) La.
27"0il and Gas Law", Texas Law Review, Supplement, Vols. 52-57 
( 195^-59). Article quoted is "State Taxation of Oil and Gas - Current 
Developments and Problems" by Lee Hill (Vol. 55j PP* 855“72), TLR p. 86 5; 
Suppl. p. 2*4-59.
28Validity in application of the Texas statute was successfully 
challenged in Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Calvert (547 U.S. 157 
1954)), which frustrated the State's attempt to tax gas collected for 
transmission by the pipeline (L. Hill, 0£. Cit., p. 865; Suppl. p. 2*1-59) • 
Louisiana's statute was ruled unconstitutional in Eel Oil Corp. v. Fontenot 
by the State Supreme Court on grounds of violation of the "commerce clause, 
of the U.S. Constitution (La. State Tax Handbook, 19^4j P* 44).
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on the gas-gathering tax "..until the question of whether such taxes are 
valid and constitutional...has been settled. ." 29 Gas-severance rates 
were increased at the same Extra Session by 2 cents per thousand cubic 
feet (the amount which the gas-gathering tax had levied) as a replace­
ment . 30 After the gas-gathering tax was invalidated, the 2-cent charge 
was extended to June JO, 196k, after which time it was reenacted as a 
permanent rate. 31
Louisiana's Liquified Petroleum Gas Permits are levied on the 
basis of a 19^ -2 Act (Act 99; RS 40:18^*9) to apply to "persons, firms or 
corporations desiring to store, sell or transport liquified petroleum 
gases over state highways, or to install storage tanks...for use of 
liquified petroleum gas." 32 The minimum amount applied is $75 and the 
maximum $J,000,based on 0.25 percent of gross annual sales of the per­
mit holder, and the tax yielded $55,551-25 in fiscal 1965-6 6, all allo­
cated to the general fund. 33
The Royalty Gas Excise Tax is a levy which Louisiana utilizes to 
assure that the producer returns to the royalty owner an amount equal to 
the price received by the producer for the royalty owner1s interest in 
gas products sold; the tax is levied as the (total) difference between
29La. State Tax Handbook, 19^4, p. M k
3°Ibid.
31Ibid.
32Ibid., pp. 60-6 l.
33Ibid., Loc. Git., and Ann. Report, 1965-66, La. Comm, of 
Revenue s, p. l5T
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the price paid to the producer and the price forwarded to the royalty 
owner. 34 This is largely a preventive measure designed to assure fair 
treatment of royalty owners, and the fiscal yield of $631.12 reflects 
the fact that this tax is not calculated as a revenue-producer.
A relatively-similar intent to assure fair treatment of inter­
ested parties to leaseholds appears to manifest itself in Texas' Severance 
Beneficiary Tax (TSA Title 122A; Art. 22.01), which seeks to levy the 
severance taxes on the "severance beneficiary", whether he be the pro­
ducer, or someone who contracts with the producer for all or part of the 
production of gas or oil for a stipulated period. 35 The intent of this 
statute is apparently to lay the tax on the one who actually benefits 
from the production by receiving the value on the resource commodity, 
whether he is the actual severer or not. This is not to say that the 
burden of the tax falls either on the "beneficiary" or on the producer 
(or operator) . 36 This tax was not detailed as to revenues for 1966, but 
its application and rates are the same as for the "occupation taxes"
(Arts. 3*02 and k.02, and 3*H) previously noted, and their yield is in­
cluded in the totals for oil and gas in Table 13.
Michigan, in addition to the regular oil and gas severance tax, 
levies an Oil Privilege Fee, imposed on oil producers by the Oil and Gas
34La. State Tax Handbook, 196^, p. 71.
35VAST 122A, Ch. 22.
36The process of tax shifting, wherein the burden of a tax is 
transferred to someone other than the one on whom it is levied will be 
discussed in Ch. V.
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Conservation Act of 1939 (Sec. 22, Act 61, P.A. 1939)•37 The oil privi­
lege fee is payable on the same dates as the oil and gas severance tax, 
at the rate of one-eighth cent per barrel of oi..l- .-produced, with its pro­
ceeds going to the state General Fund . 38 The yield on this tax was 
$18,270 in fiscal 1966, down from its higher yields of about $20 thou­
sands, but apparently continuing a trend beginning in 1964 for smaller 
yields. 39 Figures for this tax were included in the consolidated figures 
for oil and gas severance in Table 13.
B. Taxation of Other Minerals
Leaving the subject of mineral-fuels taxation, the tax picture 
becomes a bit more spotty, with different minerals being subject to spe­
cial tax treatment in the several states. As previously noted, Michigan 
limits her severance taxation to oil and natural gas, and applies no such 
levies to other minerals. The only other mineral subject to severance 
taxation in Texas is sulfur, but Arkansas and Louisiana levy several 
taxes of the severance type on a variety of other minerals. In consider­
ing the remaining minerals, it may be convenient to examine their taxation 
by the individual states which impose them.
Other Minerals Taxes -- Arkansas. Arkansas taxes all the mine­
rals classifications other than minerals fuels under the general severance
3729th Annual Report, Department of Revenue Division, p. 79-
38Ibid.
39Ibid., p. 80.
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tax previously noted, with the disposition of revenues three-fourths to 
the state1s general fund and one-fourth to the county of origin. Barite, 
bauxite, titanium ore, manganese and manginiferous ores, zinc ore, cin­
nabar and lead are all taxed at the rate of 15 cents per ton of 2,000 
pounds.40 Of this group, the fiscal 1965-66 yields are detailed only 
for bauxite, which yielded ^k0,^>62.6Q in taxes.41 Recent figures sug­
gest that barite yields would be about $35-$^0 thousands, and the yields 
of tax on the other listed ores would be very nominal.42
The severance tax applied to gypsum other than that used for 
manufacturing in the State of Arkansas or sold for that purpose, and for 
chemical-grade limestone, silica sand and dimension (building) stone is 
one-and-one-half cents per ton of 2,000 pounds.43 The 1965-66 fiscal- 
year report details none of these products as to taxes collected, but 
some observations may be in order regarding probably collections. First, 
gypsum used in manufacture in Arkansas is exempt from the severanee-tax 
levy, and most or all of that produced in the state is devoted to these 
purposes, principally the production of cement, wallboard and related 
products. The other products are included in the "miscellaneous severence
4°Report by State Comptroller, Arkansas, I965, P* 52-
41Biennial Report, Fiscal years 196^-65, 1965-66, Commissioner 
Revenues, Arkansas, p. 2 7.
42Report by State Comptroller, Arkansas, 1965, p- 33*
43Ibid., p. 3 2.
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category, and their individual totals are not available, but it appears 
relatively certain that their significance, individually and collectively, 
is very slight. 44
Finally, on crushed stone, sand of construction grade, gravel, 
clay, chalk, shale and marl the rate is one cent per ton of 2,000 pounds.45 
These items were included in the "miscellaneous severance" category and 
are not subject to separate determination.
Other Minerals Taxes -- Louisiana. Louisiana's severance taxes 
on minerals are somewhat more detailed and complex than those of Arkansas, 
in that not only is the general severance tax applied to a variety of 
minerals, but a special severance tax on sand and gravel is applied by 
the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission ( RS 9:1101). First, the general 
severance taxes will be considered.
The general severance tax applies the rate of $1.03 Per long 
ton (2,240 lbs.) on sulfur, with the fiscal 1965-66 collections totaling 
$2,714,645.34. 46 The rate on salt (common) is 6 cents per ton of 2,000 
pounds, with 1965-66 collections of $231,418.07; salt in brine used in 
manufacture of other products is taxed at one-half cent per ton of 
2,000 pounds, and the yield in fiscal 1963-66 was $23,185-75*47 Louis­
iana also levies a tax of 10 cents per ton on coal and ores, and a
44The bulk of the "miscellaneous" yields has been accounted for 
by gas and barite (see preceding pages).
45Report of State Comptroller, Arkansas, 1965, p. 32.
46La. State Tax Handbook, 1964, p. 80 and 26th Annual Report,
La. Department of Revenue, I965-66, p. 10.
47Ibid.
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tax of 20 cents a ton on marble, but no revenues were reported on these 
substances for fiscal I965-6 6 .48 The same distribution of revenues from 
the severance tax on the above minerals applies as that for general 
severance-tax receipts from oil and natural gas.
The special severance tax on sand and gravel administered by 
the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission is imposed on "persons receiving 
permission from the...Commission to take sand or gravel from the water 
bottoms of the State."49 The rates applied are: screened sand -- 5 1/2
cents per cubic yard; gravel, screened or washed -- 15 cents per cubic 
yard; sand and gravel mixed and unscreened —  10 cents per cubic yard; 
and fill material -- 2 1/2 cents per cubic yard. 50 An exception is pro­
vided for materials taken from the Pearl River forming the boundary be­
tween Louisiana and Mississippi, where a rate of one-half the above 
schedule applies, 51 apparently a recognition of mixed jurisdictions. 
Collections from this tax are retained by the Commission and placed in 
the State Conservation Fund, with collections amounting to about $13^ - 
thousand in fiscal 1965-6 6. The bulk of these collections (est. $100 
thousand in fiscal 1965-66) comes from fill material. 52
48La. State Tax Handbook, 19^-> P* 80, and 26th Annual Report, 
La. Dept, of Revenue, p. 10,
49La. State Tax Handbook, 196^, p. 8 5.
5°Ibid.
5lIbid., p. 86.
52llth Biennial Report, 196^-65, Louisiana Wild Life and Fish­
eries Comm., p. 14.
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Other Minerals Taxes -- Texas. In the "other minerals" cate­
gory, Texas levies only one severance tax, an "Occupational Tax on the 
Production of Sulphur" (Title 122A, Arts. J.Ol-J.Ok),53 This tax is 
levied on sulfur producers at the rate of $1,03 per long ton (2 ,2k0 lbs.), 
and is subject to basically the same provisions as the other "occupation 
taxes" discussed previously. The yield on this tax for fiscal 1965-66  
was $3 ,330,0 0 0 .54
C. Leases and Royalties
Although these collections are not, strictly-construed, taxes 
on mineral industries, they do represent a sometimes-considerable source 
of public support from such industries, and thus are deserving of exami­
nation in this study. The State of Arkansas collects royalty and lease­
hold payments under stipulations of the severance tax law, which authorizes 
the Commissioner of Revenue "..to enter into contracts with producers pro­
viding for the severing of resources from the beds or bars of navigable 
rivers and lakes, and other lands held in the name of the state."55 The 
leasehold payment is determined by negotiation, and the royalty payments 
are provided for under the following rates:56
53VAST; Title 122A; Ch. 5 .
54Report of the State Comptroller of Public Accounts, State of 
Texas, I966, Part la, Table No. 1.
55Report by the State Comptroller, 1965? p- 32.
56Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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...on sand, 2 1 /2 <£, per cubic yard; on gravel, 5f£ Pet cubic
yard; on coal, 6$6 per ton; on oil, gas and casinghead gas,
1/8 of value; and on other natural resources, such amounts 
as may be agreed to by the contracting parties, with the ad­
vice and approval of the Attorney General (Sec. 10-1101).
For fiscal 1965-66, revenues from all oil and gas leases amounted to
$8 ,7 2 6.7 6, and royalties from sand, gravel and oil amounted to $109,O8O.6 3 .57
All royalties and leasehold payments are classified as general revenues,
payable into the state1s General Fund. 58
The State of Louisiana collects massive sums from leaseholds 
and royalties, particularly for petroleum and natural gas production in 
state-owned and controlled lands in the tidelands and coastal areas, 
along with some inland operations in game refuges, parks and inland water­
ways. The total from oil and gas leases for fiscal 1965-66, combined with
royalty receipts amounted to an estimated $102.9 millions. 59 These pay­
ments for leaseholds and royalties are classified as both general and 
special revenues, and their disposition is to various agencies; in I966 
the General Fund received an estimated $72.8 millions, the highway fund 
was allocated $15 millions, and the remainder was allocated to the Conser­
vation Fund. 60 Some revenues were reserved to the use of agencies asso­
ciated with the lands from which severance occurred. 61
57Biennial Report, 1964-65, 1965-6 6. Commissioner of Revenues 
( Arkansas), p. 6 .
5eReport by the State Comptroller, I965, P- 33-
59State of Louisiana Executive Budget, Fiscal 1965-66, pp. 4,
6 ; Sched. 5 7 .
6°State of Louisiana, Executive Budget, I966, Loc. Cit.
6lIbid.
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Texas also realizes considerable sums of revenues from leases, 
rentals and royalties on resource lands she owns or controls, though not 
so much as is true of Louisiana. Identifiable sources of such royalties 
in fiscal 1965-66 were: oil, gas and mineral royalties, about $36 mil­
lions; sand, shell and gravel sales, about $‘1.5 million; mineral leases; 
rentals, and bonuses, about $15 millions.62 All sources of sale, rental 
and royalty transactions were estimated to yield about $95 millions in 
1966, but other, public properties than resource lands were apparently in­
volved. 63 The items which could be identified as resource-connected 
accounted for nearly $52 millions, in any case.
Thus, about $260 millions of the state's revenue comes directly 
from the basic-resource-development industries, either in the form of 
severance levies or other payments. This constitutes about 11 percent of 
the total state revenues for fiscal 1966 of $2 ,335 millions. 64
62Report of the State Comptroller of Public Accounts, State of
Texas, 1966, Part la, Table No. 1.
S3Ibid.
S4Ibid.
CHAPTER V
SOME NOTES ON SHIFTING, INCIDENCE AND EFFECTS 
OF NATURAL RESOURCE TAXATION
Taxes levied upon business are seldom willingly retained as a 
burden of the enterprise. Rather, they are subjected to the process 
called "tax shifting", in which an attempt is made to transfer the burden 
of payment to someone other than the enterprise upon which the tax was 
levied. 1 The final disposition of burdens arising from taxes levied upon 
resource industries may have substantial implications for policy goals 
(previously discussed in Chapter I of this study), either furthering or 
frustrating them. Therefore, some attempts will be made to analyze the 
most probable disposition of the tax in the light of policy aims, to 
determine whether existing forms of levy contribute to the proper "mix" 
of conservation, incentive to production, and reliable yields of revenue 
within the limitations imposed.
A. Structural Basis for Tax Shifting: Commodity-Tax 
versus Property-Tax Approaches
Economic Basis for Shifting. A prime requisite for tax shift­
ing is that the tax be levied against, or associated with, a commodity or 
service which is subject to a price transaction; that is, the capability
10ne helpful distinction in understanding tax shifting is the 
characterization of the point at which the tax is levied (and collected) 
as the point of "impact", while the final resting place for the burden 
(payment) is called the point of'incidence". Sharp, Ansel M., and Bernard 
F. Sliger, Public Finance, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 196 -^,
p. 210) .
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must exist to assign the cost of the tax bill to one or more items pro­
duced and/or exchanged for value by the person or firm taxed. 2 Not all 
taxes are assumed to be subject to shifting however, and the above case 
contrasts with the case in which shifting is thought to be virtually im­
possible: when the tax is levied on property reserved to personal use, on 
pure profits (economic surplus), and generally when a tax is levied on 
personal income. 3 Taxation of commercially-exploited natural resources 
would, of course, lie within the scope of tax-shifting possibility.
Taxes assessed against resource industries may generally be 
classified as comprising two overall categories: those assessed against
resource-producing properties, and those which bear directly upon the 
resource commodity in one or more stages of its production and distribu­
tion. The former category would include ordinary ad valorem property- 
tax levies, and, to a lesser extent, special yield-tax variations on the 
ad valorem convention (the manner in which this tax is assessed and col­
lected renders it very much like a commodity tax, though it is technically 
designated a property tax). The latter group would apply, as a practical 
matter, to severance levies (although these are nominally "privilege" 
taxes levied on the act of severing, the severed commodity becomes, in
2Ibid., pp. 211-212.
sThis last generalization is not universally held, however, 
when the "person" is a business corporation, and the tax imposed is the 
corporate income tax. Many students of tax shifting contend that, as the 
tax actually touches elements of capital, rent and other contributions 
than "profits" alone, some backward shifts may take place (to workers, 
bond-holders and others) or some forward shifts through higher prices to 
consumers (See Groves, 0£. Cit. p. 150-51).
Ill
practice, the object of the taxation). Because of the existence of a 
price transaction associated with exploitation of resources for commercial 
purposes, the nominal capacity for shifting exists in either type of levy.
Given the presence of a price transaction, the extent and direc­
tion of tax shifts are dictated by market conditions; not only those pre­
vailing at the origin of the basic resource, but throughout the distri­
bution system for the resource and its ultimate products. Perhaps most 
commonly, the forward shifting of a tax is the mode first thought of as 
a possibility. Attempts to shift taxes forward from the point of impact 
are largely based on the degree of inelasticity, real or presumed, in the 
demand for the product of the person or firm taxes; the success of such 
shifts is dependent upon the actual degree of market elasticity and the 
long-run supply conditions of the firm or industry attempting the shift. 4
4The consequences of long-run supply conditions to the extent of 
tax-shifting under competitive conditions may be illustrated by two elem­
entary cases: constant long-run average costs (fig. 1-a) and increasing 
long-run average costs (fig. 1-b) ,
Figure 1 - Tax Shifting: Constant vs. Increasing Costs.
a. Constant costs b. Increasing costs
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P0 - Price before tax 
Pi = Price after tax
(continued on following page).
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before tax (increasing 
cost)
Si1 = Industry Supply Curve after 
tax (increasing cost)
Po* = Price before tax 
Pi' = Price after tax
In a purely-competitive market, the individual firm must be largely con­
trolled in his shifting options by the consequences of the tax upon 
aggregate supply conditions for the industry ( see note below) .
In a case of complete monopoly, the monopoly producer may seek 
to shift the tax, and would be successful to the extent necessary to re- 
equate marginal cost and marginal revenue. However, inasmuch as his mar­
ginal revenue would rise more rapidly than his average revenue, the 
resultant price increase would be somewhat less than the sum of the ori­
ginal price plus the (unit) tax. This may be most readily illustrated 
in the case of a tax assessed on the basis of a given amount per unit ot 
output (a specific levy). In figure 2 below, let AR and MR represent, 
respectively, the average revenue ( "price-line") and marginal revenue 
functions for a monopoly firm (not necessarily the classic "pure mono­
poly", but a single seller in a given product market). Functions AG and 
MC may be taken to represent average cost (total) and marginal cost curves 
prior to the imposition of the tax, and AC1 and MG' the same data after 
imposition of the tax. The disparities between the vertical heights of 
AC and AC1, and MC and MC1 designate the amounts of the tax per unit.
The Price before the tax is denoted by P, and the resultant tax after the 
monopolist attempts to shift the tax by P1.
4(cont'd).It will be observed that, in the case of increasing 
long-run average costs, the price after the tax (Pi1) is less than that 
for constant cost (Pi), which was equal to the original price (P0) plus 
the entire amount of the tax. In the case of increasing average costs, a 
portion of the tax was shifted to price, and a portion absorbed in lower 
cost data ( lower payments to productive factors employed). The greater 
the slope of the long-run supply curve (i.e., the less elastic), the 
lesser the shifting of the tax to price. Adapted from Sharp and Sliger, 
Op. Cit., pp. 214-15, an-d Due, 0j>. Cit., pp. 264-66.
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Figure 2
Forward-Shifting of a Production Tax -- 
Monopoly Case
Price
MC
\  MR
Quantities
As may be observed in figure 2, above, the monopolist reacts to 
the imposition of the tax by seeking to set a price which will re-equate 
marginal cost and marginal revenue (his profit-maximizing condition), but, 
because of the differential rates of change in MR and AR , 5 this equality 
is reached at a price below the amount which would equal the old price 
plus the whole amount of the tax. The less elastic the market demand 
faced by the monopolist, the more of the tax ultimately finds its way to 
the price. 6 Thus,, the pure monopolist, dealing with a necessity item,
5This condition is characteristic of all less-than-pure competi­
tion, wherein actions of a single firm, will tend to alter the price (AR) 
position for all firms; the greater the price control, the more pronounced 
the change, other factors equal, showing the greater effect on aggregate 
supply conditions.
sDeclining marginal (and average) revenue commences for the firm 
operating in imperfectly-competitive markets with the first unit produced, 
with gains in total revenues arising from a balance between the price of 
the added unit produced and sold and the loss of potential revenue from all 
units previously produced occasioned by the new price (necessary to sell 
the marginal unit). Thus:
MR = Price of One Additional Unit Sold minus (Reduction in Price 
for all Previous Products Sold) x (Previous Quantity Sold).
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would be expected to transmit a larger part of any tax through price in­
creases than, say, a monopolist producing a luxury good, or a good with 
many close substitutes.
As a practical matter, it is doubtful that many products are 
produced or sold under either conditions of pure competition or monopoly 
of the total degree suggested above. Rather, the more usual case may in­
volve conditions of imperfect competition ( characterized by a considerable 
number of producers, operating more or less independently of one another). 
This condition (often called "monopolistic competition”) gives rise to 
some degree of price power, either due to special advantages of location7 
or product differentiation,8 but no firm enjoys more than slight pricing 
power. A second practical alternative is oligopoly, a market structure 
characterized by a few powerful sellers who dominate the industry, with 
each firm keenly aware of the power possessed by his rivals. In this 
latter type of market structure, the policies and actions of each firm 
would be largely conditioned by expectations as to the possible reactions 
of rival firms.
Due9 suggests that, under conditions of imperfect competition 
where the firms operate independently of one another, they would attempt 
to adjust prices upward in an attempt to recoup the cost of the tax in­
crease, but, having little price power individually they would ”... trans­
7Defined by Mrs. Joan Robinson in The Theory of Imperfect Com­
petition (London: The Macmillan Company, ltd., 1933)•
sConcept of E. H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933)*
90p. Cit.
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fer little of the burden to the customers, and most would rest temporar­
ily upon the owners of the business firms"10 (through loss of profits 
given the prevailing demand and supply data). The exodus of some sub­
marginal firms would be necessary to re-align average cost and price 
data for the surviving firms (i.e., to increase the share of market de­
mand enjoyed by each of the survivors -- to shift the Average Revenue 
curve upward to accomodate the higher average costs).11 If, as a result 
of the exodus of some of the firms, the demand curve facing firms sur­
viving becomes less elastic than before, then the final prices will re­
flect a greater amount of increase than the tax, theoretically; if 
greater elasticity results (as each producer may expand his scale of 
operation and enjoy economies of scale, for example), then the final 
price may reflect less than the full amount of the tax.12 The implica­
tion of the above generalizations is that the monopolistically-competitive 
producers are producing initially at less-than-optimum scale, both in the 
long- and short-run senses (i.e., at greater-than average costs), and 
that any cutback in output is possible only average and marginal costs; 
similarly, any increase in scale or quantity of output may be expected to
10Due, 0£. Cit., p. 268. 
i;LIbid.
12Ibid.
/
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yield lower average costs (see figure 3 below as a general-case illustra­
tion of cost-revenue relationships) . 13
The oligopoly case is, if anything, even less determinate than 
the ill-determinate case of monopolistic competition, regarding shifting 
possibilities. The keen awareness of oligopoly firms for one another's 
economic significance (mutual interdependence) adds its weight to the 
self-interest of the firm in making price and output decisions. No firm 
operating in such an industry would invite destructive retaliatory actions 
on the part of his rivals by a precipitate action disregarding their pre­
sence. Rather, as Due suggests, "Firms, in reacting to changes in costs, 
will typically not disregard the probably responses of competing firms,... 
and to the readjustments they make in their own prices." 14 To the extent 
that the tax is generally applied to all the oligopoly producers, and 
"..each seller knows that competitors are likewise affected..", then Due 
feels that the tax would be shifted forward by the firms simultaneously, 
finding it profitable "...provided that the prices had not already attained
13The following diagram is suggestive of the theoretical long- 
run equilibrium for. a monopolistically-competitive producer: (AC = AR
only at point "T", otherwise AC exceeds AR) .
Figure 3
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Quantities0
14Due, 0£. Cit., p. 269.
the levels which would maximize profits for the firms as a group."15 Note 
that it is considered of first importance that it be known that all firms 
will respond to the price change, a factor which might prevent or curtail 
shifting of taxes imposed upon only one or a few oligopoly firms operat­
ing in one area or state, but not all firms in the industry. In a case 
such as this, unless one of the taxed firms were dominant (a "price lead­
er") , forward shifting might be forestalled.
The alternative to forward shifting is, of course, backward 
shifting, in which the attempt is made to transmit the burden back to 
a supplier, or to an earlier stage of production. As has been noted 
above, some backward shifting accompanies implementation of forward shift­
ing (i.e., as a consequence of the lesser quantities of product sold, de­
mand for inputs is affected). When forward shifting is prevented, such 
as in the presence of a highly-elastic demand for the product, highly 
competitive conditions among producers,16 etc., then the only shifting 
alternative is backward shifting. Just as forward shifting depended to 
a considerable degree upon inelasticities (either in product demand or 
due to market control, or both) in the demand curve faced by the seller, 
so backward shifting depends heavily on an inelastic supply schedule for
15Ibid.
inputs. The logical terminus for any backward shift is with the first 
supplier of inputs ( factor of production), though complete backward shift­
ing would require a perfectly inelastic supply curve for output. 17 Hob­
son18 feared that excises which were shifted backward might result in the 
destructive taxing of the "social cost" inherent in basic materials, tend­
ing to "dry up" these sources until the resultant shortages "raise the 
prices of the taxed factors and thus readmit them to restore the requisite 
supply"19 (possibly through higher prices in the product markets, thus 
transforming an attempted backward shift into an ultimate forward shift). 
Groves suggests that Hobson's thesis, though "sound enough", still does 
little to aid in distinguishing "social cost" from "social surplus," citing 
the case of nonreproducible (natural) resources as having a "..highly 
inelastic supply.." and "..their services would not disappear if their 
owners' rent were taxed away."20 This assertion contains considerable
l7Under these circumstances," no matter how demand for the pro­
duct were affected by taxes, no price' above zero would theoretically call 
forth less (or more) supplies of the product, as below, DD represents the 
demand curve for the product prior to the tax, and D'D1 the demand curve 
net of the tax (per unit). The perfectly-inelastic supply curve SS re­
mains unresponsive to the change. Q
Pri
Figure ^
Perfectly-inelastic 
Supply and Backward 
Shifts of Taxes
lsHobson, John A., Taxation in the New State (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, 1920).
19Groves, 0£. Cit., p. 120.
20Groves, 0£. Cit., p. 120.
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moment for the policy results of taxes at their final resting place { in­
cidence) . Although backward shifting traditionally is not considered to 
be as widespread as forward shifting, there do appear to be important 
possibilities for this mode associated with basic natural resource devel­
opment .
Having considered the mechanics of tax shifting in order to 
provide a basis for understanding the phenomenon, the following sections 
will make some generalizations regarding possible patterns of shifting 
for taxes levied on basic natural resources.
B. Property and Yield Taxes on Natural Resources:
Some Probable Patterns of Shifting and Incidence.
Property taxes of various forms, as has previously been asserted, 
constitute the principal locally-generated levy against natural-resource 
industries. It has also been noted (Ch. I) that modifications of the 
ordinary ad valorem property levy have been instituted in a number of 
states to fit the burden of such tax to the economics of resource-exploit­
ing industries. Still, property taxes are levied and collected from nat­
ural resource industries. The question to be pursued in this section is: 
who pays these taxes, and what are the means by which they are transferred 
to the point of incidence? The answers may provide some insight into the 
policy effectiveness of such taxes, and offer some bases for further modi­
fications in the property-tax structure.
Property Taxes on Timber Resources. Seeking to assign general 
rules-of-thumb to shifting and incidence for timber taxation is to deny 
both the variety of levies applied, and the differing market structures
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associated with timber suppliers and owners of timber tracts. The timber 
owner may be a farmer, a nonfarm owner of a small private tract, a large 
tract-owning speculator, a firm engaged in the wood-products industry, 
or a government owner. 21 Necessarily, the manner in which property taxes 
(including yield taxes) bear upon these owners differs with each classifi­
cation. For our purposes, timber owners will be broken into the classes 
of small private tractholders, large private tractholders, and wood-prod­
ucts industrial holdings (government owners, of course, not being subject 
to the property taxes, as such).
The small tractholder has probably received a disproportionately- 
large share of attention of students of property taxation, historically 
( see Chapter I and Chapter II above), The burden of the property tax on 
timberlands held in small tracts seems to be a particularly onerous one, 
especially on those tracts not actively in process of cutting. Thus, the 
earliest efforts at reform of the property-tax laws were largely directed 
at seeking relief for this classification of timber owner. 22 Viewed from 
the standpoint of the possibilities available to the small tractowner, 
the economics of tax shifting encompass a rather narrow range, at best.
The elasticity of the supply function for timber products of 
the small tract owner is likely to be very slight; especially so if his 
property is located in an area unsuited to competitive uses, or the quality 
of the land is such as to be unsuited to other agricultural application.
At the same time, competition for the exploitation of small tracts is
21For the survey states, and for the nation, see the distribu­
tion of ownerships noted in Table 5, Chapter II.
22See the discussion of yield taxes in Chapter I.
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likely to be limited, with no more than one or two potential developers 
for the timber "crop". Under these conditions, and based on the infre­
quent occasions on which timber may be "harvested", the small timber 
owner may be forced to absorb a good portion, if not all, of the property 
taxes levied annually.
The small tract holder may fare somewhat better under the yield- 
tax exception to the property levy, but only by delaying the assumption 
of burden of this tax, levied against the timber at time of cutting. Again, 
his poor economic position relative to buyers is likely to mean the absorb- 
tion of the bulk of any stumpage levies assessed in connection with the 
yield tax. The general existance of poor quality in small-tract stands 
(see Ch. II above), will further prejudice the market power of the small 
owner.
The large tract owner fares somewhat better in economic power 
than the small owner, in that his ability to influence the prices of tim­
ber in the locality is bolstered somewhat by the scale of his operation.
If relatively small sawmills, poleyards, or even pulp mills in the area 
consider his tract significant enough for their total needs, the large 
tract owner may be able to shift at least a part of property taxes to 
them. One difficulty in shifting the ordinary ad valorem levy is the 
problem of calculation of a per-unit charge applicable to the timber crop. 
Where the yield tax is assessed in lieu of the regular tax, this calcula­
tion may be made considerably easier and the (normally) percentage levy 
either included in the price or as a separate contract item payable by 
the buyer.
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Whereas the small tract owner had operated either in a highly- 
competitive or at best monopolistically-competitive market in which he 
was virtually without power, the large tract owner is likely to have, if 
not a monopoly in the area, at least the position of an influential oli­
gopolist in this generally-localized industry. The shifting possibilities 
for taxes levied against the forest property are to be determined accord­
ingly.
The forest-industries owner represents a growing category of 
timber ownership, and seems destined to continue this growth for the fore­
seeable future, accounting for 13 percent of timberland ownership nation­
ally, and nearly 20 percent of timberland in Arkansas and Louisiana, 26
n £3percent in Texas, but only o percent in Michigan. These lands, owned 
and managed by forest industries, are generally in medium-sized-to-large 
tracts, often comprising the bulk of timberlands in the locality. Taxes 
assessed against this property classification would be subject to attempts 
at forward shifting. Vertically-integrated, diversified corporations 
(such as the Georgia-Pacific and Dierks Forests operations in Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Texas and other states), possess sufficient market power to 
exert considerable price power in markets extending to the final sales of 
lumber, paper products, poles and posts, etc. Giant firms, though numeri­
cally a minority in the wood-products industry (with the possible except­
ion of the paper industry, which requires such capital outlays for plant 
and equipment as to exclude very small operations), exert considerable in­
fluence in wide markets, and this influence should continue to grow. Both
oo
See Chapter II, Table 5b.
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the conventional ad valorem tax and, where applicable, yield taxes are 
quite likely to be shifted forward under either near-monopoly or oli­
gopoly conditions.
The existance of policies established by various trade asso­
ciations and "rating" boards (such as the Southern Pine Inspection Board) 
may help in standardizing prices at the final product market, and thus 
aid in forward shifting of the tax. This is a potential aid to large 
tract owners as well as to wood-industries owners. It is unlikely that 
such organizations provide a similar service to many small-tract owners 
or to the mills using their products to produce "unrated" lumber.
Finally, in comparing the ad valorem property tax with the 
yield-type levy, Professor James Yoho24 suggests that, when not unreason­
ably high, the ad valorem (annual) tax tends to mitigate in favor of the 
"all-age" type of timber operation, in which the products are more-or-less 
continuously harvested.25 The yield-type levy, which may be deferrable 
until harvest, tends to favor the "even-age" stand1 or at least to make 
it feasible, in his opinion.26 In any event, excessive ad valorem levies 
may be expected to work to discourage increasing the density and/or quality 
of stands, as the taxes (if assessment is kept up to date) would be in­
creased with each stand improvement.27
24Yoho, James C., "Economic Impact of Local Taxes and Death Taxes 
on Timber Resources," Timber Tax Journal, Vol. I, No. 1 (July, 1965), 
pp. 50-65.
25Ibid., pp. 56-7 *
26Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 53-
12k-
' In the harvesting of a mature stand, also, the annual levy 
would constitute a valid reason for withdrawing timber as rapidly as pos­
sible, thus reducing the exposure of the stand to tax assessment, and pro­
ducing a cost saving. The yield-type levy produces no such urgency, and 
it is precisely this quality which prompted its initial adoption as a 
conservation expedient.
Which type of measure, then, is best suited to modern forestry 
objectives? This is a difficult question to answer in absolute terms, as 
the considerations center on whether it is preferable that the forest 
yield an annual product, or that it be allowed to mature as a single unit 
("even-age" forest). Much of modern forestry leans toward the former 
application, though Professor Yoho associates high quality with the latter.28 
It may be necessary to provide an option between the election of an annual 
tax or a deferred, yield-type levy for different tracts and for different 
purposes (e.g., sawtimber is somewhat more amenable to the extended, "even- 
age" tract method; pulpwood might readily come from the "all-age" stand).
In any event, rates applied through the ad valorem tax should be reasonable. 
Professor Yoho suggests that "frozen" rates might be utilized; that is, a 
ceiling may be set on the assessment and/or rate for property taxes col­
lected against timber tracts.29 In this way, the owner would not be penal­
ized for stand improvement, and, as long as the rates were sufficiently 
high to prevent pure speculations, they would occasion no great advantage
28Ibid., p. 57.
29Yoho, Op. Cit., p. 57.
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or disadvantage for either approach to timber management over the 
other.30
Property Taxes on Mineral Properties. The exploitation of 
mineral properties entails a complex and mixed set of ownerships and 
industrial structures even more varied than that for timber. In order 
to encompass the entire range of market structures, one must include 
small, localized operations for the excavation of sand and gravel, or 
clay for local brickyards, along with the gigantic and powerful complex 
of exploration, drilling, pipeline transport and refining of the oil in­
dustry. For purposes of this analysis, taxation of mineral lands will be 
considered on the basis of localized versus interregional production; and 
ownerships on the basis of small, large and industrial categories.
Small ownerships of such common minerals as sand and gravel, 
stone and clay, and other minerals of no particularly unique qualities 
would likely be operating in markets in which price is largely determined 
by the level of demand for the product. That is, local or regional acti­
vity in such areas as residential and commercial construction, roadbuild- 
ing, brickmaking and related activities would set standards for prices 
received. To the extent that development of these materials does not 
compete with such other activities as farming, residential use or other 
economic applications (e.g., the case of excavation of sand and gravel 
from creek and river beds), supply would tend to be highly inelastic. For 
the small-tract owner, there is a general likelihood that he will be unable 
to shift the property tax forward in any significant or predictable degree.
30Ibid.
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An exception would arise in the case of a particularly-rich, or parti­
cularly-well-located deposit which might command a premium price, com­
pared to other sources of supply. In the case of inferior deposits, it 
is possible that no development offers may be made to the owner, or 
offers made may not be considered worthwhile, even given the more-or-less 
"surplus" value in such deposits.
Even when the small tract owner commands deposits of minerals 
with an interregional or national market, such as petroleum or natural 
gas, he may enjoy few opportunities for shifting the property tax forward. 
Having insufficient capital and/or technical knowledge to develop such 
deposits, and given the high fixed costs associated with oil and gas pro­
duction, the small-tract owner is generally forced to deal with profes­
sional developers ("wildcat" speculators or pipeline or petroleum companies). 
These developers, in turn, seek to execute leasehold agreements with 
several tractowners in a given locality, in order to achieve economic 
scale of operations (a leasehold agreement with any individual small 
tractowner may even include an "escape" clause, to be exercised in the 
event that sufficient numbers of leases, or sufficient area for develop­
ment, are not secured by the developer to make production worthwhile).
Thus, in the case of the small minerals tractholder, as in the case of 
the small timber owner, the possibilities for shifting the burden of pro­
perty taxes are very limited.
Owners of large tracts (or even medium-sized tracts of unique 
advantages of richness or favorable location) would be likely to fare 
better, to the extent that they have the capacity to affect supply appre­
ciably in local markets. Even in interregional or national markets, the
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size of their holdings alone may give these owners some advantage among 
regional developers. Because large leaseholds negotiated with a single 
owner tend to insulate the owner from "whipsawing" (setting one owner 
against another in negotiating the lease), and may be attractive to seve­
ral developers bidding against one another, the owner may be able to shift 
a portion of the property taxes forward to the developer eventually awarded 
the lease. This presumes, of course, that the owner has some basis for 
estimating the cost of such taxes for purposes of incorporating them into 
the leasehold and royalty agreements.31 A minimum of records-keeping, 
however, should make this feasible.
Large tractowners should find agreements on resources traded in 
the less-competitive markets (e.g., petroleum, natural gas, metals, etc.) 
less subject to wide variations in both numbers of prospective developers 
and terms which such developers are willing to accept than for the more 
competitive or localized markets (such as for sand and gravel, stone and 
other materials generally used in the locally-oriented construction in­
dustries) . This may be due to the fact that the former group possess a 
greater capacity to shift the taxes through monopoly price power to a 
later production stage.32
31If, for example, a tax on a given tract amounts to, say, $500 
per year, the owner would adjudge the rate of earnings on a lease net of 
this amount, as follows:
rate = L( leasehold amt/term of lease) + avg. royalty-] - $500 
Market Value of Leased Lands (est.)
32As long as the industry may be able easily to include the 
shifted tax in an administered price structure, resistance to the shift 
would tend to be considered unimportant; a "markup" on this part of cost 
may even be possible (see Groves, 0j). Cit., pp. 285-6: "pyramiding" of 
taxes).
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Industrial tractowners will view shifting possibilities largely 
on the basis of their price power in the markets, which may be extensive 
in the case of large, vertically integrated concerns in industries pro­
ducing and selling in oligopoly or virtual monopoly markets (e.g., the 
petroleum, metals, salt, and sulfur industries nationally; the cement, 
glass, brick and other industries locally or regionally). In these in­
dustries the property tax is viewed as a cost of production, and the 
attempt to recoup this cost through the price of products is a foregone 
conclusion.
As in the case of other industries, excessive property taxes on 
natural resource holdings of industries may exert a repressive effect.
This would be especially true of a firm operating interstate or inter- 
regionally in a market characterized by highly-competitive conditions.
In the bulk of resource industries operating on a national scale (oil 
production and distribution, metals, sulfur, salt, gypsum, etc.), however, 
the rule is oligopoly organization virtually throughout the production, 
distribution and marketing processes. In oligopoly the practice of "bulk- 
line cost" pricing, in which market price is administered either covertly 
or more-or-less overtly to accommodate the least efficient (highest-cost) 
member of the oligopoly in a position of at least minimum profits.33 
Under such an arrangement, the highest state or local tax rate paid by 
one of the oligopoly producers may actually become a substantial element 
in price-fixing for the entire industry, in addition to allowing the
33Backman, Jules, Government Price-Fixing (New York: Pitman 
Publishing Corp., 1938)» pp* 31j 3^~5*
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producer in question to shift the entire amount of the property tax from 
the point of impact to the point of ultimate sale. Conceivably, then, 
the final effect to the private sector of the economy is a shift of much, 
much more than the very highest property tax assessed by any state or 
locality, with the more-favored firms enjoying a substantial monopoly 
profit as a consequence,
A study of property taxation would be incomplete without a con­
sideration of the subject of tax capitalization. This is a special case 
of tax shifting in which the perpetual burden of any newly-imposed prop­
erty tax is theoretically permanently shifted backward to the owner of 
the property at the time the tax is imposed.34 This phenomenon, of course, 
would be most applicable to property devoted to commercial purposes, but, 
in a sense, it may be applicable even to residential property to the ex­
tent that real property taxes are a consideration in the decision of a' 
householder to buy. The requirement of a price transaction to enable 
shifting is met by what Sharp and Sliger35 describe as "a simulated one 
between the current property owner and the future buyer of the property”.36 
For the owner of natural resource lands, especially for the small-tract 
owner, this is likely to mean a capitalization of not only the bare-land 
tax on his property, but the capitalization of yield-tax charges in the 
case of timber or other materials whose realization for production is sub­
ject to taxation at time of conversion. If a corrollary may be apended to
34For an excellent discussion of tax capitalization, see Groves, 
Op. Cit., Ch. 6, pp. lk-2-h^ .
35Sharp and Sliger, Ojd. Cit.,
360£. Cit., Supra note no. J, p. 212,
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the concept of tax capitalization, it would be that an area characterized 
by very low tax rates applied to real property may find the sellers at­
taching a "negative capitalization" to this virtue. That is, inflated 
property values may be the result of property taxation which is signi­
ficantly lower than that for otherwise-competitive properties. Thus, the 
property owners at time of the enactment of special property-tax deferrals 
or exemptions may actually enjoy a speculative economic surplus associated 
with the capitalized value of such tax relief. 37
37The extent of this "negative capitalization" is by no means 
certain, but it may be described by the following formula:
t*p = A + S11 
r
where
P = Market price,
A = Net Annual return in an adjacent ( or similar) competitive 
area with a higher tax rate (net rent),
S = difference in ad valorem (or other) property taxes favoring 
the region in question, and, 
r = average return for similar properties deemed sufficient 
to induce purchase and development.
Thus, if the average net rental return on a parcel of property in a 
higher-tax area, sufficient to induce development at a rate of, say 5 
percent were $300; then the value of such a property would be (capital­
ized) :
P = — = — ^ 05—  ” $6,000; while for the favored (negative 
capitalization) region, the value would be:
- -fooo ti.100 „ $8,000,
* Up
when the tax advantage (St)for the favored region is $100 (less) compared 
to the tax in the less-favored region.
C. Severance Taxes on Natural Resources:
Patterns of Shifting and Incidence
The unique application of the severance tax to the equally- 
unique natural resources industries contains the elements necessary for 
shifting of the tax (price transaction, component of cost structure of 
commodity, differing elasticities of demand and supply in the markets, 
etc.), and constitutes, in operation, a commodity tax. Though the tax 
is variously applied as a "privilege" tax (Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, 
et. al.), or as an "occupation" tax (Texas), or on some other basis of 
nominal designation, the fact that the tax involves the extraction, pro­
duction and distribution of commodities in trade would lead those in­
volved to regard the severance tax as applying to the commodity. As In 
the case of property taxes, the analysis will be made on the basis of the 
ability to shift the tax by various classes of resource owners and devel­
opers, and for various types of resource industries. Special attention 
will again be given to the timber and wood-producing resources as distin­
guished from minerals industries, representing,respectively, renewable 
and nonrenewable resource classifications.
Timber Severance Tax Shifting and Incidence. As should be appar­
ent by now, little reliance is placed by the survey states upon timber 
severance taxes for public revenue; rather the bulk of such taxes is de­
voted to the interests of conservation and forest management (See Ghs. I, 
III). The presence of the tax, however, has the same immediate implica­
tions for shifting and incidence as if it were disposed in the conventional
manner of distribution for revenues, and the incidental benefits received
*
by forest owners and developers from forest improvements financed by the
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tax have little, if any, bearing upon the desires of owners and developers
alike to 'shift the burden of the tax.
Timber severance taxes are levied upon the ’’severer" or developer
of the resource property, whether he be the owner of the lands, or someone
with assigned leasehold rights conferred by the owner. The final resting 
place of the tax, however, may or may not lie with the severer: his capa­
city to shift the burden of the levy to others will determine the final 
resting place for the tax.
Severers dealing with small tract owners are likely to have the
option of the direction of shifting which they will choose -- backward
shifting to the tract owner (capitalization, as it were, of the diminished 
net value of timber after the tax), or forward shifting to the processor 
(this would be of more practicality if the severer had several alternative 
customers for his product] the likelihood of success would be reduced in 
proportion to the economic power of the processor, increased with larger 
numbers of processors). As in the case of the property tax, the small 
tract owner would have little price power (due to his insignificant con­
tribution to supply) to influence the price received from severers, and 
thus would be in no position to protect himself from a backward shift of 
the burden of the severance tax, save for diverting his lands to alter­
native uses. The option would largely lie with the severer.
The developer (either owner or lessee) of timber resources on 
small tracts would face forward-shifting possibilities largely based on 
the numbers and economic power of would-be processors or manufacturers of 
wood products in the locality or region. Thus, if the severer were for­
tunate enough to deal with a number of small competing sawmills in an
area, elasticities of supply faced by any one of these sawmills might 
cause the acceptance of at least a partial forward shift of the tax. 
Similarly, a choice between sawmills, pulpmills, postyards and other 
wood-users competing with one another might ease forward shifting, espe­
cially if there were a limited number of suppliers. However, if the 
severer were only one of a large number of suppliers to, say, a monopson- 
istic paper mill, dominating the area, then it is quite unlikely that the 
severance tax would be accepted as a part of the supply contract unless 
the mill were able to transmit the cost to the ultimate market. A fur­
ther disadvantage for severer and/or owner prevails when the timber crop 
is limited in its market applications (e.g., smaller, poletimber-sized 
tress on second-growth stands would be suited only to either pulpwood or 
post production). In these latter cases, the small tract owner and/or 
severer may expect, between them to bear a large part of, if not all, the 
burden of payment for the severance tax.
When timber is developed in large tracts, the timber owner may 
be accorded some protection against backward-shifting of the severance 
tax due to the likelihood that his tract will be more attractive to a 
larger number of development possibilities and developers. He may now 
command more price power in dealing with developers, and, perhaps, even 
with subsequent processors. If, as is frequently the case, the timber on 
the large tract is well situated and of higher quality for development, 
then the inelasticity of his demand function is further enhanced, and the 
shifting possibilities expand.
The severer other than the owner, seeking to develop a large 
tract, may be placed in a "squeeze" between the influential owner and the
13k
dominant processor of wood products, in which case, he may have to absorb 
all or a large part of the severance levy burden. To the extent that his 
rights to large tracts comprise a substantial part of the local supply, 
the severer may be at least partially successful in shifting a portion 
of the tax to processors in the negotiated price. This latter possibility 
is made more tenable if the processor has some confidence that he, in turn, 
may shift the tax to subsequent buyers.
The industrial owner/developer of timber tracts, as in the case 
of the property tax, tends to regard the severance tax as a part of the 
cost structure, and is ill-inclined to absorb its burden. Again, to the 
extent that the commercial owner is economically-influential in the wood- 
products industry, regionally or nationally, his power to incorporate sev­
erance taxes in price is substantial. Should competitive or other condi­
tions (such as product substitutes like plastics, masonry materials or 
others) deprive the wood-industries owner-producer of price power in the 
final market, his alternative are to transmit the burden of the tax to his 
labor force, capital-equipment suppliers or others, or, finally, to absorb 
the cost of the tax from profits. The possibilities for a backward shift 
of severance levies, though difficult to ascertain empirically, would be 
especially favorable if the wood-products producer is an oligopsonistic 
or monopsonistic buyer of labor in the area, or is a similarly-dominant 
customer for timber and wood-processing equipment and materials.
The forward shift of the severance tax still appears to be the 
more likely course of action for the vertically-integrated forest-owner- 
processor, and this possible course of action may be aided materially by 
the trade associations and boards previously mentioned, with their atten-
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dant power to fix prices and marketing policies. If the elements for 
conscious oligopoly market structure were lacking before, such associa­
tions lend decisive support.
One development by the wood-products industry which, in recent 
years, may have eased the dilemma faced by the small-tract owner relative 
to the severance tax burden is the so called "American Tree Farm System", 
sponsored by the American Forest Products Industries organization.38 This 
program enlists private forest owners, often small-tract farm or family 
operations in providing sources of supply to the local wood-using industry, 
in return for which the industry offers advice, services and other con­
siderations to the tract owner in order to produce conditions of scienti­
fic, sustained-yield management.39 By I96I, acreage under the System 
amounted to about 5^.8 million acres, with 3*8 million acres in Texas,
3»T5 million in Louisiana, 3*6 million in Arkansas, and 1.2 million in 
Michigan.40 Aside from the obvious conservation benefits to be derived 
for forestry, the participation by the forest industries may also enable 
the small tract owner to enjoy, by association, the price-power of the 
industry, and cause the forward shifting of severance-tax burdens other­
wise likely to have been shifted back to the owner, or absorbed by the 
developer. The extent of forward-shifting might be deduced by comparing 
the prices received on such "Tree Farm" contracts with the valuations 
placed on timber cut on its own tracts by the forest industry itself.
  (
38"American Tree Farm System", March, 1961, American Forest Prod­
ucts Industries, Conservation Yearbook, 19^1, pp. 117.
39Ib id.
4°Ibid.
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Severance Taxes and Shifting in Minerals Industries. Unlike 
the severance tax on forest products, the minerals severance tax may be 
considered to produce respectable (if not spectacular) revenues, and to 
be largely treated as a revenue source. As in the case of the severance 
tax on timber, however, the severance tax on minerals may be regarded by 
the severers as a commodity tax on the minerals realized. Again, market 
structures facing severers, owners, and producers are decisive in patterns 
of shifting which may emerge. The analysis which follows will be based 
on a consideration of these factors.
Again, as in the case of property taxes, where the minerals are 
quite common, and held in small deposits, the tax on severance may be 
expected to hold few possibilities for forward shifting, and to include 
the possibilities for backward shifts from the severer to the owner. This 
stipulation may not apply in the case of some minerals of unique or very 
limited supply, for which the demand by developers and producers is great 
(e.g., certain gem stones, platinum and other precious metals, etc.).
Severers and/or developers operating in industries of relatively 
common and highly competitive products will seek to shift the tax, but 
forward shifting may be largely unprofitable due to the market competition, 
and/or existence of numbers of substitute products. The alternative, then, 
is a backward shift to the owner, who is similarly disadvantaged in market 
price power. The success of such attempted shifts will depend, then, on 
the relative powers of the owner and severer; it is quite probably that 
both will ultimately shoulder some of the burden of the tax.
For certain industries whose production is localized (such as 
the salt and sulfur industries), and who operate in oligopoly-oriented
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production and distribution markets (such as the above, plus oil, natural 
gas and metals), forward shifts are sufficiently easy that they may be­
come a matter of policy, without regard to the possibility of backward 
shifts. Thus, the severer of petroleum products, even if not a verti­
cally-integrated concern, such as a pipeline company or producer-refiner, 
may be successful in gaining a forward shift of severance taxes. Price- 
fixing by the oligopoly firms in the area may offer an incidental benefit 
to the independent developer who deals in the same market. 41
Vertically-integrated owner-severer-producer firms, or simply 
severer-producers, in industries organized in oligopoly-market forms will 
be strongly disposed to transmit the tax as a cost of production to the 
final price of products. Here, again, trade associations and boards may 
aid in maintaining parallel price policies for the oligopoly firms. In 
the case of petroleum, the state and federal governments have been of 
substantial (even if unintended) help in market control, through the osten­
sible pro-conservation practice of prorationing and the economic "assist­
ance to orderly marketing" of Bureau of Mines estimates of monthly crude 
production. 42 Industry-sponsored guideline practices are available to 
other oligopoly-oriented minerals industries.
41For a survey of landmark proportions regarding market organi­
zation of the domestic crude petroleum industry, see Rostow, Eugene V.,
A National Policy for the Oil Industry, Part II, Chs. 4-6.
42Rostow, 0£. Cit., pp. 27-9.
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D. Effects of Resource Taxation: Some 
Observations
The incidence of the tax is the end result of shifting; the 
effects of a tax are far more widespread in nature, and pertain to the 
social as well as the economic costs inherent in the tax- Some general 
effects of taxes on resources will be suggested in this discussion, and, 
in the concluding chapter (Ch. Vi), specific observations regarding re- 
source-tax effects will be made.
Effects on Timber Industries. Tax policies, and the mechanisms 
for shifting of taxes on timber industries have been studied very care­
fully by public policymakers as they affect conservation, incentives and 
production in the modern period (since the 1930's). Modification of the 
ad valorem property tax has been accomplished through the yield-tax con­
cept in many states in an attempt to encourage (or at least, to avoid 
discouraging) sound forest management. Substantial amounts (in some cases 
virtually all) of the yields from both severance and yield taxes on timber 
have been "ploughed back" into the agencies and programs promoting sound 
forestry.
The results of forest-tax policies thus far do not provide evi­
dence that conservation has been either helped or hindered by the modern 
approaches to forest taxation, though the industry has certainly benefited 
from the tax-supported public education, information and research programs. 
The ad valorem tax may have taken some toll in the ruthless cutting prac­
tices of the 1930's and previously (though the economic conditions of the 
great depression may have contributed to much of this waste), but partici­
pation in yield-tax programs has not, thus far, indicated that there is an
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overwhelming desire to escape the burden of the conventional levy. Con­
servation and scientific methods of good forestry practice have been in 
evidence most on the publicly-held lands, followed in order by those 
owned by the forest industry and large, privately-held tracts (see Ch. ll). 
These are the areas in which improvements would have been expected in any 
case, and the areas controlled by the latter two types of owner have grown, 
and will probably continue growing, at the most rapid rate. While the 
small woodlot may not disappear completely, such holdings will assume a 
lesser and lesser significance to the forest industry. Perhaps those re­
maining will frequently be connected directly with the wood-using indus­
tries as suggested by the "tree farm” approach, said to be growing at the 
rate of about 3 million acres per year . 43
Minerals taxation appears to have been largely accomodated into 
the cost structures of those resource producers operating in markets 
characterized by lack of strong competition. The ultimate resting-place 
for many of these property and severance taxes, or large parts thereof, is 
the ultimate marketplace for the finished product. Thus, the taxes in­
volved become consumption taxes, paid through prices for goods produced 
by the taxed industries. The tax may have few ill effects, and, indeed 
may be something of a tax on "benefits received" for the consumer who 
enjoys the end product of society's common largess.
Again, many of the minerals industries are characterized by 
large, often vertically-integrated, concerns; but this need not be an 
effect of the tax structure, so much as of the industries' requirements
43Conservation Yearbook, I96I, Loc. Cit.
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for large capital outlays, or, for some industries, the fact that the 
subsequent stages of production and distribution are populated with large, 
powerful firms. Mining, like manufacturing, is often most efficiently 
conducted on large-scale operations, and this may better serve conserva­
tion and output goals than the attempt to limit the size of enterprises 
arbitrarily.
If it appears that the success in shifting taxes on resource 
industries subverts the intent of such levies, perhaps the real intent 
of production taxes should be viewed in the light of the following state­
ment :44
...it is commonly believed that a cigarette tax paid directly 
by a manufacturer in North Carolina ends as a burden on the 
smoker.... In fact, we are so confident of the shifting in 
this case that we label the tax a consumption tax.
Thus, the purposes of public policy may be served, even if, as is very
frequently the case, business taxes become, at length, personal taxes.
In this aspect, taxes on businesses ( or persons) engaged in the resource
industries are not materially-different from taxes on any industry.
E. Summary
In the foregoing discussion, attention has been given to the 
probable patterns of shifting and incidence for resource taxes; that is, 
the manner in which the initial levy is ultimately disposed of, and the 
probable final resting-place for the burden of payment. The mechanics of 
shifting suggest that, in order for a tax to be shifted, it must involve
44Groves, Op. Cit., p. 116.
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a commodity or process which is subject to exchange for value ("price 
transaction"), and, in this particular, taxes levied against natural 
resources qualify.
Taxes levied against resource industries constitute two general 
effective applications: those which may be considered as attaching to
the resource lands and wealth (property taxes), and those which may be 
associated with the production or processing of the resource commodity 
(severance taxes). The yield-tax variation on ad valorem property taxes 
constitutes something of a "hybrid" levy in effect, containing as many 
(or more) attributes of the commodity tax as of the property tax. This 
is due to the timing of its collection with the harvesting or mining of 
the resource.
Property taxes constitute the most difficult type for shifting in 
the conventional sense when they are applied on an annual basis to re­
source lands which yield a product only periodically, sometimes over sub­
stantial periods of time, as, for example, those pertaining to standing- 
timber tracts. When shifting is possible, the capacity to shift the ad 
valorem tax is probably greater among large-tract owners than small-tract 
owners, due to the greater price power of the former, and easier for in­
dustrial owners than for other private owners, due to the greater degree 
of vertical integration with the processing and final markets for this 
class of owners. This is generally true for both timber and minerals 
properties. The presence of yield-type, "in lieu" taxes on the resource 
commodity only, or on both the lands and commodity, simplifies the process 
of tax shifting, providing a timing of the tax with the actual trading in 
the resource commodity. Under these circumstances, the computation of
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the tax on the basis of the resource commodity is virtually automatic, 
and the possibilities for shifting will be virtually all based on the dif­
ferential market influences of owners, severers and processers, proceed­
ing in the direction and degree dictated by the dominant member of this 
group.
Severance taxes, constituting commodity taxes in effect, are sub­
ject to shifting according to the degree of price-power possessed by 
owners, developers and processors, with the small-scale owners being least 
able to avoid a backward shift by severers, and smaller-scale severer- 
developers being least able to transmit the burden forward to processors, 
other factors equal. The composition of the industry utilizing the re­
sources will have a substantial bearing upon the degree and direction of 
tax shifts, with those who operate in oligopoly or near-monopoly product 
markets being more disposed and able to shift taxes forward toward the 
ultimate consumer. The more competitive the product market, the fewer the 
forward-shifting possibilities. Industrial owners in vertically-integrated 
resource industries would be most likely to seek forward-shifting possibil­
ities, given sufficient price power in product markets.
The final disposition of the burden of resource taxes, where for­
ward shifts have been successful, lodges largely with the ultimate customer 
for the resource product. Despite the basic designations of both property 
and severance levies, there is an implicit acceptance (even intent) of the 
consumer's shouldering the burden of resource taxes, as in the case of all 
production-oriented taxes, in the drafting of such taxes. These taxes are 
often popularly called "consumption" taxes when more overtly transferred 
to the consumer, as in the case of tobacco taxes levied originally upon
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the manufacturer. Thus, forward shifting of the taxes on natural re­
sources provides both a rationing function for their use, and a basis 
for collection, in various stages of their development, of society's 
demand for compensation for the loss of these resources.
From the standpoint of final effects, the pattern of shifting 
assumed by commodity taxes has a very real bearing upon the consequences 
of a tax to the state or region in which it is levied. That is, if a 
commodity-type tax such as that described in the preceding paragraph is 
successfully shifted forward to consumers markets diffused throughout 
several regions, then the state or area in question will actually have 
relieved itself of substantial portions of the burden of the tax. There­
fore, if a petroleum severance tax in, say, Texas or Louisiana, is trans­
mitted to the final sale of products by a national corporation, purchasers 
in Iowa or Florida may actually be made to shoulder some of the burden of 
taxes levied on removals of resources from the former states. In effect, 
the states of Texas and Louisiana have levied taxes to be paid, in part 
at least, by persons in other states. This is much in keeping with the 
concept that persons benefiting from the enjoyment of resource products 
should be assessed the social (as well as market) cost of such enjoyment.
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding chapters, the reader has pursued an examination 
of the roles of resource industries at the basic-production level in the 
economies of the survey states, and the manner in which they are subjected 
to special forms of taxation by those states. In the course of the study, 
the similarities and differences among the four states, both as to resource 
wealth and the approach to its taxation, have been portrayed to afford the 
reader insight into the question, and to provide a basis for comparison 
and evaluation.
The present chapter will have three fundamental objectives: 
first, an analysis of the fiscal significance of natural-resource taxation 
for the four states; secondly, an examination of the policy effectiveness 
of resource taxes, in line with the policy objectives suggested in Chapter 
I; and, finally, some suggestions will be offered for modification of tax 
structure for more effective results from both the policy and revenue 
standpoints.
A. Fiscal Significance of Natural Resource Taxes 
Compared for the Four States
Probably the most obvious characteristic observed from the study 
thus far is the vastly-differing fiscal significance of resource taxes for 
the survey states. Two of these states, Texas and Louisiana, collect mas­
sive revenues from resource taxes, principally those on mineral resources, 
and most of the latter from petroleum products. Arkansas and Michigan 
stand in an entirely different class, realizing only modest revenues from
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taxation, of resource industries, though the petroleum industry is the 
mainstay for resource-tax collections in these states, also.
As a basis for analyzing the differential fiscal significance 
of resource taxes to the several states, it may be appropriate to examine 
each state in the survey separately, giving attention to each classifica­
tion of resource industry separately, also. The contrasts provided are 
quite striking, and may aid in understanding both the degree of importance 
associated with resource industries for each state and the comparative 
yields of various resource industries to the revenue base.
Texas. The treasury of natural-resource wealth for Texas is 
vast, and places the state at the very top of this category, both in terms 
of the value of resources products, and public revenues obtained from 
taxes levied upon them. Texas' minerals production is, of course, the 
principal basis for her preeminent position in natural resources. The 
value of her minerals production accounts for about 22 percent of the 
total minerals value produced in the entire nation, a figure which is 
well ahead of that for any other state (Louisiana was second in production 
in 1965 with 14 percent, California third with about 7*5 percent).1 The 
values obtained from her forest and fisheries industries also contributes 
significant, if not such spectacular amounts.
As might be expected, in the light of the above observations,
Texas led the nation in resource-severance tax collections in fiscal I965- 
66, with almost $211 millions, the bulk of this figure ($205 millions) 
coming from her severance taxes on petroleum products (See Table 13, Ch. IV).
Minerals Yearbook, Vol. I, I965, p. 102.
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As a percent of her total tax collections, the combined severance tax 
receipts accounted for about 16.5 percent, second only to sales and gross 
receipts at $786 millions and 62 percent of the total $1,267 millions. 2 
A portion of the gross receipts revenue arose from processing industries 
dealing with natural-resource products, and this, it should be pointed 
out, would add to the fiscal significance of resources at stages of their 
development above the basic level.
In addition to tax revenues gained from natural-resource in­
dustries, the State also collected substantial amounts of money from 
leases, sales and royalties on products severed from public lands, or 
lands under public jurisdiction.
Louisiana. Louisiana, like Texas, possesses vast natural- 
resource wealth. Her second-ranking position among resource producers 
(14 percent of 1965 value in minerals industries) makes her, in many 
characteristics, very similar to Texas in the role which resource taxes 
play in her publie-revenue picture. Unlike Texas, Louisiana levies spe­
cially-designed taxes against her forest and fisheries industries, along 
with the minerals-resource industry. Louisiana, then, has the most com­
prehensive structure of resource-tax application among the survey states.
Consistent with the great significance of her natural-resource 
industries, Louisiana derives a major proportion of her tax and nontax 
revenues from this area of tax application. The severance-tax, in its 
various applications, is the leading tax for the state, with the $205 
millions in fiscal 1966 accounting for almost one-third of total tax
aReport of the State Comptroller of Public Accounts, State of 
Texas, Part 1, Fiscal I965-66, Table No. 1.
lbj
revenues ($620 millions} . 3 The overwhelming bulk of severance-tax col­
lections come from minerals ($204 millions in fiscal 1966), and of mine­
rals taxes, oil and gas products account for the virtual total sum($200  
millions and 98 percent in fiscal 1966).4 Timber severance taxes during 
the same period accounted for about $630 thousands, or only about 0 .3  
percent of the total severance-tax revenues, and fisheries severance taxes 
have characteristically accounted for a very small part of the total sev­
erance revenue (less than $400 thousand in fiscal 1965) the latest year 
for which data were available in detail) , 5
The impact of Louisiana’s natural resources upon her fiscal 
revenues is not limited to the yields from severance taxes. She also 
realizes large sums from mineral leases and royalties on resource pro­
ducts taken from state lands, territorial waters and streams of the state, 
as evidenced by the estimate for fiscal 1965-66 of $103 millions from 
such leases and royalties. 6 Combined with severance tax revenues, the 
total estimated returns of about $306 millions approaches one-third of 
total budgeted state revenues of about $1 billion for the fiscal year 
I965-6 6.7 Thus, viewed from the context of either taxes or total state 
revenues, natural resources possess a critical significance to the state's 
fiscal well-being.
326th Annual Report,Fiscal 1965-66, La. Dept, of Revenues,pp. 15.
4Ibid., p. 10.
511th Biennial Report, 1964/1965) Louisiana Wild Life and Fish­
eries Commission, p. 14.
6State of Louisiana, Executive Budget, Fiscal 1965-66, p. 4.
7Ibid.
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The disposition of severance-tax revenues is of considerable 
interest, also, as these revenues constitute a vital base of support for 
several necessary public functions. As previously noted (Ch. IV), with 
the exception of timber severance tax revenues, (limited in returns to 
any parish of $200,000, or three-fourths of the total, whichever is 
smaller), the majority of severance revenues are retained by the State 
for the benefit of the free school textbook program and for the Public 
School Fund. 8 This latter fund has been the principal beneficiary of 
the revenues, as the textbook program has required only a small part of 
the total. Fisheries severance taxes have primarily nourished the Con­
servation Fund, though the amounts have hardly been adequate to any sub­
stantial support in themselves.
The returns on mineral leases and royalties for 1965-66 fiscal 
year were budgeted for the General Fund ( about 70 percent) and to the 
Highway Fund (about 14 percent), and the balance was allocated among a 
number of special-fund accounts. 9
Arkansas. The significance of severance taxes to the support 
of fiscal budgets in the State of Arkansas is in striking contrast to the 
leading roles such taxes occupy in Texas and Louisiana. Severance tax 
revenues are a minor part of the total collected by the Revenue Department, 
with the 1965-66 fiscal-year collections of $4.8 millions accounting for
8La. State Tax Handbook, 1964, pp. 8 l, 82.
9Executive Budget, p. 6.
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only about 2 percent of the tax receipts handled by that agency ($253  
millions).10 The $253 millions in collections by the Revenue Department 
accounted for about 95 percent of total tax and other collections of $267 
millions in fiscal 1965-66.
When the $8 ,72 6 .7 6 derived from oil and gas leases and the $109 
thousand from royalty payments (principally sand and gravel) are added to 
the total from severance taxes, the relative importance of resource-based 
yields is not changed materially, still falling somewhat short of 2 per­
cent of the total tax collections from all sources. 11 In terms of a total 
state budget of about $400 millions, the total support from natural re­
source taxes and other collections from the industry accounts for about 
1 .2 percent. 12
Of the total from severance taxes, the largest contributor is, 
and has been, the petroleum industry. Oil severance taxes have recently 
averaged about $3 millions annually ($2 .85 millions in fiscal I965-66 is 
somewhat below figures obtained in preceding years), or about 6 2 .5 per­
cent of total severance taxes. 13 Next in value were timber severance col­
lections, with $885 thousands collected in fiscal 1965-66, and reflecting 
a sustained rise in recent years. 14
lQBiennial Report, 1964-65, Wild Life and Fisheries Commission,
pp. 6, 8.
11Biennial Report, 1964-65, 1965-66, Arkansas Revenue Dept.,p. 6 .
12Report by the State Comptroller (Arkansas), 1966, pp. 242-3. 
13Biennial Report, pp. 14-15-
14Ibid.
Thus, the State of Arkansas presents a more orthodox picture of 
state revenue system, with the "customary" state taxes -- sales, gasoline, 
income, etc., -- being the leaders in revenue production. Severance taxes 
and other collections from natural resource industries must be considered 
as having minor significance in the scheme of state finances, and repre­
sent only a limited source of "turnback" to the county and local units.
In fiscal 1965-66, the one-fourth share of general severance tax revenues 
returned to the counties totaled $570 thousand. Shares of this sum would 
be likely to assume significance only for the poorer counties. 15
Michigan. For the State of Michigan, resource taxes have the 
least fiscal significance among the survey states. Her collections of the 
oil and gas severance tax for fiscal 1965-66 totaled about $983 thousands, 
off slightly from the previous several years, when the average of collect­
ions had averaged just over $1 million. 16 The I965-66 total accounted for 
less than 0 .7 percent of the total tax collections of $1,^2^ millions. 17 
Addition of the Oil Privilege Fee collections ( $18 thousands) barely brings 
the total to 0 .7 percent, and the state-collected portion of the forest- 
severance taxes on timber in fiscal 1965-66 of $19 thousands raises the 
total only slightly. 18 The severance taxes on timber in private forest
15Ibid.
la25th Annual Report, Department of Revenue Division (Michigan),
p. 8 0 .
17Ibid., pp. 10-11, p. 2 8.
l825rd Biennial Report, Michigan Dept, of Conservation, Lands 
Division, 1966, p. 3^ >*
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reserves (woodlots) are locally-collected, and not readily available, but 
the indication is for a very nominal sum.
In 1965-66 there were only 57 oil and gas severance taxpayers 
recorded on the rolls of the Department of Revenue Division, and this 
small number of taxpayers seems to suggest a limited potential for the 
severance tax as it is presently constituted. 19
Added to the resource-based support from the severance tax and 
privilege fee is a comparatively-large income from oil and gas royalties, 
rentals, bonuses and fees, which totaled over thousands for fiscal
I965-6 6 .20 Total state-collected revenues from natural resources thus 
approach $1.5 millions, or about 0 .8  percent of the total state revenue 
from all sources, estimated at $1,871 millions for fiscal I965-6 6 .21
Summary. In the matter of natural resources taxation from the 
standpoint of fiscal significance, Texas is the apparent leader in dollar 
terms, but Louisiana places a much greater relative reliance upon these 
taxes as a means of public revenue. Texas' natural-resource taxes on 
basic levels constitute almost 17 percent of total tax collections, and 
are second only to her sales tax in productivity of revenues. Louisiana's 
severance-tax collections approach one-third of her total tax collections, 
and comprise the largest single category of tax levied in terms of yield. 
Question may be raised as to the soundness of such substantial dependency 
by these states upon a tax source which, by its nature, is subject to ex­
1925th Annual Report (Revenue), p. 15.
20(Lands Div.), p. 37.
21( Revenue) , p. 15 .
haustion in production. However, the vast reserves of the principal rev­
enue-producing resources, petroleum products, suggest no crisis will 
develop in the immediate or foreseeable future. 22 Certainly, it may be 
argued that tying one's tax structure so closely to a single, or limited 
number of activities subject to business fluctuation not necessarily 
coordinated with fiscal requirements of the states is unwise; but, by the 
same token, many other levies are subject to the same condition. The in­
come tax, for example, is prone to wide fluctuation, especially if pro­
gressive rates are applied.
For Arkansas and Michigan, resource taxes are a minor base of 
support. The tax is not inconsequential for Arkansas, at least, consti­
tuting about 2 percent of total tax collections. In absolute terms, the 
Arkansas taxes produce a valuable addition to her total receipts. For 
Michigan, revenues from resource taxation represent only a "token" amount 
when considered with her diverse, richer other sources of support.
B. Policy Effectiveness of Resource Taxation 
in the Survey States
At the outset of the study, in Chapter I, three major policy 
considerations in formulating resource-tax policies were suggested: con­
servation, incentives to economical production and optimum fiscal yield.
In postulating these policy goals, it was suggested that priorities might 
be assigned which would often emphasize one or another of these objectives 
over others. For example, conservation might be considered paramount to
22See Tables J, 8 and 9j Chapter II.
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fiscal yields in the case of a scarce or critically-valuable resource 
threatened with depletion. This section will be devoted to a considera­
tion of the degree of success in the ostensible policy emphases for the 
various resource-tax applications. The manner of approach will be to 
consider each type of resource in turn, and to examine the results in 
each state apparent in each industry. Especial stress will be placed 
upon timber, as this area appears to have been subject to the earliest 
and most intensive policy-directed tax programs.
Timber and Forest Products. Both Louisiana and Michigan have 
erected timber-tax structures embodying the yield-tax principle, with 
attendant concessions to the special tax status of standing-timber tracts. 
Michigan, with her private and commercial forest reserves laws providing 
relief from annual property-tax collections, has sought to stimulate re­
forestation and renewed productivity fcir lands previously cut over, and 
to reduce the rate of abandonment of tax-delinquent former forest land. 
Louisiana, with her reforestation contracts and mandatory forest classi­
fication law, has sought to encourage managed reforestation and to pro­
vide for only minimal burdens from the property tax, respectively. At 
the same time, Arkansas and Texas have provided no similar yield-tax bene­
fits for timber, though forestry services are supported in other ways, 
with research and assistance programs for forest owners and development. 
Arkansas, for example, returns all forest-severance revenues to the agen­
cies dealing with forest research and assistance.
How well have the special, incentive-based tax programs worked? 
The evidence is, at most, inconclusive. Total acreage listed under Michi­
gan1 s commercial forest reserve classification, as has been noted, consti­
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tutes only a very small fraction of the total forest land held by private 
owners. Michigan's is a "voluntary" program of classification, and 
apparently timber owners have not rushed to avail themselves of its bene­
fits. During the time in which Louisiana's forest classification program 
was voluntary, a similarly-disappointing experience was noted,23 and it 
was not until classification was made mandatory in 1954 that classifica­
tion comprised a significant fraction of total forest lands. As to 
Louisiana's reforestation contracts providing restricted "in-lieu" tax 
treatment for timber, these are presently said to account for about 500 
thousand acres.24
But what of the physical gains made in forest acreage in the 
past several years? The total forest area has, indeed, been expanded 
within each of the four survey states. Qualitatively, however, the addi­
tions to the forest land in many cases are simply abandoned farmlands 
which have reverted to timber by natural reseeding, often without produc­
ing stands of sufficient density, or having less desirable species mixed 
with the more desirable ones. Cull trees present a continuing problem, 
retarding the production of marketable ones.25 A report in 1955 showed 
that Louisiana's forest lands were only about 50 percent well-stocked, 
mainly in the Southeastern region, and by i96 0, Michigan's forest lands 
were TO percent well-stocked, while in 19 6l, Arkansas1 forest lands were 
estimated at about two-thirds well-stocked.26
23R. Hayes, 0£. Cit., p. 3.
24Ibid.
25See Ch. II.
2sFindell, 0£. Cit., pp. 2,3, and Sternitzke, Ojd. Cit. , p. 4.
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With reference to forest management and active maintenance of 
good forestry practices, the most abundantly-clear feature is the spotty 
record of farm owners and individuals not connected with the wood-using 
industries. The Michigan study27 noted that Michigan led the nation in 
replanting of forest acreage in 1957* with over 1 .2 million acres re­
planted between 1935 an(l 1957? hut of this total JO percent of the plant­
ings occurred on publicly-owned lands, although this classification 
accounted for only about 28 percent of the total ownership acreage. 28 In 
Arkansas, the 1961 report noted that the recent gains in desirable species, 
especially softwoods, were "largely on public and industrially-owned 
tracts." 29 In East Texas forests, the chronic problem area for forest 
management and quality of stands has been the Northeastern region, which 
is largely populated by farm woodlots and small tracts held by non-indus­
trial owners. 30 Perhaps the most general defection is among the absentee 
owners and other individuals not connected with the wood-using industries, 
with practices of farm owners varying from good silviculture to none at 
all.
The record of policy success, with special reference to conser­
vation and promotion of forest management, appears to have been something 
less than complete, with the most encouraging results from industrially-
^Findell, 0£. Cit.
2aIbid., p . 8 .
29Sternitzke, 0£. Cit., p. 1.
30"Forests of East Texas", p. 6 .
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owned tracts, and the most dismal from the private, nonassociated owners.
A hopeful sign of some policy success may be deduced from the condition 
in Michigan, an area which had been victimized by shortsighted cutting 
practices until the mid-1930's. Michigan shows a substantial involve­
ment in new plantings entailing a high percentage in seedlings and sap­
lings among the growing stock. 31 This suggests that Michigan, in the 
1950's, had commenced to lay the basis for poletimber and sawtimber vol­
ume consistent with a balanced-yield potential, something which she did 
not have at that time. 32
The property-tax situation in the states of Arkansas and Texas 
is due some very prompt attention. The increasing population, and the 
expansion of competing uses for land which it entails, may threaten 
forest areas in those states, and the existence of no "shelter" from the 
regular ad valorem property tax may contribute materially to the threat.
It cannot be assumed that historically-low assessments for forest lands 
will be continued indefinitely in the face of the expansion of urban pop­
ulations into these areas, accompanied by factories, residential-land 
expansions, and other improvements which may tend to raise assessment 
ratios. The long market period for forest products, particularly from 
those tracts characterized by substantial immature stands, mitigates 
against the owner's ability to sustain the burden of high assessments and 
annual collection. It would appear then, that Texas' and Arkansas' timber
slFindell, Op. Git., pp. 9"1^*
32Ibid.
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industries are headed for trouble unless some yield-tax or other modifi­
cation of the property tax is executed within the near future.
Minerals and Other Resources. For the most part, the policy 
applications to minerals taxation appear to have been designed to meet 
requirements for orderly production with minimum repressive effects, and 
in some cases to produce substantial public revenues, as well. Perhaps 
it is not so much the taxes themselves, but the absence of taxes which 
describes policy applications in many cases. For example, the applica­
tion of petroleum and natural gas severance tax rates differs substan­
tially for the states of Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas compared to that 
levied by Michigan on the same industry. The rates for Michigan's oil 
and gas industry are substantially lower, effectively, than those applied 
in the other three states. 33 This may be partly explained by the minor 
role played by the petroleum industry in Michigan, as compared to the 
other three states, however, and may be a public-policy consequence of a. 
desire for continued well-being and expansion. Reference has previously 
been made to the fact that Michigan does not levy a severance tax on its 
metallic-minerals industry (Ch. IV), and to the concessions that she makes 
relative to the property tax on metallic-minerals values (Ch. I, pp.10,ll). 
These concessions appear to reflect the concern of public policy for the 
industry's ability to compete with adjacent states' metallic industries, 
and with Canadian competition in this area. 34
33Given a price of crude oil of, say, $5*00 per barrel, a tax 
of 18 cents amounts to 6 percent; a 26-cent tax would amount to 8 .6  per­
cent (Louisiana's rates); Texas taxes oil at 4.6 percent of value,* Arkan­
sas at 5 percent; and Michigan at 2 percent.
34See Gronouski, 0£. Cit., pp. j553“57j in which competitive 
pressures are detailed.
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In similar fashion, Texas does not levy severance taxes over 
the entire group of her minerals industries, nor on forest industries. 
Instead, she concentrates her efforts upon the petroleum products and 
sulfur (see Ch. IV). Whether this limited application of taxes is pro­
ductive, from a policy standpoint, of more efficient production and lar­
ger total economic benefits, is unclear. It may be that Texas simply 
considers the application of severance taxation to presently-untaxed 
areas productive of insufficient potential revenues to make it worth­
while, considering the administrative burdens.
The taxation of fisheries by Louisiana appears to reflect a 
means of internally-generated finances for services to this industry, and 
seems to work no extreme hardship on the taxpayers, while aiding in assur­
ing the perpetuation of the industry. Texas apparently has utilized fees, 
licenses and other assessments rather than severance taxes to accomplish 
her public-policy goals in this resource area, as do Arkansas and Michi­
gan. The small scale of the fisheries industry in Arkansas does not 
appear likely to yield revenues of any consequence, and special taxes may 
operate to discourage marginal operations to the extent as to erode the 
tax base. For Texas and Michigan, it appears a matter of choice as to 
which application, taxes or fees and licenses, is most productive of de­
sired results, and both have apparently chosen the latter course.
Summary. As indicated previously, the critical policy applica­
tion of resource taxation appears to have been historically devoted to 
timber and forest products, conservation having been among the earliest 
concerns associated with tax measures in this area. Policy for other 
resources appears to have been a pragmatic balance between revenue poten­
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tial and orderly conduct of the enterprises, without wasteful exploitation. 
More than taxation policies, it still appears that the principal problem 
of conservation is the finding of the most economically-sound methods for 
exploitation of the mineral resources; in the case of petroleum and nat­
ural gas, the dilemma of the "rule of capture" (see Ch. I) and the appar- 
ently-wasteful and contradictory practice of "prorationing", wherein 
neither the geologically-optimum nor economically-optimum rate of recov­
eries seems to be served. 35 This problem should be subjected to disinter­
ested and dispassionate study toward a satisfactory solution, perhaps 
along the lines suggested by Davidson. 36
C. Suggestions for Modifying Resource Taxation
The discussions just concluded have examined the fiscal signi­
ficance and policy result of resource taxation in the survey states. Now, 
some attention will be given to suggestions for changes in the taxes which 
will be directed at improving one or both of the above results. No 
attempt will be made to overhaul the entire structure of resource taxes 
in any of the states, but rather suggestions will be made for improving 
the coverage and policy effectiveness within the present framework of the 
existing structure in each case.
Timber Taxes. Apart from the rather obvious suggestion that the 
states of Arkansas and Texas should give high priority to the development 
of a system of yield-tax levies for their forest industries, in advance of
35Davidson, 0£. Cit. (See Ch. I, pp. 17-23).
36lbid.
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hardships which are likely to accrue to timber owners as assessments are 
raised, a number of general observations of possible improvements in both 
severance and yield tax systems present themselves. As suggested in the 
previous discussion, the degree of success in conservation and management 
improvements in those states levying special taxes for forest owners has 
been somewhat limited. In all the states, the private, non-industry- 
associated owners comprise the problem group. Louisiana's success in 
gaining private participation in forestry programs seems to date from her 
imposition of mandatory classification requirements for forest lands, as 
previously suggested. Based on this development, perhaps it is fair to 
say that the "voluntary" character of Michigan's private and commercial 
forest reserve laws has contributed to the low incidence of participation, 
and the restrictive aspects of the language in the acts37 may have dis­
couraged numbers of owners who might have otherwise participated.
To improve the effectiveness of Michigan's timber-tax laws, a 
first suggestion would be to liberalize the requirement for maintaining 
forest lands in the reserve, to permit other uses of the land not incom­
patible with forestry (hunting is already permitted), such as for recrea­
tional and camping use, along with limited grazing. The recognition of 
mixed-forestry activity, already partially recognized for "selectively- 
logged" tracts, and the allowance of either tax-free or reduced-rate 
taxing of necessary cutting for optimum stand density would also be help­
ful. 38 Perhaps as much as anything else, Michigan needs a general timber-
37See Ch. I for examples of restrictions which have been, or are
currently applied.
3BSee Ch. III.
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severance tax, applied to those lands outside the commercial and private 
reserves, and approaching the rates of the present stumpage levies for 
reserved lands, to remove any tax advantage in cutting on such lands.
These measures would work toward increasing the listings under both pri­
vate and commercial reserves.
A general incentive to participation in forest-improvement pro­
grams in all the states might embody rewards for new plantings and for 
active silviculture programs by private owners. Such a program might 
include, in addition to reduced prices for seedlings for replanting (al­
ready available in Michigan), a partial remission of severance taxes 
otherwise due, on proof of replanting, or in cases of removal of trees 
adjudged consistent with a stand-improvement program (such as the thin­
ning of trees for maximum growth, or removal of less-desirable species 
from a managed tract). This remission might be as little as ten percent 
of taxes otherwise due, or perhaps as much as fifty percent or more. A 
sliding scale, based on the extent of forestry improvement, might be most 
productive if its administration is feasible. 39 Although such a program 
is almost certain to reduce tax revenues initially, the improvements aris­
ing as a result may very possibly cause more abundant revenues within a 
decade or two, and would aid in assuring the continuation of yields. Co­
incidentally, the volume and value of forest products would improve, and 
this might bring substantially more benefits than any taxes foregone in 
the short run.
39Some of the burden of verification might be eased by utilizing 
county agricultural agents, local sheriffs or other officials as inspec­
tors, within the limitations imposed by lack of technical knowledge.
162
The fact that Texas and Arkansas have no present basis for dif­
ferentiating between timberland and other properties for property-tax 
purposes may become a real problem soon, as suggested above. With this 
factor in mind, it may be considered wise to adopt some measure of modi­
fication of the property tax to recognize the special character of forest 
lands. Possibly a fixed valuation such as that applicable to Louisiana's 
classified forest land (see Ch. Ill) would be sufficient, or "freezing" 
the assessments at their present relatively-low levels in most areas may 
be desirable. If this is not adequate or feasible, then some application 
of the "in-lieu", yield-tax principle may be necessary. With her tradi­
tionally rural character, Arkansas's property taxes have been generally 
lower in farm and forest areas than in urban or mixed areas, but the days 
of this practice are definitely numbered, with the case of Northern Lower 
Michigan providing an indication of what may be in store for her as pop­
ulation density increases. Similar results may be forecast for East Texas.
If it appears that the modifications suggested for timber taxa­
tion tend to be dilutive of the tax base and yield, as indeed they may 
be, it may be well to remember that forestry will be, and to a consider­
able extent already is, an industry which has a minimal application of 
the "free gift of nature" argument for taxation. 40 Most forest holdings 
now are not virgin stands, but the result of second-growth and even third-' 
growth regeneration. To a considerable degree, replacement growth has 
been the result of the forest-owner's initiative. This is especially true
4°Marquis ("Severance Taxes on Forest Products") suggests a 
"..loss of force..to ....this (free-gift) argument" when the development 
effort is considered (p. 317)■
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when a balanced forest results from careful management and good forestry 
methods. To this extent, the forest owner is a partner of nature, and 
should not be taxed as if he received only a windfall gain from her 
bounty. Especially the incentive-based reductions of severance taxes 
suggested above would offer recognition and reward for good forestry.
Other Resource Taxes. In the changes recommended for other 
resource taxes, the emphasis is primarily on means of either improving 
fiscal yields, or in providing more equitable tax treatment for the re­
source owners. Some recommendations also will be made for enlarging the 
coverage, especially that of the severance tax.
Petroleum and natural gas products taxation occupies the domi­
nant position in the severance-tax structures of all the survey states, 
and represents Michigan's only "pure" severance tax. Rates on severance 
taxes are varied as to basis and rates of application; Louisiana uses a 
specific (measure) basis for the taxation of petroleum products, while 
the other states use ad valorem bases. This writer tends to lean toward 
the ad valorem rate application as more immune to comprimise through price 
inflation or, alternatively, imposing hardships on producers during de­
flation of prices received. For example, the present rates applied to 
petroleum products in Louisiana were enacted in 19^ -8, and since that time, 
the price of, especially crude petroleum, has increased substantially, in 
effect reducing the rates of taxation paid by Louisiana's petroleum pro­
ducers. Further, a percentage-rate scale would maintain yields on a par 
with other features of the general price level, with dollar amounts tied 
to prices received by the industry. Of course, the argument might be made 
that declining prices would cut tax yields with falling prices, but it
16k
should be apparent that recession conditions would have reduced produc­
tion-tied revenues in this case, anyway. Similar percentage rates might 
readily be applied to other mineral categories for all states without 
increasing (in fact, in many cases reducing) the administrative burden.
As previously indicated Michigan's 2 percent levy against oil 
and natural gas products is the lowest effective rate against resource 
products in the mineral-fuels category among the survey states. Con­
sidering the very potent capacity of the petroleum industry for forward- 
shifting of tax burdens, (see Ch. V), it would appear that the levy is 
based on needlessly-low rates. However, without data on the comparative 
costs of production and technical problems, arbitrarily suggesting new, 
higher rates would be presumptive. Still, the matter would appear de­
serving of study.
Another observation is quite evident in Michigan1s taxation of 
resources through severance-tax measures: the fact that most of her nat-
ural-resources industries "ride free"; that is, they are not subject to 
severance taxes. This, it would seem, is inequitable and unfairly dis­
criminate ly against the oil and natural-gas producers, as well as consti­
tuting omission of potential tax sources whose taxation has been success­
fully undertaken in other states. Therefore, it is suggested that a 
generalizing of severance taxes might well be studied, with possible ap­
plication either of the taxes currently applied to oil and gas, or a 
separate schedule of rates, to such industries as the metallic minerals, 
cement, sand and gravel, peat and such other areas as appears appropriate. 
Similarly, the levies of the State of Texas might also be generalized to 
include more of her minerals industries.
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If the "free gift of nature" argument has any credibility at 
all, it is certainly applicable to the case of minerals-resource indus­
tries, wherein a portion of the value received is due in no measure to 
the effort expended in developing the properties, but rather to the acci­
dent of nature which caused the owner to command the wealth buried in the
soil or waters under his control. Society has a stake in these resources,
and their taxation is consistent with the public interest, and perhaps 
even incumbent upon government, if the social value of this natural wealth
is to have the general benefits which it should yield. The issue, then,
would appear to be not whether the resource-exploitation should be taxed, 
but the degree of taxation needed to assure society's claim, without the 
confiscation of that part of value attaching to the enterprise of the 
developer.
D. General Summary
As a climax to the study of resource taxation in the states of 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan and Texas, this chapter has sought to pro­
duce some keener insight into the importance of natural-resources indus­
tries to the fiscal support of their respective states; the policy appli­
cations in resource taxation, and their apparent success or failure; and, 
finally, to offer some general recommendations for the improved operation 
of resource' taxation. Efforts have been made to describe the successful 
aspects of operation, and to point out some apparent shortcomings. For­
estry taxation historically has been, and continues to be, a real problem 
area in taxation, as is apparent from the volume of study devoted to means 
of coping with the taxation of forest properties. The ideal tax for
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forest lands and products has not been found, and still defies solution.
If some light has been shed on this problem by this study, then that alone 
may serve to justify it.
Other resource taxes and the problems surrounding them appear 
to be less subject to general classification, rather being unique in each 
case to the state or region (or industry) in which they are situated.
Some resources are common to all the survey states; others are unique in 
their own areas (e.g., sulfur in Louisiana and Texas; bauxite in Arkansas; 
peat, copper and iron ore of commercial quality in Michigan). Whether 
common or unique, the taxation of these resources is subject to very defi­
nite conditions of markets, abundance of reserves, political makeup of 
the state, nature of competition, and other considerations which have a 
bearing upon the manner in which resource taxation is applied. For these 
reasons, it should come as no great surprise that tax structures have 
developed quite differently among the states.
The discussion just ended, it is hoped, has placed some of these 
differences in perspective, and has concentrated on problem-solving fol­
lowing the policy benchmarks of conservation, incentives to efficient 
production, and optimum fiscal yield in the public interest. With the 
seeking of answers to some problems, others are made more apparent, and 
the cycle may be expected to go on indefinitely. In the pursuit of know­
ledge, our appreciation of problems is heightened and expanded, so that 
more questions are raised than answered. That is the price of inquiry, 
and a price which the seeker of knowledge must be willing, even eager to 
pay. Others who wish to pursue this fascinating area of resource taxation 
will find abundant rewards for their pains.
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